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Many Islamic countries propose legitimising the death penalty using theological and secular 
political reasoning. They argue that the punishment is privileged within a conception of 
theocracy expressed through state sovereignty and/or it is an efficacious criminal justice policy 
for punishing those who commit the ‘most serious crimes’. This study argues that such 
justifications are misguided, and that the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) provides a cogent mechanism to provide a clearer perspective on the legitimacy 
of the death penalty within Islam.    
To investigate the claims of the erroneous theological reasoning for the death penalty, the 
present study uses the UPR as a methodological lens from which to scrutinise Islamic Member 
State reasons for the use of the punishment. The UPR is an innovative mechanism for the peer-
review of the human rights record of all 193 UN Member States, and this includes the human 
rights implications for implementing the death penalty within Islam. The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan are presented as two case studies, and the work considers whether the 
sovereign state discourses for maintaining the death penalty are compatible with international 
human rights standards. 
The foundational assessment of this UN mechanism for assessing the Islamic use of the death 
penalty is then followed by an exegesis of Islamic law and presents findings on the legitimacy 
of Islamic state propositions for maintaining the death penalty, based on theological 
interpretations. It identifies a more enlightened reading of Islamic jurisprudence to provide 
cogent reasons for the prominence of the right to life over the Islamic Member State claims to 
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1.1 General Theme of Enquiry  
At least 993 executions occurred in 2017 of which 84% took place in just four countries: Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan.1 
Islamic nations are amongst the world’s top executioners, often laying blame at the doorstep 
of religion by citing the application of ‘sharīʿa law’.2 This study challenges the religious 
underpinnings to maintain the death penalty and tackles the two main theories used to 
legitimise the punishment, sovereignty and criminal justice. It does this by scrutinising Islamic 
Member States’ justification for the use of the death penalty in the Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR). The UPR is an innovative mechanism of the United Nation’s Human Rights Council 
established in 2006 which reviews the human rights records of all UN Member States. Each 
UPR cycle runs for a period of four and a half years.3 
Under the UPR, countries that apply the death penalty justify its application by claiming that 
the punishment does not violate international standards on the right to life, under Article 6 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and that it does not constitute 
inhuman punishment in violation of Article 7 ICCPR. These arguments are generally aimed at 
                                                          
1 Amnesty International, Global Report: Death Sentences and Executions 2017 (2018) 5. 
2 Although the word sharīʿa is commonly accepted as representing the Islamic legal system, it must be noted that 
the sharīʿa encompasses both the legal and non-legal aspects of a Muslim’s life, individually and communally. 
Hence, the term Islamic law is preferred by the author, but it has been used interchangeably with sharīʿa law in 
this thesis, owing to the latter’s recurrence in the constitution of Islamic states and their UPR reports. Norman 
Calder and MB Hooker explain, ‘[w]ithin Muslim discourse, sharīʿa designates the rules and regulations 
governing the lives of Muslims, derived in principal from the Ḳurʾān and ḥadīth…The academic discipline 
whereby scholars described and explored the sharīʿa is called fikh. The word designates a human activity, and 
cannot be ascribed to God or (usually) the Prophet... The sharīʿa, contained in God’s revelation (Ḳurʾān and 
ḥadīth), is explained and elaborated by the interpretative activity of scholars, masters of fiḳh, the fuḳahāʾ. Since 
this is in practice the only access to the law, the two words are sometimes used synonymously, though sharīʿa 
retains the connotation of divine, and fiḳh that of human.’ See Norman Calder and MB Hooker, ‘Sharīʿa’ in 
Encyclopaedia of Islam: Second Edition available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1040> 
accessed 8 November 2015. 
3 UNGA Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) UN DOC A/Res/60/251.  
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demonstrating either that the punishment is a legitimate expression of state sovereignty, and/or 
it is an effective administration of criminal justice.   
The background to the research is that there is currently a significant challenge to the hitherto 
normative religious application of Islamic law to facilitate the application of the death penalty. 
It is important to note that the authority of the sharīʿa is not being challenged, but what is the 
focus of this study is the theological interpretation which allows for a large scope of capital 
crimes and the regularity of its application in various contexts. This research engages with the 
interpretive tensions within Islamic law, and contributes to the debates, through the lens of the 
UPR. This is the first such study of the subject matter. It attempts to provide a critical 
framework for all the actors involved in the peer-review mechanism to engage with this 
discourse within the UPR and international human rights discussions more generally.  
1.2 Lacunae in Current Analysis 
This study has developed due to the paucity in the research on Islam and the death penalty 
within the discourse of international human rights law.  Although there has been a wide range 
of scholarly enquiry into the parameters of Islamic law or international human rights law, there 
have been fewer interdisciplinary analyses that combine the two.4 Specifically, there is no 
scholarship on placing this theoretical enquiry within the context of the Universal Periodic 
Review. Scholarship in this area is clearly lacking and it is the aim of this research to address 
this gap. 
Currently, there have only been three book-length publications which deal specifically with the 
Universal Periodic Review. The first is the monograph of Purna Sen which provides a general 
                                                          
4 Mashood A Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: OUP 2003); Andreas Th Müller 
and Marie-Luisa Frick (eds), Islam and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of 
Perspectives (Leiden: Brill 2013); Anver M Emon, Mark S Ellis, and Benjamin Glahn (eds), Islamic Law and 
International Human Rights Law: Searching for Common Ground? (Oxford: OUP 2015). 
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overview of the mechanisms of the UPR and what has been understood from states undergoing 
the review process and lessons from the interactive dialogues in Geneva. However, Sen makes 
it clear that the publication is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the UPR or 
to review the workings of the Human Rights Council.5  
The second text is an edited collection by Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, Human 
Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism, which provides a detailed 
analysis of the UPR and its ability to influence states’ behaviour by drawing upon a collection 
of socio-legal scholarship.6 The third text by James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan, The 
Universal Periodic Review of Southeast Asia: Civil Society Perspectives,7 has a chapter 
dedicated to ‘The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Southeast Asia: The Arduous March 
Forward’.8 Neither publication specifically engages with the Islamic use of the death penalty. 
Similarly, all available academic articles on the UPR have been consulted but there is 
insufficient engagement with the death penalty within such a context.9 
                                                          
5 Purna Sen, Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights: Towards Best Practice (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2009); Purna Sen, Universal Periodic Review: Lessons, Hopes and Expectations (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat 2011).  
6 Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and 
Ritualism (Cambridge: CUP 2015). 
7 James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan (eds), The Universal Periodic Review of Southeast Asia: Civil Society 
Perspectives (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan 2017). 
8 M Ravi, ‘The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Southeast Asia: The Arduous March Forward’ in James Gomez 
and Robin Ramcharan (eds), The Universal Periodic Review of Southeast Asia: Civil Society Perspectives 
(Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 77-96. 
9 See eg, Felice D Gaer, ‘A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System’ 
(2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 113-114; Nico Schrijver, ‘The UN Human Rights Council: A New 
“Society of the Committed” or Just Old Wine in New Bottles’ (2007) 20(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 
812; Elvira D Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of 
the First Session’ (2008) 7(3) Chinese Journal of International Law 721-34; Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, ‘Of 
Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 4; Emma Hickey, ‘The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it 
Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights Situation on the Ground? A Critical Evaluation of the First Cycle 
and Recommendations for Reform’ (2011) 7 ICL Journal 4; Alex Conte, ‘Reflections and Challenges: Entering 
into the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism’ (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of 




There is a wide range of scholarly literature on Islamic criminal law which will inform the 
research. Of particular relevance is the work of ʿ Abd al-Qādir ʿ Awdah,10 M Cherif Bassiouni,11 
Mohamed S El-Awa,12 Khaled Abou El Fadl,13 Rudolph Peters,14 and Intisar A Rabb.15 Within 
the parameters of Islam and capital punishment, there is limited information available in the 
English language and most publications concentrate on Islamic criminal law as a whole rather 
than a specific focus on the right to life.16 This work widens the approach of the existing 
scholarship to expand the horizon of human rights knowledge and demonstrate how it applies 
to Islam and the death penalty. It aims to provide cogent symmetries between the right to life 
in Islamic law and international human rights law by identifying shared values between the 
systems, viewing them as complementary norms as opposed to competing norms. It is hoped 
that the UPR can act as a forum for such discussions.  
1.3 Scope: Defining an Islamic State 
This research provides two case studies to illustrate the position of Islamic countries on the 
death penalty, followed by a theological review of the prima facie capital offences in Islamic 
law. The author is aware of the dangers of broad generalisations in using the term ‘Islamic’ as 
there is not a homogenous expression of the religion, and so specific characteristics concerning 
criminal justice will be identified and explored. For the purposes of this study, an Islamic state 
                                                          
10 ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAwdah, al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī: Muqāranā bi-l-Qānūn al-Waḍʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-
ʿArabī, n.d.). 
11 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Death as a penalty in the Sharia’ in Peter Hodgkinson and William A Schabas (eds), 
Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition (Cambridge: CUP 2004); ‘Crimes and the Criminal Process’ (1997) 
12(3) Arab Law Quarterly 277; ‘Leaving Islam is Not a Capital Crime’ Chicago Tribune (Chicago, 2 April 2006) 
<www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2006-04-02-0604020336-story.html>; Bassiouni (ed), The Islamic 
Criminal Justice System (London: Oceana Publications 1982).  
12 Mohamed S El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law (Plainfield: American Trust Publications 1993). 
13 See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: CUP 2001); Reasoning with 
God: Reclaiming Shari'ah in the Modern Age (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2014); Speaking in God's Name: 
Islamic Law, Authority and Women (London: Oneworld Publications 2014). 
14 Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-
first Century (Cambridge: CUP 2005). 
15 Intisar A Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law 
(New York: CUP 2015). 




is that which: (1) belongs to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); and (2) 
incorporates Islamic law within its legislative framework, particularly its criminal justice 
system.  
The OIC was established in 1969 and Ioanna Cismas observes that it is the ‘sole inter-
governmental actor to display religious contours’17 of Islamic states and provide an interpretive 
role of human rights in the context of Islam. The organisation describes itself as ‘the collective 
voice of the Muslim world’18 and at the time of writing has 57 Member States.19 Its religious 
overtones can be seen in the OIC Charter of 1972 which identifies that common belief is ‘a 
strong factor for rapprochement and solidarity among Islamic people’.20 This continues in the 
revised Charter of 2008 which begins symbolically in the name of God and affirms that ‘the 
objectives of the Charter are to be pursued in accordance to the noble Islamic teachings and 
values’.21  
Nevertheless, the performance of the OIC’s role is complicated by the rich diversity of its 
membership. Countries may follow either the sunnī or shīʿa branches of Islam and both 
denominations are further categorised into different schools of legal thought. Furthermore, 
Member States have Islamic law as the source of their legislation to varying degrees. In some 
states it may constitute the sole source of legislation (Iran,22 Saudi Arabia23) whilst in others it 
                                                          
17 Ioana Cismas, Religious Actors and International Law (Oxford: OUP 2014) 239.  
18 ‘History of the OIC’ <www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en> accessed 2 May 2016. 
19 The Member States of the OIC (as listed on the Organisation’s website in May 2017) are: Afghanistan, Albania, 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. See <www.oic-oci.org/states/?lan=en> accessed 2 May 2017.  
20 Charter of the Islamic Conference (1972), preamble (emphasis added). 
21 OIC Charter (2008), art 2. 
22 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, art 2. 




may form an important but not exclusive source (Egypt,24 Jordan25) or not a source of law at 
all (Albania,26 Tajikistan,27 Turkey28). Other states may have Islam as the state religion29 
(Malaysia,30 Morocco31). 
The shīʿa Islamic Republic of Iran has the highest execution rates in the Muslim world, a 
country responsible for at least 507 executions in 2017;32 however, this study is restricted to 
the sunnī branch of Islam. A review of shīʿa Islam is beyond the scope of this work as it is a 
separate discipline in its own right due to the different theological framework and doctrinal 
schools that exist within its legal tradition.  
This study is therefore limited to the four sunnī doctrinal schools (madhāhib) known as the 
Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Shāfiʿī, and Mālikī schools, all of which were named after their eponyms.33 
Reference is also made to the extinct Ẓahirī school where appropriate.34 The two case studies 
chosen are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which follows the Ḥanbalī school,35 and Sudan, 
which follows the Mālikī school.36 The author uses these two countries to provide examples of 
Islamic Member State engagement with the UPR and analyse the question of the death penalty 
in the review. 
                                                          
24 The Egyptian Constitution 2014, art 2. 
25 The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 1952, arts 98 and 99. 
26 The Constitution of Albania, art 1. 
27 The Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan 1994, art 1. 
28 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, art 2. 
29 Cismas, Religious Actors and International Law, 243; Nisrine Abaid, Sharia, Muslim States and International 
Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative Study (London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2008) 32-58; Tad Stahnke and Robert C Blitt, ‘The Religion-State Relationship and the Right 
to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim 
Countries’ (2005) 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 947, 958–961. 
30 The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, art 3. 
31 The Constitution of Morocco, art 3. 
32 Amnesty International, Global Report: Death Sentences and Executions 2017 (2018) 6. 
33 See Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law: 9th-10th Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill 
1997). 
34 ibid. 
35 Jacques Waardenburg, Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspectives (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2002) 
233. 
36 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan (Abingdon: Routledge 2008) 5. 
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1.4 Methodology  
The method employed for collating information for this study has been through the use of 
library-based research. Both primary and secondary literature, particularly specialist Islamic 
texts in English and Arabic, have been utilised to gain a comprehensive insight into the area of 
this study.  
The study analyses the legitimacy of justifications for the continued use of the death penalty 
by Islamic states within the opportunities provided for scrutiny and review under the UPR. This 
is undertaken through an analysis of the UPR’s online repository in relation to the two countries 
chosen for the purposes of this research. Under the UPR process, the documents which form 
the basis of a state’s review consist of a national report submitted by the state under review, 
the stakeholder report, and a report by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
(OHCHR).37  
To interpret the legal and political framework, existing literature on the UN Human Rights 
Council, such as the work of Rosa Freedman,38 Philip Alston,39 and M Cherif Bassiuoni,40 has 
been consulted. Scholarly review of the effectiveness of the UPR is used as a framework to 
analyse the specific research question on Islam and the death penalty.  
                                                          
37 The reports can be found on the OHCHR website: <www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx>. 
38 Rosa Freedman, ‘Improvement on the Commission? The UN Human Rights Council’s inaction on Darfur’ 
(2010) 16 UC Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 81; ‘New Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council’ 
(2011) 29(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 289; ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of 
the Same?’ (2013) 31(2) Wisconsin International Law Journal 209; The United Nations Human Rights Council: 
A Critique and Early Assessment (New York: Routledge 2013); Failing to Protect? The UN and the Politicisation 
of Human Rights (London: Hurst 2014). 
39 Philip Alston, ‘Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Promoting the Accountability of Members of the New Human 
Rights Council,’ (2005-2006) 15 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 49; ‘Reconceiving the UN Human 
Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human Rights Council’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 186. 
40 William A Schabas and M Cherif Bassiouni (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What 




The legal and political information this study generates is used to look at the extent to which 
Islamic countries disregard enquiry into their application of the death penalty. The two general 
rejections put forth by retentionist states are that the death penalty is not a human rights 
question, but it is an appropriate manifestation of state sovereignty and a question of domestic 
criminal justice.41 The study therefore examines the extent to which these two political claims 
act as bulwarks against adopting UPR recommendations which call for the restriction and/or 
abolition of the death penalty in Islamic countries. The leading text on the international legal 
framework on the death penalty by William Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
International Law,42 and the leading criminological text on the death penalty, The Death 
Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective,43 authored by Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle are of 
particular importance for setting out the international framework for which to view and analyse 
the question of the death penalty in Islam. 
This is followed by a jurisprudential analysis of the death penalty in Islamic law. An inductive 
approach is taken in that the four doctrinal schools are reviewed in order to consider to what 
extent one school over the other can promote mercy and peace, in the context of the death 
penalty, or whether a more sophisticated application of some schools over others is required. 
It is through this analysis that a new theological interpretation is offered for elevating mercy 
over retribution to help diminish the use of the death penalty in Islam. This study considers 
arguments for the non-application of the death penalty which come from within the Islamic 
jurisprudential tradition. In doing so, it adopts an eclectic approach which draws upon 
principles from each of the schools that preserve the right to life. 
                                                          
41 William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd edn, Cambridge: CUP 2002). 
42 ibid. 
43 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (5th edn, Oxford: OUP 2015). 
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It should be noted that the prominence of the discussions on Islam and the death penalty is 
around the right to life which reflects the discussions at the UPR. The death penalty also 
involves significant questions under Article 7 of the ICCPR (prohibition of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and therefore it is mentioned where 
appropriate to do so; however, for the purposes of this study the main focus is on the right to 
life. 
1.4.1 Insider/Outsider Perspective 
The researcher of this study identifies as a Muslim and acknowledges that writing from an 
insider perspective generally presupposes that the writer must lack objectivity. However, W 
Montgomery Watt (d. 2006) writes:  
Normally a person can only reach important levels of religious experience through 
participating in the life of the community in which he has been brought up and 
basing his activity on its ideas. There are exceptions, but this is the normal case. It 
is not easy for a person brought up in a Christian environment to appreciate the 
religious ideas of Islam, far less to make them the basis of a satisfactory life. The 
same is true for the Muslim with Christian ideas. This means that it is Christian 
ideas which give the Christian the best chance of attaining a richer and deeper 
experience, and likewise Muslim ideas the Muslim.44 
Hence, the position of this researcher is one of self-disclosure and transparency. This researcher 
brings an Islamic religious experience to provide an appropriate lens for which to interpret how 
this punishment is applied within the UPR by Islamic authorities. 
 
                                                          
44 W Montgomery Watt, Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’an (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1970) 182. 
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1.4.2 Research Questions 
The research questions will consider: 
• To what extent is the UPR effective for scrutinising the death penalty as a punishment? 
• To what extent has Saudi Arabia and Sudan’s use of the death penalty been 
appropriately scrutinised in the UPR and to what extent do they accept or reject the 
recommendations? 
• To what extent is the death penalty a religious necessity in Islam? 
1.4.3 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 1 of this thesis sets out the research questions, methodology, and scope. The thesis is 
then divided into two parts. Part One consists of three chapters and focuses on Islam and the 
death penalty within the UPR. Chapter 2 serves as an introductory chapter which sets out the 
UN framework in which this thesis is situated. It discusses the history of the UPR, its 
modalities, and how it functions in the context of Islamic states. The chapter then explores 
Islamic Member State interaction with the question of the death penalty, beginning with these 
states’ perspectives of the drafting of international human rights instruments through to their 
participation in the UPR. Chapters 3 and 4 present the two case studies: The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan. Both states’ UPR cycles are reviewed through an analysis of the relevant 
UPR documentation (the national report, stakeholder report, OHCHR report, and the Working 
Group report which documents proceedings from the interactive dialogue in Geneva). 
Part Two, consisting of two chapters, contributes to an enhanced understanding of human 
dignity in Islam by analysing the classical jurisprudence on the death penalty and its application 
today. Islamic law adopts three categories of crime: ḥudūd (doctrinal offences), qiṣāṣ 
(retributive offences), and taʿzīr (discretionary offences). Chapter 5 deals with those ḥudūd 
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crimes that are punishable by death such as adultery and apostasy whilst Chapter 6 considers 
death penalty offences that fall within the latter two categories of qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr. 
Finally, Chapter 7 addresses the research questions, draws upon the preceding chapters, issues 
recommendations, and deals with limitations and future research. 
1.5 A Note on Referencing and Transliteration 
For citations and punctuation, this study largely follows the Oxford Standard for Citation of 
Legal Authorities (OSCOLA). Modifications are as follows:  
• Subsequent citations of sources have been shortened using the author’s surname and a 
short form of the title. This replaces the standard n.x style of citation and full references 
in such cases can be located in the bibliography.  
• Place of publication is identified. This is particularly useful for readers wishing to 
access Arabic sources.  
• The full references of ḥadīth texts are listed in the bibliography. 
• Stakeholder submissions are cited as ‘(name of stakeholder) UPR submission’. These 
can all be located on UPR-Info’s online repository at www.upr-info.org/en/review > 
select country > select ‘civil society and other submissions’. Full links for individual 
submissions can be found in the bibliography.  
Arabic transliterations follow the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES).45 
All Arabic terms are transliterated according to their pausal forms. This is to enable non-Arabic 
speaking readers to understand how the Arabic word is written. Where ibn (‘son of’) is part of 
a longer name, the lower case ‘b.’ is used but when it is part of the popularised name by which 
                                                          
45 See <https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/> accessed 15 December 2016. 
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the individual is normally referred then Ibn is written out thus Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidīn 
or Ibn ʿĀbidīn, not Muḥammad Amīn b. ʿĀbidīn. 
Where both dates AH (After the Hijra) and CE (Common Era) are used, the first date mentioned 
is AH. The conversion of Islamic dates to the Christian calendar follows the online ‘Islamic 
Hijri Calendar For 1400 Years’ available at <https://habibur.com/hijri/>. Unless otherwise 












































CHAPTER TWO:  
THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW AND  













2. The Universal Periodic Review and the Death Penalty 
2.1 Introduction 
The Commission on Human Rights (Commission) was in operation for sixty years before it 
was dissolved and subsequently replaced by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2006.  Many 
of the issues surrounding the Commission and its reform proposals have reflected in the way 
the new HRC has developed and functions, including its creation of the Universal Periodic 
Review. Hence in order to fully appreciate the purpose of the UPR, it is important to consider 
the historical context in which it was established. 
This is an introductory chapter which sets the UN framework within which the Islamic context 
will be reviewed. The chapter itself serves two main purposes. The first is to provide a 
background and comprehensive overview of the UPR process in the context of Islamic states. 
Secondly, to provide an analysis of the role, or lack thereof, of these states in the evolution of 
the death penalty in international law and how this is reflected in the UPR.  
2.2 UPR Origins: From Commission to Council 
Article 68 of the United Nations Charter mandated the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) with creating commissions for the protection and promotion of human rights.1 
Under its mandate, ECOSOC established the Commission on Human Rights in 1946, a charter-
based subsidiary body, which was ‘entrusted with promoting respect for human rights globally, 
fostering international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in specific 
countries and assisting countries in building their human rights capacity’.2  
                                                          
1 See generally Eibe Riedel, ‘Article 68’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP 2002) 1011, 1027. 
2 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World - Our Shared Responsibility (2 




The Commission’s work was primarily based around standard setting during its first two 
decades and from 1967 onwards, ECOSOC extended the Commission’s work to promoting, 
monitoring, and implementing human rights.3 It began to investigate state-specific human 
rights violations and a complaints procedure was initiated which was accessible to all states, 
individuals, and NGOs. Twenty-nine countries were considered under this procedure, between 
1978 to 1985, however coverage was not balanced as certain states such as Iran and South 
Korea were scrutinised whilst other Arab countries and North Korea were not.4 This selective 
nature of the Commission was criticised.5 
In order to address cross-border human rights violations, the Commission created thematic 
mandates which allowed it to deal with widespread human rights abuses across a range of 
states.6 The Commission was criticised for its one-sided form of action as ‘it was the mightiest 
-  militarily, economically and politically - who ran the human rights show’.7 In other words, 
it was mainly Western countries placing developing countries under international scrutiny and 
according to the representative of Iraq, ‘it was forbidden to mention violations occurring in the 
United States and Europe’.8  
Miko Lempinen argues that selective scrutiny could be partly attributed to ‘a different 
understanding of how to address and handle human rights concerns, as well as by a different 
                                                          
3 Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment (New York: 
Routledge 2013) 15; Ladan Rahmani-Ocora, ‘Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: The UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2006) 12(1) Global Governance 15. 
4 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-85: The Question of Bias’ (1988) 32 International 
Studies Quarterly 275, 294. This procedure was largely confidential however, the Commission would publicise 
the list of countries concerning which action had been taken. Inclusion on this list was generally interpreted as 
evidence of serious violations (ibid).  
5 ibid 295. 
6 ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967) UN Doc E/4393; ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII) (27 May 1970) UN 
Doc E/4832. See Tom J Farer and Felice D Gaer, ‘The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning’ in 
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), United Nations: Divided World (2nd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1993) 279; Phillip Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: OUP 1995) 126; 
James H Lebovic and Erik Voeten, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights 
Practices in UNCHR’ (2006) 50(4) International Studies Quarterly 864.  
7 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/SR.4, para 27 (Mr Khalifa, member of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights). 




understanding of what constitutes promotion and protection of human rights, or for that matter, 
what constitutes a violation of human rights’.9 For example, during Brazil’s draft resolution on 
human rights and sexual orientation, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries 
prepared no less than 55 amendments to the draft aiming to remove any reference to sexual 
orientation. According to the representative of Pakistan, ‘the issue was not a proper subject for 
consideration by the commission’.10 
The Commission’s increasing deficiencies paved the way for its ultimate downfall. A number 
of factors have been identified which contributed to the Commission’s demise such as the 
increasing politicization of its activities;11 naming and shaming policy in country-specific 
resolutions;12 scrutiny of certain states;13 and the absence of membership criteria.14 Rosa 
Freedman has noted that, ‘the expansion of international human rights to cover ever more 
issues, coupled with the body’s increasing loss of credibility in the eyes of the states and 
observers resulted in the Commission widely being deemed to be unable to fulfil its mandate’.15 
                                                          
9 Miko Lempinen, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Different Treatment of Governments 
(Abo: Abo Akademi University Press 2005) 168. 
10 UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/SR.61, para 60. See also UN Docs E/CN.4/2003/L.106-110; Commission on Human 
Rights Decision 2003/118. 
11 In the words of Libya, the Commission had become a ‘battlefield for political debate’, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2002/SR.49, para 22. 
12 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-85: The Question of Bias’, 295; Jerome J Shestack, 
‘The Commission on Human Rights: Pitfalls, Progress and a New Maturity,’ in Seymore M Finger and Joseph R 
Harbert (eds), U.S. Policy in International Institutions: Defining Reasonable Options in an Unreasonable World 
(Boulder: Westview Press 1982). 
13 ibid. 
14 Elvira D Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the 
First Session’ (2008) 7(3) Chinese Journal of International Law 721-34; Eric Heinze, ‘Even-handedness and the 
Politics of Human Rights’ (2008) 21(7) Harvard Human Rights Journal 41. See also Philip Alston, ‘Richard Lillich 
Memorial Lecture: Promoting the Accountability of Members of the New Human Rights Council,’ (2005-2006) 
15 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 49; Tait Carney, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2007) 
8 Human Rights and UK Practice 34; Nazila Ghanea, ‘From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human 
Rights Council: One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways?’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Quarterly 
695. 
15 Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment, 17. See also Nico 
Schrijver, ‘The UN Human Rights Council: A New “Society of the Committed” or Just Old Wine in New Bottles’ 




A prime example was the case of Iran which was placed under country-specific scrutiny for 
nearly twenty years by the Commission.16 The mandate failed to be renewed after the rejection 
of draft resolution E/CN.4/2002/L.33 in 2002 with Member States criticising the Commission’s 
politicised nature. For example, Algeria observed that ‘despite widespread human rights 
violations during the Shah’s political regime, the Commission had seen fit to condemn Iran 
only since the emergence of the new republic in 1979’.17 It considered the draft resolution 
unbalanced and politically motivated.18  
Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the OIC, said that the organisation opposed selective criticism 
of some developing and Islamic countries and the Commission was being used to promote 
political objectives rather than to advance the cause of human rights in the targeted countries. 
It maintained that, ‘the promotion of human rights would not be guaranteed by the adoption of 
a politically motivated resolution, but through dialogue and cooperation’.19 Sudan echoed 
similar sentiments commenting on the selectivity that was practised against some states and 
how the resolution, ‘did not accurately reflect the recent improvements in the human rights 
situation in Iran and it made negative references to Islam’.20 
The sentiment was shared amongst non-OIC states too. Cuba voted against the draft resolution 
in an endeavour to put an end to ‘the use of double standards and politically motivated draft 
resolutions that were threatening the credibility of the Commission and emphasizing the 
division between the Powers of the north and the developing countries of the south’.21 
The most damning statement came from Iran itself in that:  
                                                          
16 For a detailed case study of Iran in the Commission, see Lempinen, The United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, 333-45. 
17 UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/SR.49, para 20. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid para 16. 
20 ibid para 24. 
21 ibid para 23. 
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The United Nations system had been taken hostage by a powerful minority that 
unsparingly exploited its mechanisms to exert pressure on certain countries. The 
system had lost all credibility and integrity.  
The promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was the 
primary objective of the United Nations and no country should be immune from 
international scrutiny. However, the existing system of monitoring human rights 
violations was selective, arbitrary, partial and unproductive. To rectify the 
discrepancies of the system in respect of its human rights machinery, and to prevent 
its abuse and manipulation, a spirit of understanding and cooperation among the 
entire membership was essential.22 
Despite its shortfalls, the Commission’s achievements cannot be understated. The conception 
and foundation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,23 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights24 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights25 (which comprise the International Bill of Human Rights26) can all be attributed to the 
workings of the Commission which played a principal role in these achievements.27  
2.3 The Introduction of the Human Rights Council  
In 2005 the United Nations General-Secretary, Kofi Annan, published a damning report 
entitled ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’.28 It 
                                                          
22 ibid paras 26-31. 
23 UNGA Res 217A (III), ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1948) UN Doc A/810 at 71. 
24 UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (16 December 1966) UN Doc 
A/6316. 
25 UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (16 December 
1966) UN Doc A/6316. 
26 See, for example, Peter Meyer, ‘The International Bill: A Brief History’ in Paul Williams (ed), The International 
Bill of Rights (California: Entwhistle Books 1981). 
27 Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment, 16.  
28 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Huma 




questioned the Commission’s credibility and professionalism with states seeking membership 
for the promotion of self-interests as opposed to the protection and promotion of human 
rights.29 This credibility deficit had ‘cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations 
system as a whole’,30 so Annan called for the disbanding of the Commission, arguing that: 
If the United Nations is to meet the expectations of men and women everywhere - 
and indeed, if the Organization is to take the cause of human rights as seriously as 
those of security and development - then Member States should agree to replace 
the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights 
Council.31 
Anan’s report advocated for a new body on human rights and was met with general support by 
states and organisations.32 Although there was a broad consensus that the Commission failed 
in its duty and there was a need for a new body to strengthen UN human rights, it was masked 
by grave disagreements about what had actually gone wrong. So, after a series of negotiations 
on the composition, functions, and procedures of the new Human Rights Council, the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 60/251 on 15 March 2006.33 The final text of the Resolution, 
however, only determined basic structural issues, such as election of members and composition 
and issued broad guidelines in respect to the institutional and procedural arrangements of the 
new Human Rights Council.34 
                                                          
29 ibid para 182. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid para 183. 
32 See ECOSOC, ‘Summary of the open-ended informal consultations held by the Commission on Human Rights 
pursuant to Economic and Social Council decision 2005/217, prepared by the Chairperson of the sixty-first session 
of the Commission’ (21 June 2005) UN Doc A/59/847; UN Doc E/2005/73 at para 12. 
33 UNGA Res 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’ (3 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251. The Human Rights 
Council was created with 170 states voting in favour, 4 against (Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau, United States) and 
3 abstaining (Belarus, Iran, Venezuela). See UNGA Press Release, ‘General Assembly Establishes New Human 
Rights Council by Vote of 170 in Favour to 4 Against, with 3 Abstentions’ 
<www.un.org/press/en/2006/ga10449.doc.htm> accessed 20 December 2015. 
34 Philip Alston, ‘Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human 




In accordance with Article 22 of the UN Charter,35 the General Assembly established the HRC 
as one of its subsidiary organs,36 thereby elevating its institutional standing in comparison to 
its predecessor. The HRC would therefore assist the General Assembly with the performance 
of fulfilling its mandate on human rights. This suggested a greater international commitment 
towards the protection and promotion of universal human rights as the HRC’s enhanced status 
would make its discussions more visible, influential, and authoritative both inside and outside 
the United Nations.37  
The ‘strong and uniting’38 language employed in the Resolution helped convey the need for 
international dialogue, understanding, and cooperation between countries, cultures, and 
religions. It responded to criticisms of the Commission’s politicisation and selectivity by 
ensuring that the guiding principles of the HRC’s work should be universality, impartiality, 
non-selectivity, and objectivity; it introduced ‘a number of innovative elements that would 
make the Council a significant improvement on the Commission on Human Rights’.39  
The main differences between the new Human Rights Council and its predecessor revolved 
around the frequency of meetings held annually, election of members, and the creation of the 
Universal Periodic Review; a mechanism designed to strengthen the accountability of Member 
States in relation to their human rights record.40 The latter would have significance for an 
                                                          
35 ‘The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.’ 
36 Freedman notes that ‘[s]ubordination is a legal characteristic of subsidiary organs with the GA retaining 
organisational power and control over the bodies’ structure and activities. For example the GA votes to elect the 
Council’s members; has the power to suspend a Council member; may dictate which situations the body must 
address; and receives an annual report from the Council’. Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: 
A Critique and Early Assessment, 56.   
37 Kevin Boyle, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: Origins, Antecedents, and Prospects,’ in Kevin 
Boyle (ed), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford: OUP 2009) 12. 
38 UNGA President Jan Eliasson, statement on the draft resolution on the Human Rights Council, GA 60th Session 
(15 March 2006) 4. 
39 ibid 5. 
40 Gareth Sweeney and Yuri Saito, ‘An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights 
Council’ 2009 9(2) Human Rights Law Review 203; Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions 




understanding of the relationship between Islam and human rights by allowing a transparent 
and cooperative dialogue to take place at the international level free from notions of bias and 
selectivity.  
2.4 The Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review 
2.4.1 Background 
The concept of a peer review mechanism was first raised by Kofi Annan in 2005 during the 
final session of the Commission41 wherein he proposed to abolish the Commission and use a 
process of peer-review to evaluate and implement universal human rights.42 Such a proposal 
was expected to combat the politicization and selectivity of the Commission and would be the 
key factor in depoliticizing the human rights body.43 
Annan’s proposal suggested a periodical review of each state thereby preventing the 
‘selectivity bias that had kept some states perennially on or off the Commission’s agenda’.44 
He defined peer review as a process ‘whereby states voluntarily enter into discussion regarding 
human rights issues in their respective countries’45 and findings are implemented ‘as a 
cooperative venture with assistance given to states in developing their capacities’.46  
The mechanism of universal scrutiny would be the driving factor for the success of such a peer 
review process. It would allow states to be subject to assessment by other Member States and 
therefore prevent any single state from evading scrutiny.47  
                                                          
41 Speech of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Commission on Human Rights, ‘Reforming UN Human Rights 
Machinery’ (7 April 2005) UN Press Release SG/SM/9808 HR/CN/1108. 
42 UNGA, ‘Secretary-General Report, Addendum, Human Rights Council, Explanatory Note by the Secretary-
General’ (23 May 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005/Add.1, para 6. 
43 Mathew Davies, ‘Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations’ (2010) 
35 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 449, 457. 
44 ibid 456. 
45 UNGA, ‘Secretary-General Report, Addendum, Human Rights Council, Explanatory Note by the Secretary-
General’ (23 May 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005/Add.1, para 7. 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid para 8. 
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2.4.2 The Creation of the Universal Periodic Review 
Under subsection (d) of Resolution 60/251, the Human Rights Council was mandated with the 
responsibility of monitoring Member States’ compliance with human rights obligations and 
commitments. This was to be implemented through the Universal Periodic Review, a 
mechanism based on:  
objective and reliable information…in a manner which ensures universality of 
coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a 
cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement 
of the country concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building 
needs.48 
Themes of cooperation, capacity-building, and consent were reiterated throughout the 
resolution. The interaction with the wider UN human rights machinery was also addressed by 
ensuring that the Universal Periodic Review ‘shall complement and not duplicate the work of 
[the] treaty bodies’49 which was a main criticism of the Commission.  
Drafting took place over three sessions and a conference was also held in Geneva to discuss 
the different models50 and approaches suggested for the review.51 Elements requiring further 
consideration included whether there should be a prior review by a regional group of the state 
under review; sources of background information; extent of the state’s presentation during the 
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review; scope of participation of stakeholders; and contribution of experts or a country 
rapporteur during the interactive dialogue phase.52  It was decided that Member States would 
be reviewed every four years53 and the periodicity and modalities would be reviewed at the end 
of the first cycle.54  
The following year, the HRC adopted Resolution 5/1, also known as the ‘Institution Building 
Package’, which provided an overview of the modalities and further expanded upon Resolution 
60/251.55 It listed the objectives of the review as:  
(a) The improvement of the human rights situation on the ground; 
(b) The fulfilment of the State’s human rights obligations and commitments and 
assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the State; 
(c) The enhancement of the State’s capacity and of technical assistance, in 
consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned; 
 (d) The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders; 
 (e) Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights; 
(f) The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the Council,       
other human rights bodies and the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.56 
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The Institution Building Package stressed that the Universal Periodic Review should be a 
cooperative mechanism; an intergovernmental process; operate in an objective, transparent, 
non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational, and non-politicized manner; and most 
importantly, promote universal and indivisible human rights.57 Cultural relativism, however, 
has the potential to pose a barrier to the realisation of universal human rights, especially in the 
context of the present study. This is addressed further in section 2.8.1 below. 
2.5 Basis for the Review 
The Institution Building Package also identified which human rights commitments and 
obligations would be used to review a state and therefore form the basis of its review. It was 
agreed that the review would be based upon, ‘the United Nations Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, human rights instruments to which a State is party, and voluntary 
pledges and commitments made by States, including those undertaken when presenting their 
candidatures for election to the Human Rights Council’.58 The review criteria also included 
applicable international humanitarian law due to the ‘complementary and mutually interrelated 
nature of international human rights law and international humanitarian law’.59  
The inclusion of legally binding and non-legally binding human rights instruments as the basis 
of the review highlights its comprehensiveness and allows it to build upon the universality, 
indivisibility, and interrelatedness of human rights, and also provides a forum to consider the 
question of cultural relativism.60  
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2.6 How the Universal Periodic Review Works  
The first cycle commenced from February 2008 and concluded with the 12th session of the 
HRC’s Working Group in 2011. However in order to accommodate slightly longer reviews by 
the Working Group, the second and subsequent cycles have been extended to four and a half 
years in length from 2012. Two-week sessions of the Working Group take place in February, 
May, and October of each year with fourteen countries being reviewed in each session (a total 
of forty-two countries per year).61 At the time of writing, the third cycle of the UPR is 
underway. 
This change, amongst others, is a product of Resolution 16/2162 which was adopted in March 
2011. It contained the revised modalities for the functioning of the Human Rights Council and 
although a substantial part of the resolution consisted of the Universal Periodic Review, some 
issues remained pending. The HRC completed the review by adopting Decision 17/119 as a 
follow-up to the resolution.63 The implication of this decision allowed the process to become 
more fair and transparent as identified below in section 2.6.3. 
2.6.1 National Consultations 
The first stage of the UPR involves national consultations where the state under review is 
encouraged to prepare information that it will submit ‘through a broad consultation process at 
a national level with all relevant stakeholders’.64 The consultations, which generally begin ten 
to twelve months before the actual review,65 allow the stakeholders to make significant 
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65 Lisbeth Arne Nordager Thonbo, ‘The Role of the State’ in Lis Dhundale and Lisbeth Arne Nordager Thonbo 
(eds), Universal Periodic Review First Cycle: Reporting Methodologies from the Positions of the State, Civil 
Society and National Human Rights Institutions (The Danish Institute for Human Rights 2011) 17. 
28 
 
contribution in spreading awareness and knowledge of the UPR mechanism. This, in turn, 
allows key human rights issues, such as protecting the right to life, to be brought to the 
forefront.  
Stakeholders are identified as NGOs, human rights defenders, national human rights 
institutions, academic and research institutions, regional organisations, and civil society 
representation.66 Prominent stakeholders raising questions concerning the death penalty in the 
UPR, and which are engaged with in the proceeding chapters, include Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists. Other NGOs such as 
Alkarama Foundation, Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain, Islamic 
Human Rights Commission, and Muslims for Progressive Values can also be seen contributing 
in the UPR of Islamic states.  
Civil society engagement in the Universal Periodic Review brings independent and impartial 
perspectives which are needed throughout the whole process in order to provide a balance to 
the state’s performance. It also gives a voice to the marginalized and vulnerable groups which 
highlights the universality and indivisibility of human rights. Civil society is considered a 
‘legitimate representative for the right holders’67 due to their non-governmental nature. It 
therefore has a cogent role to play when a state’s human rights record is being reviewed. 
The idea of national consultations is in line with the principle that the UPR must ‘ensure the 
participation of all relevant stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations and 
national human rights institutions’.68 No detailed instructions, however, are provided on the 
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manner in which the consultative national process should be carried out. As a result, only a 
small number of state reports and submissions have identified the specific nature of 
consultations such as the time, location, and number of participants.69 One such example is 
Pakistan which listed the date and location of its consultations with government departments 
and civil society organisations but failed to disclose their identities or the number of 
organisations actually involved.70 Similarly, the UAE held several meetings and workshops 
‘with a wide range of civil society organisations and government bodies’71 but no further detail 
was provided. Consequently, the true level of cooperation and engagement with stakeholders 
cannot be determined as is seen in Chapter 3. This will include stifling effective interpretation 
of Islamic law on the death penalty. 
Some states, such as Bahrain, have also been criticised for failing to hold nationally accessible 
consultations. In Bahrain’s review, the state failed to consult with ten highly active human 
rights groups, including the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights despite an appeal to the Prime 
Minister to include them in the consultation process. In fact, the stakeholders that did 
participate revealed that the consultations held ‘were for information not consultation, and that 
their comments had no reflection in the final national report’.72 
Failure to engage in meaningful consultations will only impede the UPR process. One of the 
key reasons for a national consultation process is to allow the stakeholders to provide valuable 
input into the national report. It allows for an accurate and comprehensive portrayal of the 
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human rights situation on the ground (domestically) and it is also able to reflect progressive 
efforts made by the state to ameliorate any human rights violations. Additionally, the influence 
of stakeholders can help identify that the proposed recommendations are substantial, relevant, 
and important.73  A stakeholder involved in the UPR of an Islamic country can therefore engage 
in meaningful discourse on the state’s use of the death penalty and consider not only relevant 
international law but also address the theological underpinnings of the punishment to provide 
a more enlightened approach. This is discussed in Part Two of this thesis. 
2.6.2 Submission of Reports 
The review of a state is based upon three documents: 1) national report prepared by the state 
concerned; 2) summary of relevant stakeholder reports, and; 3) a compilation submitted by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on relevant official United 
Nations documents.74  
The state under review must submit a national report which is restricted to twenty pages in 
length. States are therefore not required to present ‘colossal and factually dense’ reports which 
would be unrealistic given the page limit.75 It must be submitted to the OHCHR approximately 
twelve to thirteen weeks in advance of the review.76  
Stakeholders’ reports need to be submitted six months before the state’s review and they can 
either be an independent individual report, not exceeding 2815 words, or a joint stakeholder 
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submission limited to 5630 words.77 Joint stakeholder submissions are given a higher standing 
as it indicates that participating stakeholders were successfully able to reach a consensus 
regarding the human rights situation and were able to propose recommendations to ameliorate 
the situation in the country concerned.78 In the instance of Pakistan, a total of 14 joint 
submissions were provided during its second review, an example being the International 
Association for Religious Freedom and the South Asia Centre for Peace submitting a joint 
statement on freedom of religion and belief in the state under review.79  
For the third cycle of the UPR, the OHCHR introduced new guidelines for stakeholders in 
order to improve the effectiveness of written submissions and introduced ‘matrices of 
recommendations of countries to be reviewed during the third cycle of the UPR’.80 The aim of 
the matrix is to record precise and specific information regarding the implementation, in the 
state under review, for both supported and noted previous recommendations. The matrix 
provides a list of thematically clustered recommendations, such as the death penalty, and allows 
space for ‘assessment/comments on level of implementation’.81  
Stakeholders are encouraged to download their country matrix, complete the relevant section, 
and submit it as an annex to the main contribution (its inclusion does not affect the word 
count).82 In Bahrain’s review, only three out of forty-four NGOs used the country matrix with 
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their submission83 and only one used the matrix in UAE’s review.84 Pakistan’s review had a 
total of 44 submissions but no stakeholder made use of the matrix. There seems to be little 
engagement with the matrix which needs to be utilised by civil society in order to identify 
‘challenges or needs of technical cooperation’85 where recommendations have not been 
implemented and to ensure submissions remain relevant and specific.  
Section 5 of the updated guidelines not only details the benefits of the matrices86 but also 
includes practical suggestions such as the use of S.M.A.R.T recommendations for states to take 
forward in the UPR.87 It also mentions other formatting and technical advice such as deadlines; 
word limits; preferred languages of submission; and the use of endnotes and annexes. The 
OHCHR then compiles all the received stakeholder submissions into a single stakeholder report 
comprising a total of ten pages in length.88  
The structure of both the national report and stakeholder reports can follow the General 
Guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council. The reports can include information on the 
national consultation process; the current normative and institutional human rights framework 
of the state under review; implementation of the human rights framework; cooperation with 
stakeholders; identification of achievements, best practices, challenges, and constraints; key 
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national priorities; and capacity-building expectations.89 The outcome should be an evaluative 
report that provides a detailed analysis of a country’s human rights record, both the positive 
and the negative, paving the way for future compromises and assistance from other countries.90  
Many states predominantly focus on best practices and achievements in their reports which 
raises the question of objectivity, a point which was raised by the Syrian Arab Republic during 
Qatar’s review. It noted a lack of objectivity in Qatar’s reporting, expressing concerns 
‘regarding the role of charitable institutions in Qatar in the absence of transparency and, also, 
regarding delays in the ratification of international treaties’.91 This proved unfavourable with 
Qatar who wished to respond to the ‘allegations and accusations’.92 Syria raised a point of 
order, indicating that the Syrian statement had been objective:  
In fact, it had displayed restraint and adhered to the principles of UPR since no 
mention had been made of the inhuman role played by Qatar in the Syrian Arab 
Republic. It requested the President to urge Qatar to refrain from using provocative 
language and to respond objectively to the Syrian statement.93  
Whilst such instances illustrate that the UPR is not immune from being politicised, it balances 
state engagement with the presence of stakeholders to allow for a more transparent perspective.   
The OHCHR Guidelines strongly encourage stakeholders to specifically tailor their 
submissions for the UPR and ensure that they contain reliable and credible information on the 
state under review. They should identify issues of concern, possible recommendations and/or 
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best practices, cover a maximum period of four years, and not contain abusive language.94 All 
submissions are made available on the OHCHR’s website which adds to the transparency of 
the whole process.95  
The third and final report is compiled by the OHCHR on information contained in the reports 
of human rights treaty bodies, Special Procedures, and other relevant UN documents. This 
report is also restricted to ten pages.96 Non-state contributions such as those by national 
stakeholders are accommodated as official documents in the review process which prevents 
any hierarchy among the different inputs.97 
2.6.3 Interactive Dialogue 
The UPR takes the form of an interactive dialogue which is held in Geneva where the Universal 
Periodic Review Working Group conducts a three and a half hour review.98 The president of 
the Human Rights Council chairs the Working Group which comprises all HRC Member States 
and Observer States.99 Undertaking the review with the members of the HRC sitting as a 
Working Group rather than at a plenary session enables full participation without occupying 
sessional meeting time.100 The duration of the review, according to Matthew Davies, provides 
for ‘more of a schematic overview’ of the country’s situation ‘rather than a detailed 
appraisal’.101 As a result, a schematic overview does not provide much opportunity to discuss 
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wider issues concerning the Islamic Member State use of the death penalty and address the 
deeper theological questions on the subject.  
The dialogue is webcasted live and made accessible on the OHCHR website which is in line 
with the principles of transparency, non-selectivity, and equal treatment. Stakeholders with 
ECOSOC status102 are able to attend the session but are not allocated speaking time and are 
therefore excluded from directly interacting in the review dialogue.103 Although this is a 
drawback to the Universal Periodic Review, it reflects the ideology that the review is a state-
led process.104  
Stakeholders can still make last minute lobbying sessions to governments and also prepare 
parallel events at the UN office in Geneva to raise awareness of the review taking place.105 To 
facilitate NGO lobbying, UPR-Info106 holds ‘pre-sessions’ in Geneva one month before the 
review. This provides civil society with an ‘international platform to directly advocate to state 
delegations ahead of the UPR sessions’.107 There are instances, however, where the state has 
restricted this process. For example, during Sudan’s second review, a group of human rights 
defenders were prevented from attending the pre-sessions.108 Stakeholder lobbying, of which 
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this research facilitated, resulted in a cross regional alliance of 14 governments and an NGO 
affirmation (36 NGOs) of a submission to the HRC for the human rights violations under 
President Bashir’s government.109 This influenced the recommendations made at the UPR with 
many states and stakeholders bringing this issue to the attention of the international community 
and holding the state under review to account.110 
The review is guided by the troika which is a group of three Member State Rapporteurs chosen 
by the drawing of lots.111 The state being reviewed can request that one of the three troika 
members is from its own region thereby allowing the state to have ‘a regional ally that 
understands its cultural sensitivities and/or issues relating to capacities for human rights 
protection and promotion’.112 During the first session of the UPR, all the African states which 
were scheduled for review requested this.113 Additionally, a state that is selected to be part of 
troika can recuse itself from the position. This occurred in 2008 where Pakistan declined to 
serve as a troika member for India’s review due to the history of political tension between the 
two countries.114  
According to Roland Chauville, the interactive dialogue reduces ‘sensitivities surrounding the 
discussion of human rights at the international level. It challenges the notion that human rights 
are a matter of domestic policy and that the involvement of the international community is akin 
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to interfering with the sovereignty of the state being reviewed’.115 Therefore, statements such 
as Egypt asserting that retentionist countries ‘need to preserve the death penalty given their 
cultural, political and legal specificities’116 can be respectfully challenged at the UPR; 
contesting the notion that capital punishment is underpinned by state sovereignty and criminal 
justice, and help solidify the argument that it is a matter of human rights. 
The interactive dialogue comprises of two main elements: a presentation by the state to be 
reviewed and a question and answer session. The state under review presents its national report 
regarding the country’s human rights situation and responds to written questions submitted to 
it through the troika. Member and Observer States are then provided the opportunity to take 
the floor and pose questions, present observations, or make recommendations. Member States 
are restricted to three minutes of speaking time whilst Observer States are given two minutes.117   
During the first cycle, on many occasions, state representatives would stay overnight in order 
to enrol onto the list of speakers, which would open at 8.45am the day before the review. 
Moreover, states would adopt strategies that involved getting blocks of allied states to speak 
together thereby enhancing the impact of their praise and using up the majority of the allotted 
time. This tactic was seen in the first review of Bahrain which was dominated by its allied 
states delivering positive statements. Such allies included Palestine, India, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Tunisia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, Algeria, Libya, and Cuba.118 Similarly, 
Tunisia’s review heard from numerous allies119 giving the impression that it was ‘an exercise 
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in filibustering’.120 As a result of political and regional allies dominating the review, many 
countries inscribed on the speakers’ list did not get a chance to participate due to insufficient 
time.121  
Regionalism through protecting allied states from scrutiny continued to impact the efficacy of 
most reviews of OIC members.122 Qatar’s review heard from 49 states123 but only six (non 
OIC) asked critical questions.124 The implications of this are not to be understated. Filibustering 
against Islamic countries that apply the death penalty will dilute the review process and hinder 
the opportunity to question their imposition of the punishment based on Islamic law principles.   
As a result of this drawback to the UPR mechanism, Decision 17/119 was adopted in 2011 to 
allow the process to become more fair and transparent for future cycles.  The speakers’ list now 
opens a week before the review and the first speaker is drawn by lot with the list proceeding 
alphabetically from that point. States are permitted to swap places if they should so desire. 
Strict time limits have also been enforced in regards to state speaking time.125 This change was 
seen in Bahrain’s second review which heard from a range of states such as Slovenia, Spain, 
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Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and the UAE allowing for a more balanced approach.126 
Hearing from states that are not from the state under review’s regional group reduces the 
chances of bias and unnecessary praise. Hence a non-OIC state will be more likely to question 
state use of the death penalty and foster critical discussion for elevating the right to life.  
It is important to note that the Human Rights Council makes it clear that ‘the state under review 
is sovereign in addressing the questions and/or issues it chooses to answer of those transmitted 
to it by the troika members or raised during the proceedings of the working group’.127 This was 
reflected in North Korea’s first review where it failed to accept a single recommendation.128 
Refusing to address issues put forth by other Member States, such as the application of the 
death penalty, demonstrates a lack of genuine engagement with the mechanism and suggests 
the state under review is merely paying lip service to the UPR and using sovereignty as a shield 
to avoid investigation into its human rights abuses. 
The state under review needs to address all recommendations put forward to it, providing a 
clear explanation for any recommendations it is unable to accept in order for the international 
community to understand what is preventing acceptance and enable ways to potentially 
overcome this. For example, in Saudi Arabia’s review, it failed to accept recommendations to 
impose a moratorium on the death penalty citing conflict with Islamic law principles.129 This 
study will engage with such reasoning to demonstrate an alternative reading of the fiqh 
(jurisprudence) and is critiqued in more detail in Part Two.  
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At the same time, it must also be noted that the potential impact of recommendations, on the 
human rights situation of a country, varies depending on the quality of recommendations that 
are issued during the review session (emphasis added). Edward McMahon has categorised 
recommendations on a scale of 1 to 5 depending on the verb that is used in each 
recommendation.130 He describes them as follows (with examples): 
1) Category 1: these recommendations require minimal action in comparison with other 
categories. They call upon the state under review to seek international assistance or share 
best practices (verbs in this category would include ‘call on’, ‘seek’, and ‘share’). 
For example, Brunei Darussalam to Qatar: ‘Share its experiences in strengthening its judiciary 
system.’131 
2) Category 2: these recommendations encourage continuity of actions and/or policies 
(‘continue’, ‘maintain’, ‘persevere’, ‘pursue’). These recommendations are fairly easy to 
implement as they do not demand any change however they can be challenging when the 
state under review is faced with political insecurity, economic cuts or conflict. 
For example, Kuwait to Afghanistan: ‘Continue implementing national policies and 
programmes to improve the living conditions of the people’.132 
3) Category 3: recommendations to consider change (‘analyse’, ‘consider’, ‘envisage’, 
‘explore’, ‘reflect upon’, ‘review’). Such recommendations are generally issued when the 
subject matter is controversial and does not enjoy state support.  
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For example, Maldives to Pakistan: ‘Consider removing the reservations made to the ICCPR 
to ensure gender equality and women’s empowerment’.133 
4) Category 4: recommendations that contain a general element. As a result of being so broad, 
they can cause frustration to both the state under review and relevant stakeholders as they 
lack clarity in regards to the method of implementation or measurable outcomes.  
For example, Egypt to Saudi Arabia: ‘Take all necessary measures to protect the rights of 
migrant workers, especially those regarding means of remedies’.134 
5) Category 5: these recommendations require specific actions and ‘demand certain tangible 
or measurable outcomes’. Recommendations on the death penalty predominantly fall 
within this category. 
For example, Sierra Leone to Lebanon: ‘Establish a moratorium with a view to abolishing the 
death penalty’.135  
During the first cycle, 154 states submitted more than 21,000 recommendations. The second 
cycle saw a total of 36,331 recommendations made by 168 states. 136 This indicates, in general, 
the active participation of states in the review process. States’ willingness to participate with 
the mechanism was reflected in their level of political engagement by sending high-level 
delegations comprising of key and prominent individuals such as state ministers, senior 
officials, or diplomats.137 Countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan sent Ministers of 
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Justice ‘thus affording the process the national legal clout that it deserved’.138 However, 
throughout the first cycle, many countries sent delegates from foreign ministries instead of 
ministers with legal or human rights expertise.139 Others such as Bahrain, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
and Algeria sent Ministers or Deputies of Foreign Affairs suggesting that they viewed the UPR 
as a foreign affairs exercise rather than a process for the protection and promotion of human 
rights.140 
2.6.4 Adoption of Universal Periodic Review Outcomes 
2.6.4.1 Adoption by the Working Group 
Following the interactive dialogue, the troika prepares a report of the Working Group which 
includes a summary of the proceedings, the issues raised in the interactive dialogue, the 
recommendations submitted by participating Member States, and voluntary commitments 
made by the state under review.141 The time between the interactive dialogue and the adoption 
of the outcome report is forty-eight hours.142 
Both accepted and noted recommendations by the state under review are identified in the 
outcome report. Attribution of recommendations was another challenge faced by the HRC. 
Egypt argued that ‘it is a violation of the sovereign rights of states’143 to imply that all working 
group members have agreed upon a recommendation which in fact has only been proposed by 
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one state. The idea that a recommendation is only ascribed to the state which proposes it 
garnered widespread acceptance amongst states. As a result, states can avoid having their 
names attributed to specific recommendations which would technically mean that the Working 
Group does not adopt the recommendations per se.144 This is particularly useful for states who 
may not agree with recommendations that conflict with their own cultural or religious norms. 
Hence Norway’s recommendation to Algeria to ‘take all necessary measures to abolish the 
death penalty and ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR’145 would not be endorsed 
by states such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, or Sudan who cite Islamic law as a barrier to 
such a step. 
Recommendations are therefore considered to be, in essence, ‘bilateral recommendations made 
through the multilateral forum of the Universal Periodic Review’146 and this is reflected in the 
language employed at the end of all outcome reports which states that, ‘[a]ll conclusions and 
recommendations contained in the present report reflect the position of the submitting states 
and the state under review. They should not be construed as endorsed by the Working Group 
as a whole’.147  
The selective and politicized nature of recommendations has drawn criticism of the workings 
of the UPR.148 An example of this is where near identical recommendations have received 
different outcomes depending on the country that submitted them. Recommendations by 
‘likeminded’ states have enjoyed state support whilst those from ‘unfriendly’ states have often 
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been rejected.149 During Egypt’s first review, it accepted a recommendation from Bangladesh 
to ‘continue its ongoing review of national laws to ensure that they are in line with its 
international human rights law obligations’.150 However, it failed to support a similar 
recommendation from Israel to ‘conduct a wide-ranging review of Egyptian human rights laws 
in order to bring them into line with Egypt’s international commitments, as so pledged in its 
Human Rights Council candidature and within its National Report’.151 
Another criticism which arose during the course of the first cycle was states’ failure to provide 
a clear response to all the recommendations received. Approximately 6.5 percent of 
recommendations received a vague and ambiguous response that failed to specify whether the 
state under review had accepted or noted the recommendation.152 One such case was Israel, 
which accepted a total of three recommendations and did not communicate clear answers to a 
number of others.153 As a result, the revised modalities for future cycles require the state under 
review to clearly convey its position on all received recommendations, preferably before the 
plenary session at the HRC.154  
2.6.4.2 Adoption by the Human Rights Council 
Approximately three to five months after the Working Group session, the Human Rights 
Council will conduct a plenary session to adopt the Working Group’s outcome report. It allows 
the state under review to respond to any issues that were not adequately addressed during the 
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interactive dialogue. This is generally preceded by an addendum to the outcome document 
which specifies whether any additional recommendations have enjoyed state support between 
the time of the review and the adoption of the outcome report.155  
The HRC allocates one hour for the discussion of the Working Group documents. The time is 
distributed evenly between the state under review (20 minutes), Member and Observer States 
(20 minutes), and stakeholders (20 minutes) to express their views. It provides the opportunity 
for relevant stakeholders to comment on the outcome report and those states whose 
recommendations were noted can restate their proposals, after which the plenary adopts the 
outcome report.156 For example, during the adoption of Iraq’s report, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and Belgium reiterated their 
recommendations to the state to abolish the death penalty as did the stakeholders, Amnesty 
International and Verein Sudwind.157 However, none of these actors made reference to the more 
limited role of sharīʿa in this matter which could have strengthened their arguments by 
addressing the status of the death penalty from a religious lens as well as an international one. 
Although Alex Conte describes this stage as ‘little more than a formality and … somewhat of 
a rubber-stamping exercise’158, it is much more than that. This is the only stage where 
stakeholders are given a platform to speak and, having discussed the importance of 
stakeholders in the UPR159, it is imperative that their voices are heard in order to make 
violations of the right to life more transparent. 
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Furthermore, adoption of the report by the Human Rights Council highlights the state under 
review’s public commitment to implement accepted recommendations and emphasises its 
position on human rights. For example, in Bahrain’s addendum to its outcome report, the state 
acknowledged that death penalty recommendations were not accepted because, ‘[s]uch 
abolition is inconsistent with Bahrain’s constitution and not required by international law’.160 
Bahrain’s constitution does not explicitly provide for the death penalty but makes it clear that, 
‘[t]he Islamic Shari’a is a principal source for legislation’.161 It is therefore using religion as 
the basis for maintaining its sovereign right to apply capital punishment, a discourse that is 
challenged in Part Two of the study.  
2.6.5 Implementation and Follow-up 
The UPR extends beyond mere reaffirmation of human rights standards by requiring states to 
explicitly accept or note recommendations. As a result, the state under review is faced with 
expectations that it will take progressive steps to implementation.162 The subsequent review 
focuses on the extent to which the previous cycle’s recommendations have been implemented.  
Implementation is one of the fundamental challenges facing the Universal Periodic Review.163 
The UPR needs to ameliorate violations and advance human rights on the ground level by 
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‘translating the recommendations and commitments made…into measurable 
improvements’.164 Recommendations on the death penalty, therefore, need to be S.M.A.R.T165 
in order to facilitate implementation. For example, a recommendation to simply, ‘consider 
restricting the death penalty’ lacks any specificity for its application. Instead a recommendation 
to, ‘adopt the punishment only for the “most serious crimes” under Article 6(2) and present to 
Parliament a motion for a moratorium within two years’ is measurable and achievable.  
In order to gauge the level of implementation, states are encouraged to submit a midterm 
update, on a voluntary basis, to the HRC in relation to the accepted recommendations.166 
However, due to the preparation and time taken between the state’s review and the adoption of 
its outcome report, the time left for implementation is significantly shortened, resulting in 
approximately three years available for domestic adoption.167  Recommendations on the death 
penalty will need to take this into account, focusing on the time-specific element of the 
S.M.A.R.T principle. 
The third cycle of the UPR, underway since May 2017, has laid an important focus on the 
implementation of accepted recommendations from previous cycles. The OHCHR now sends 
letters, which are publicly available in a spirit of transparency, to each Minster of Foreign 
Affairs after the HRC adopts the UPR outcomes. These letters are sent as part of a constructive 
engagement with Member States and identify 10-15 areas for attention and action in advance 
of the next UPR cycle.168 In his letter to Pakistan, the High Commissioner encouraged the state 
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to submit a midterm report by 2020 and highlighted areas in need of particular attention such 
as safeguarding the right to life by encouraging the state to, ‘[r]e-impose the moratorium on 
the death penalty and consider abolishing it. Should it be maintained, it may be applied only to 
the ‘most serious crimes’’.169 
All 193 UN Member States are expected to cooperate and engage with this peer-review 
mechanism. Resolution 5/1 makes it clear that, ‘cases of persistent non-cooperation’170 will be 
dealt by the Human Rights Council. However, there is no detail or explanation as to what 
exactly would be considered ‘non-cooperation’ of a ‘persistent’ nature. The Geneva based 
NGO, UPR-Info, has produced an outline of what this may be which includes non-participation 
and non-implementation of recommendations. Failure to engage with three or more of the 
following steps, according to UPR-Info, should be deemed as a persistent non-cooperation 
case: 1) submitting a national report; 2) selecting the troika; 3) participating in the interactive 
dialogue; 4) submitting an addendum; and 5) presenting midterm updates on 
implementation.171 It must be noted here that selection of the troika is undertaken by the Human 
Rights Council, by the drawing of lots, so the aforementioned point two is incorrect. So far 
only one state, Israel,172 has refused to engage with the Universal Periodic Review. However, 
the HRC’s response was to simply postpone the review. The steps developed in Decision 
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OM/7/1 were considered unsatisfactory and could set a precedent for other countries. A robust 
mechanism is needed to ensure full engagement with the process.173 
2.7 The Death Penalty in International Law  
UPR-Info assessed the progress of states during their first two reviews and found that a number 
of factors were crucial for state implementation. This included states’ responses to 
recommendations received, the nature of the recommendations as well as their subject matter 
such as the death penalty.174  
The abolition of the death penalty is one of the most non-implemented and least-accepted 
recommendations in the Universal Periodic Review.175 The issue of the death penalty is 
presented as a recommendation to nearly every retentionist state, and hitherto, has not been 
demonstrated to directly contribute to abolition. The UPR, however, can become an important 
lens to analyse the Islamic use of the death penalty. It is necessary to analyse the status of 
capital punishment in international law and how these states have contributed to its evolving 
standards as this will reflect upon the extent of their interaction at the UPR. 
2.7.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not make any reference to the death penalty; 
however, it preserves the right to life in Article 3: ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person’. The UDHR is considered to be the foundation of contemporary human 
rights law and it was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948.176 Although the 
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declaration does not create legal obligations and, ‘admits the presumption that something less 
than full effectiveness in terms of law is intended,’177 it has played a central role in both the 
United Nations framework as well as in regional systems for the protection and promotion of 
human rights. 
An examination of the Third Committee of the General Assembly debates reveal that Muslim 
states made influential and constructive contributions to the negotiation and development of 
the UDHR. This can be seen in the drafting of Article 3 (right to life) and Article 18 (freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion).178 The drafting of Article 3 underwent numerous attempts 
at amendment,179 including one from the Soviet Union aimed at the abolition of the death 
penalty.180  
This resulted in lengthy debates and four Muslim-majority states made notable contributions 
on this issue. Egypt and Syria raised the question of the death penalty as a matter of domestic 
criminal law and therefore ‘out of place in connection with the article in question’.181 Instead 
it was for ‘each country to include the relevant provisions in its penal code’.182 Turkey argued 
that abolition was premature and considered it to be a highly controversial principle which a 
number of countries had not yet accepted.183 
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Pakistan suggested that the abolition of the death penalty should be made the subject of a 
separate resolution to be discussed at a later General Assembly. Shaista Ikramullah, Pakistan’s 
delegate, stated that, ‘she was not opposed to the abolition of the death penalty, but it was too 
controversial a matter to be included in the declaration’.184 The delegation of Pakistan would 
therefore abstain from voting on the Soviet Union’s amendment.185 This shows an Islamic 
pluralism within the origin of the UDHR and demonstrates the complexity of the Islamic legal 
tradition.  
Ultimately, the wording of Article 3, as agreed by the drafters, would state the right to life in 
enumerative terms without reference to either abolition or retention of the death penalty. 
William Schabas argues that, ‘[n]owhere in the travaux [préparatoires] is there a defence of 
the death penalty as such, and the decision to exclude abolition was in no way intended as a 
statement that the United Nations in some way approved of or accepted the death penalty’.186 
Additionally, it was thought to be better not to include the phrase ‘death penalty’ as a movement 
was already underway in some states for total abolition.187 At the same time, a declaration of 
abolition of the death penalty risked isolating and discrediting the UDHR because the majority 
of states were retentionist, such as the Islamic states identified above, hence making it out of 
touch with everyday realities and thereby losing its potential significance.188  
The lack of a uniform ‘Islamic voice’ was more visible during the debates surrounding Article 
18 (freedom of religion) which has direct relevance to the death penalty since renunciation of 
Islam is perceived to be a capital crime. However, Islamic states did not invoke the prohibition 
                                                          
184 UN Doc A/C.3/SR.105, 177. 
185 ibid. 
186 William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd edn, Cambridge: CUP 2002) 
24. 
187 ECOSOC, ‘Commission on Human Rights: Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting’ (16 June 1947) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, 10. 




against apostasy as an express justification against Article 18; the theological basis for apostasy 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Saudi Arabia proposed that only the first sentence of Article 18 should be retained, ‘as it 
sufficiently safeguarded freedom of thought, conscience and religion’.189 It voiced strong 
opposition against the second part which explicitly included the ‘freedom to change his religion 
or belief’.190 According to the Saudi Arabian delegate, Jamil Al-Baroody,191 this could ‘serve 
as a pretext for inciting hatred and encouraging dangerous differences of opinion’192 since 
missionaries, throughout history, ‘had often abused their rights by becoming the forerunners 
of a political intervention, and there were many instances where peoples had been drawn into 
murderous conflict by the missionaries’ efforts to convert them’.193 
Iraq and Syria supported Saudi Arabia’s amendment. Whilst Iraq did not provide any 
justification for its approval,194 Syria explained that it would be better to simply state the 
principle without going into details in order to obviate any controversy or doubts.195 None of 
these countries focused on points of Islamic law as a potential barrier to recognising Article 18 
in its totality; however, Afghanistan alluded to it by arguing that, ‘the reasons put forward by 
the Saudi Arabian representative were in conformity with the religious beliefs and social 
principles of [the] country. Afghanistan reserved the right to conform to Moslem laws with 
regard to the question’.196  
On the other hand, Pakistan initially opposed the draft of Article 18 but in subsequent debates, 
announced its support for the whole draft of the UDHR including Article 18. The Foreign 
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Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, in explaining his position before the General 
Assembly, deemed it necessary to explain that: 
The teaching of Islam was based on the Koran which contained the oral revelations 
made to the prophet Mohammed; the Koran was, therefore, the very word of God 
for Moslems...The Koran expressly said, ‘Let he who chooses to believe, believe, 
and he who chooses to disbelieve, disbelieve.’ [Islam] formally condemned not 
lack of faith, but hypocrisy.197  
He reiterated that Islam had unequivocally provided the right to freedom of conscience and 
was ‘against any kind of compulsion in matters of faith or religious practices’.198 The somewhat 
unpredictable and complex position of Islamic states signified a diversity of national and 
individual interests, and a pluralism within the religion itself.   
No Muslim countries voted against any of the articles when they were formally put to a vote, 
‘suggesting that whatever objections they did have were not deemed so important that they 
wanted to go on record as opposing it’. 199 This included Article 3 which guarantees the right 
to life. Another reason could be that they wanted to portray a supportive and welcoming attitude 
towards the UDHR; and since the declaration was of a general nature, and not binding, there 
was no legal obligation attached.  
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Although Article 3 UDHR has been described as being ‘neutral’ on the subject of the death 
penalty, a number of General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions suggest otherwise.200 These 
important resolutions focus on the restriction and abolition of capital punishment yet cite the 
right to life provision in their preambles which implies that Article 3 is indeed abolitionist in 
outlook.201 The Secretary-General’s report of 1973 also stated that Article 3 implies the 
restriction and eventual abolition of the death penalty which suggests the two are 
inseparable.202  
The UDHR was later complemented by a further two international treaties, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)203 and the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty.204  
2.7.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The ICCPR, a formal multilateral treaty, was adopted in 1966, twenty years after drafting began 
due to the lengthy discussions surrounding its content.205 Whilst delegates from Islamic states 
were actively involved in the drafting of the Covenant, such as Bedia Afnan (Iraq), Begum 
Aziz Ahmed (Pakistan), Jamil Al-Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Abdul Kayaly and Jawaat Mufti 
(Syria), they remained relatively quiet on discussions regarding the right to life.206  
The question of the death penalty was strongly debated by other Member States and what 
emerged, according to Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, was ‘a necessary compromise allowing 
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for limited retention’.207 This is because a small number of states at the time were abolitionist208 
whilst others sought to safeguard their sovereignty and monopoly to determine that a domestic 
criminal sanction can include an execution.209  
The right to life was included in Article 6 of the ICCPR, derived from Article 3 of the UDHR,210 
but also allowed for the death penalty under certain reservations. Article 6 has, therefore, been 
viewed as being both permissive and restrictive.211 It has been interpreted as permissive by 
recognising the death penalty as an exception to the right to life whilst also being restrictive by 
describing it as, ‘a regrettable and temporary compromise, but viewing it as ultimately 
incompatible with the right to life in its most pure expression’.212 Of its six paragraphs, four 
make explicit reference to the subject of the death penalty.213 
The draft of Article 6(1) had been agreed in 1957 and stated ‘every human being has the 
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life’ (emphasis added). The expression ‘inherent right to life’ demonstrated that the 
drafters of the Covenant considered the right to life to be antecedent to legal structures and 
more than just a product of legal framework.214 Yoram Dinstein notes that the Covenant only 
characterises this right as inherent which, ‘may attest to its privacy and emphasize that it derives 
from the very fact of a human being’s existence’.215 
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Article 6(2) further states, ‘in countries that have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of 
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the crime’. The notion of ‘most serious crimes’ posed a 
significant challenge to states as it failed to discern exactly what crime(s) would fall under this 
category and as a result, it has been highly criticised for allowing a wide variation of state 
practice. It could therefore be open to interpretation according to national tradition, culture, 
and politics; the opposite of trying to create a universal declaration and definition of human 
rights.216  
Instead of being considered as permission for countries to proceed with capital punishment, the 
Chairman of the Working Group for the drafting of Article 6 stated that the expression ‘in 
countries which have not abolished the death penalty’ was intended to ‘show the direction in 
which the drafters of the Covenant hoped that the situation would develop’217 including Article 
6(6) that, ‘[n]othing in this article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant’. Furthermore, the phrase ‘in countries 
which have not abolished the death penalty’ implies that paragraph 2 would not be applicable 
to states that have already embraced the abolitionist stance and it cannot be reinstated.218  
Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle cogently argue that, ‘the term “most serious crimes” in Article 
6(2) was nothing more than a “marker” for the policy of moving towards abolition through 
restriction’.219 This idea of progressive restriction clearly indicated that the level of seriousness 
required for crimes justifying the death penalty would need constant evaluation, in the most 
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narrowing of definitions, until total abolition was achieved.220 This goal was reiterated in 
General Assembly Resolution 2857 (XXVI) and 32/61. The main objective of the United 
Nations, in accordance with Article 3 of UDHR and Article 6 of ICCPR, is to ‘progressively 
restrict the number of offences for which capital punishment might be imposed, with a view to 
the desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries’.221  
The Human Rights Committee222 has also addressed the meaning of ‘most serious crimes’ in 
the most recent Draft General Comment No. 36223 stating that the term must be read 
restrictively and relate to crimes of extreme gravity, such as premeditated murder or genocidal 
killings. It states in length that: 
Crimes not resulting directly and intentionally in death, such as drug offences, 
attempted murder, corruption, armed robbery, piracy, abduction, repeated evasion 
of compulsory military service and sexual offences, although serious in nature, do 
not manifest the extraordinary high levels of violence, utter disregard for human 
life, blatant anti-social attitude and irreversible consequences that could 
conceivably justify the imposition of the death penalty as a form of legal 
retribution.224 
Therefore, States Parties that retain the death penalty for these offences are in violation of their 
obligations under Article 6 ICCPR. This also means that Islamic states that criminalise 
apostasy, blasphemy, adultery, and homosexuality as capital offences are not adhering to 
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international law standards. Another restriction of the death penalty under Article 6 is found in 
paragraph 5 which excludes pregnant women and persons below 18 years of age.225  
Furthermore, Article 7 of the ICCPR which prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
is of particular relevance to the imposition of the death penalty. It has been recognised as an 
indirect attack on the use of capital punishment.226 A violation of this article is also linked to 
the death-row phenomenon where there is a considerable delay in execution following a 
sentence of death. The method of execution must be ‘carried out in such a way as to cause the 
least possible physical and mental suffering’.227 Hence, executions by way of gas chambers, 
decapitation, stoning, and hanging would constitute violations of Article 7.228 Confessions that 
are obtained as a result of treatment that is prohibited, such as torture, also constitute a breach 
of the Article. The Committee has declared this to violate the right to a fair trial, under both 
Articles 14 and 6.229  
Article 14 provides that ‘everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. The Committee noted that ‘in capital 
punishment cases, the duty of states parties to observe rigorously all the guarantees for a fair 
trial set out in Article 14 of the Covenant is even more imperative’.230 The death penalty must 
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therefore only be imposed after a fair trial. A breach of procedural norms in such a context 
would also be a breach of the right to life itself.231 
2.7.3 ECOSOC Safeguards 
In 1981, five years after the ICCPR came into force, the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control was assigned to examine the issues surrounding summary and arbitrary executions.232 
The Committee prepared nine safeguards to be adhered to wherever the death penalty was 
imposed. These ‘Safeguards’ were adopted by the Committee in 1984 and subsequently 
entrenched in an ECOSOC resolution.233 They were also endorsed by the General Assembly 
and the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders who called for their ‘widespread dissemination and implementation’.234 In essence, 
they reiterated the terms of the relevant provisions in the ICCPR, namely Articles 6, 7, 14, and 
15. According to the safeguards, the death penalty should only be applied to the most serious 
of crimes, expanding upon Article 6(2). It declared that the definition of most serious crimes 
‘should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave 
consequences’.235  
In 1989, the Committee adopted a new resolution that dealt with implementing the Safeguards 
and incorporated new standards to be applied in capital punishment cases. This second 
resolution added that ‘persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely limited 
competence, whether at the stage of sentence or execution’ would be excluded from the death 
                                                          
231 See Human Rights Committee, ‘Views: Communications No. 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995, 627/1995’ (29 
May 1998) UN Doc CCPR/C/622/D/623/1995, CCPR/C/622/D/624/1995, CCPR/C/622/D/626/1995 and 
CCPR/C/622/D/627/1995, para 18.10. 
232 UNGA Res 36/22, ‘Arbitrary or Summary Executions’ (9 November 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/22, para 7. 
233 Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, ‘Report on the Eighth Session’ (21-30 March 1984) UN Doc 
E/1984/16 and E/AC.57/1984/18; ECOSOC Res 1984/50, ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of 
those Facing the Death Penalty’ (25 May 1984) UN Doc E/1984/50. 
234 UNGA Res 39/118, ‘Human Rights in the Administration of Justice’ (14 December 1984) UN Doc 
A/RES/39/118. See also UN Doc A/39/PV.101, para 79; UN Doc A/CONF.121/C.1/L.9. 




penalty. It also highlighted retentionist states’ obligation to allow ‘adequate time for the 
preparation of appeals to a court of higher jurisdiction and for the completion of appeal 
proceedings, as well as petitions for clemency’.236 The resolution was reconfirmed in 1996 and 
recognised for its unique contribution as there had previously been a lack of protection for the 
mentally retarded from the death penalty.237  
Although the Safeguards are not treaties, they have been endorsed by ECOSOC which 
illustrates their unanimous acceptance by the international community. The Secretary-General 
monitors their implementation with his findings published in quinquennial reports.238 Schabas 
argues that the Safeguards and their implementation, ‘represent an invaluable benchmark and 
an important development in the limitation- that is, the partial abolition- of the death 
penalty’.239 
2.7.4 Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR 
Alongside the Safeguards, another important development in this area has been the creation of 
the Second Optional Protocol which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1989.240 This 
Protocol, which supplemented the ICCPR, was developed with a view to furthering the 
discussion on capital punishment and seeking to break new ground.241 Prior to the drafting of 
the Second Protocol, Islamic states remained relatively quiet during the United Nations debates 
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on the death penalty and failed to mention the influence that Islamic law had on their position. 
It was only after preparations began to introduce a draft protocol to the ICCPR that this group 
of states ‘emerged as a force determined to influence the debate in the 1980s’.242  
In 1981, the General Assembly sought submissions from Member States on the idea of an 
optional protocol. Pakistan stated that the abolition of the death penalty was incompatible with 
Islamic law and according to Schabas, this was the first sign of religious arguments, within the 
international community, on the death penalty.243  This religious justification soon became a 
common aspect of the debates.244 During a discussion on the Protocol, the position of Islamic 
countries was aptly summarised by the delegate of Oman who was firmly convinced that:  
The abolition of the death penalty was a substantive and controversial question 
which was inconsistent with the legal system of the Islamic countries for which the 
death penalty was of fundamental importance…For Islam, the right to life was a 
sacred right since human beings were the creation of Almighty God and, as such, 
must therefore be protected. However, if an individual willingly took the life of 
another, Islamic law provided that the State must in turn take the life of that 
criminal, once guilt was established by the courts. The death penalty, to the extent 
that it was an integral part of Islamic law, must be upheld at all costs.245  
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Countries such as Afghanistan,246 Iran,247 Iraq,248 Jordan,249 Kuwait,250 Libya,251 Oman,252 
Pakistan,253 Somalia,254 Sudan,255 and Tunisia256 all expressed their support for the death 
penalty. According to Kuwait, ‘there could be no question of accepting the idea of abolishing 
the death penalty…because that would involve changing a cardinal principle of the Kuwaiti 
religion’.257 The debate on an actual draft reached the General Assembly for consideration in 
1988. Again there was strong opposition voiced by states in favour of capital punishment, the 
majority being states with a predominantly Muslim population.258 
Saudi Arabia suggested the draft resolution be set aside and argued that the death penalty was 
enshrined in the Qurʾān, aimed at protecting human rights and was a sanction against anyone 
who took a life.259 Similarly, Jordan stated that the death penalty had a positive, deterrent 
effect.260 Pakistan and Afghanistan opposed the draft resolution due to the primacy afforded to 
Islamic law.261 Somalia ‘endorsed the views already expressed by the representatives of 
Muslim countries. The draft resolution was insensitive to [the] country’s values and 
religion’.262  
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Notwithstanding the above, the ‘Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty’ was adopted on 29 
December 1989. It received fifty-nine votes in favour, twenty-six against, and forty-eight 
abstentions. With the exception of China, the United States, and Tanzania, all votes against the 
resolution belonged to OIC Member States.263 
Under Article 1, the Protocol stated: 
1. No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be 
executed.  
2. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty 
within its jurisdiction. 
The Second Optional Protocol also introduced independent and international supervision of 
whether States Parties are complying with their commitment of abolition. Article 3 requires 
States Parties to submit their reports to the Human Rights Committee on measures undertaken 
to give effect to the Protocol. In cases of non-compliance, the Committee will consider 
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communications from other State Parties (Article 4) and individuals subject to its jurisdiction 
(Article 5). 
States Parties believe that abolition of the death penalty, ‘contributes to enhancement of human 
dignity and progressive development of human rights’ and all measures towards abolition are 
considered as ‘progress in the enjoyment of the right to life’. The Protocol emphasises that 
States Parties undertake an ‘international commitment to abolish the death penalty’.264 Eric 
Neumayer maintains that although there are no specific measures requiring States Parties to 
persuade retentionist countries to join the abolitionist movement, it is evident that ‘countries 
go beyond the mere domestic abolition of the death penalty in becoming state parties to the 
second protocol’.265 This was reflected by Italy and the Nordic countries in 1994, as well as the 
EU in 1999, when they submitted a proposal for a UN resolution calling upon all states to ratify 
the Second Optional Protocol.266 However this was met with strong opposition by Muslim 
states once again and such attempts ultimately failed.267  
Islamic Member States such as Bangladesh,268 Sudan,269 Saudi Arabia,270 Libya,271 Egypt,272 
Iran,273 and Jordan274 all spoke against the resolution. Sudan argued that capital punishment 
was ‘a divine right according to some religions, in particular Islam’.275 Saudi Arabia denounced 
the attempt for failing to take account of the cultural and religious features or domestic laws of 
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different countries.276 Libya maintained that capital punishment was imposed in accordance 
with Islamic law and there should be no effort to impose the abolition of the death penalty 
which, it claimed, was still the sole deterrent to serious crimes such as murder.277 Iran declared 
it was the ‘sovereign right of every state to choose the most appropriate penal system, taking 
into account its society’s cultural, religious and historical characteristics’.278 Although not an 
OIC state, Singapore criticised attempts by States to use the UN ‘to impose their own values 
and system of justice on other countries’.279  
As demonstrated above, the most vocal opposition received to the Second Protocol, and the 
abolition of the death penalty in general, has come from Islamic retentionist countries, 
including those with a strong Muslim population. These states cite Islamic law as the 
justification for their continued use of the death penalty and have therefore either abstained or 
voted against resolutions concerning capital punishment.280 The legitimacy of such an 
argument is deconstructed in Part Two below which focuses on the Islamic use of the death 
penalty. 
2.7.5 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
A year after the Second Protocol was adopted, the OIC adopted the 1990 Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) which implicitly provided for the death penalty. The 
Declaration was intended to, ‘serve as a general guidance for member states in the field of 
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human rights’.281 It is important to note that the CDHRI is a non-binding instrument and 
therefore it does not have the legal capacity to derogate from human rights law. 
What distinguishes the CDHRI from other human rights instruments is the incorporation of 
‘Islamic limitation clauses.’282 The preamble affirms the religious nature of the document 
which is ‘to contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from 
exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah’ whilst Article 24 makes a sweeping statement that, ‘[a]ll 
the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari’ah’ 
(emphasis added). 
Numerous rights afforded in the CDHRI are limited by clauses such as ‘except for’ or ‘without 
a Shari’ah prescribed reason’; ‘in accordance with ethical values’, the ‘tenets’, the ‘principles’ 
or the ‘provisions of the Shari’ah’; ‘within the framework of the Shari’ah’; and ‘as would not 
be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah’.283 This is also reflected in the right to life 
provision under Article 2(a) which recognises that, ‘[l]ife is a God-given gift and the right to 
life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to 
protect this right from any violation’ but this right may be infringed ‘for a Shari’ah prescribed 
reason’. This phrase is broad and vague and fails to reflect the plurality of Islamic law which 
is demonstrated in Part Two. Islamic law is not a monolithic entity and encompasses 
interpretations that promote the sanctity of life and emphasise universal values of mercy, 
justice, and forgiveness over the right to put to death. Using the CDHRI to accommodate 
interpretations which are at odds with human rights standards can open the door to human 
rights violations. As a result, the CDHRI has been viewed as a major compromise on human 
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rights as it has the potential to legitimise human rights abuses. Furthermore, it is found to have 
had little impact on the practice of OIC states.284 
The OIC has built a form of ‘religionalism’, which subjects human rights to sharīʿa instead of 
building a regionalism that strengthens human rights protection. This approach is not reflective 
of the majority of OIC states but mirrors the legal systems and attitude of a minority. States 
that do not incorporate sharīʿa into their domestic laws can make little use of the CDHRI.285 
According to Ioana Cismas, this is the main problem of the Cairo Declaration: ’it does not 
encourage states to promote reform of sharīʿa law, but accommodates the status quo. 
Ultimately, if the intention of the OIC is to construct cultural legitimacy for international 
human rights in Muslim societies, the Cairo Declaration does not reflect such an intention’.286 
The CDHRI must evolve its language to reflect a Declaration which develops a regionalism 
that strengthens human rights and reflects the plurality of the sharīʿa. 
2.7.6 Arab Charter on Human Rights  
Another regional human rights instrument is the 1994 Arab Charter of Human Rights adopted 
by the League of Arab States.287 The Charter received widespread criticism for failing to meet 
international human rights standards and no Arab state ratified it. A revised text of the Charter 
was adopted in 2004, aimed at modernising the original document to correspond with 
international human rights. It entered into force March 15 2008 and 13 states have ratified it to 
date.288 
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The first article of the 2004 Charter declares the need ‘[t]o entrench the principle that all human 
rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’ which emphasises a clear and 
unambiguous commitment to universality unlike the 1994 version of the Charter which did not 
contain such a provision. The Charter is devoid of cultural, religious, or other relativism and 
its preamble makes reference to various international instruments including the UN Charter, 
the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR. However, it also refers to the CDHRI, a document which is 
clearly grounded in Islam. 
In agreement with Mervat Rishmawi, the conservatism of the CDHRI is reflected in some of 
the substantive provisions of the Charter. For example, Article 8 requires States Parties to 
‘protect every person in their territory from being subjected to physical or mental torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ but not punishment, which reflects the continued use 
of corporal punishment and the death penalty under sharīʿa. 289 Furthermore, Arab states do 
not have a uniform position on some of the issues which demonstrates the inconsistency in the 
interpretation of sharīʿa amongst states that use it as the main source, or one of the sources, of 
legislation.  
The Charter affirms the right to life and closely follows the principles of the ICCPR but with 
some textual differences. Under Article 6, the death penalty is reserved for only ‘the most 
serious crimes’ and Article 7 exempts juveniles under 18 years as well as pregnant women 
‘unless otherwise stipulated in the laws in force at the time of commission of the crime’. This 
caveat is in clear breach of Article 6(5) ICCPR and 37(a) CRC which contain an absolute 
prohibition, with no deferring to domestic law.290 The majority of Arab states are party to the 
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ICCPR and CRC and none have entered any reservations under Article 6(5) ICCPR or 37(a) 
CRC. It appears that the Charter ‘reflect[s] the practice in a small minority of States, namely 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, who are among the remaining few countries in the world still to 
execute children under 18’.291 This is explored further in Chapter 3. Furthermore, pursuant to 
Article 4 of the Charter, the prohibition on the use of the death penalty against children and 
pregnant women can be the subject of derogation in a state of emergency. This is in 
contradiction to Article 5 which guarantees the right to life and prohibits derogation.  
Under Article 8, ‘physical or psychological torture’ is prohibited, as is ‘cruel, degrading, 
humiliating or inhuman treatment’ but not punishment. No definition of torture is provided292 
and a number of important principles related to torture that have been emphasised by the 
Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, and the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture are absent. For example, there is no prohibition of the use of statements extracted under 
torture or cruel treatment in any legal proceedings.293 This provision can therefore be 
understood as implicitly providing for punishment and, arguably, certain forms of torture since 
no definition is given as to what may constitute torture which risks it being arbitrarily applied. 
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Further omissions can be also be found under Article 13 which guarantees the right to a fair 
trial and procedural guarantees and Article 16 which lists a number of minimum guarantees for 
trial. The Charter lacks some important guarantees such as trial ‘without undue delay’ and by 
an ‘independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ as recognised in Articles 14(3)(c) 
and 14(1) of the ICCPR respectively.294 This exacerbates the risk of hearings falling below the 
fair trial standards and provides greater leeway for sentencing individuals to death. 
The Arab Charter on Human Rights is a significant document for Arab States reaffirming their 
commitment to human rights. Whilst it remains largely consistent with international law, it 
contains a number of omissions and inconsistencies which prevent it from being in total 
compliance with international human rights standards. This is particularly evident from its 
failure to make progress in the law and practice on the death penalty in the region. It is argued 
that the Charter represents, ‘a serious setback in the struggle to afford greater protection for the 
right to life. In turn, it actively undermines the position of international human rights law in the 
Arab world’.295 
2.8 The Death Penalty in the UPR through the OIC Lens 
The attachment of OIC Member States to the CDHRI, or that of Arab League states to the Arab 
Charter, appears to have been minimal, particularly when acting in the UN framework.296 The 
UPR mechanism illustrates this point well. Only one OIC state, Iran,297 referred to the CDHRI 
in its national report and only two Arab League states, Lebanon298 and Kuwait,299 mentioned 
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the Arab Charter on Human Rights. These states have not used either of the two instruments in 
their international practice, particularly the CDHRI, ‘nor have they expressed a conviction that 
parts of it or the entire Declaration are binding on them- there is no evidence to support a claim 
that the Declaration or parts of it are regional customary law’.300  
This demonstrates that OIC and/or Arab state practice on human rights issues, such as the right 
to life, is not agreed upon for these instruments to reach customary law status. A lack of reliance 
on the CDHRI and Arab Charter to maintain the death penalty is further support of this. It is 
therefore not a legal obstacle to Member States’ compliance with international human rights 
law, such as protecting the right to life. 
Nevertheless, the imposition of the death penalty still remains a highly contested issue in the 
UPR. To date there have been a total of 2539 death penalty recommendations of which only 
564 have been accepted by states, translating as a 22% acceptance rate. This includes 
recommendations that have been partially accepted.301 
During the first cycle, the top five states receiving death penalty recommendations were the 
United States (32); Iran (27); Iraq (26); Sudan (22); and Tanzania (19) and the top five issuing 
death penalty recommendations were Spain (73); France (72); Italy (65); Brazil (47); and UK 
(43). Cycle one received a total of 913 recommendations on the death penalty.302 
The second cycle saw similar statistics. The top five states receiving death penalty 
recommendations were the United States (51); Iran (41); Thailand (32); Singapore (32); and 
Japan (30) and the top five issuing death penalty recommendations were France (110); Spain 
(97); Australia (90); Italy (88); and Portugal (88). Cycle two received a total of 1626 
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recommendations on the death penalty suggesting a greater engagement on the issue by 
states.303 
The majority of states making the most death penalty recommendations belong to the European 
Union which holds an abolitionist position hence their recommendations are reflective of this 
stance.304 Similarly, Muslim majority states have received the highest number of death penalty 
recommendations which reflects the global assessment of their entrenched endorsement of 
capital punishment. 
Islamic Member State support for the death penalty is most apparent when assessing Egypt and 
Sudan’s recommendations at the UPR. Instead of making recommendations challenging 
retentionist states’ use of the punishment, they went one step further and used the UPR 
mechanism to encourage other states to maintain the death penalty (emphasis added). Egypt 
recommended Afghanistan, Viet Nam, Central African Republic and Chad to ‘continue using 
its sovereign right to apply the death penalty as a tool of criminal justice in accordance with 
the proper safeguards specified under international human rights law’.305  It also encouraged 
China to ‘continue to implement the policy of strictly controlling and applying the death 
penalty’.306 All these states under review accepted the recommendations except Chad which 
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did not provide an explanation. It would have proven fruitful for Chad to explain why it did 
not accept the recommendation which would have allowed for greater discussion on this issue. 
Egypt’s pro death penalty stance was further highlighted in its recommendation to the 
Netherlands, a state that had abolished the death penalty in 1870, to ‘initiate a debate on the 
death penalty, with a view to reaching responsive conclusions consistent with international 
human rights law’.307 Netherlands did not accept the recommendation affirming its ‘firm 
opposition to the death penalty, and that its respect for human rights is basic in this position’.308 
These examples show Egypt’s attempts to problematise the abolitionist perspective in the UPR 
as it did not base its recommendations on the review criteria309 but instead focused on state 
practice to maintain the death penalty or consider its reintroduction contrary to international 
law.310 
Both Egypt and Sudan also made similar recommendations to Malaysia to ‘continue exercising 
its sovereign right of adopting national legislation and the penal code, including the application 
of the death penalty’.311 Sudan also recommended Yemen to ‘abide only by internationally 
agreed principles of international law. In this regard, capital punishment does not fall within 
such agreed norms, the imposition of capital punishment is the prerogative of individual 
States’.312 This indicates a misinterpretation of the role of the death penalty in international law 
which provides for a very restricted application of the punishment as demonstrated in the 
previous sections.  
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Furthermore, Islamic states encouraging other states to maintain the death penalty reinforces 
the attitude that it is not a matter of human rights but rather it is a legitimate criminal sanction 
which the state, as sovereign, can apply as it wishes. It does not consider the implications of 
such a recommendation, especially if the country in question has a poor record of human rights, 
for example, failing to observe fair judicial processes. This risks the death penalty being 
arbitrarily applied and the right to life ultimately subjugated.  
During Libya’s review, the state acknowledged that the question of abolition of the death 
penalty has been considered on several occasions however it ‘resolved to retain the penalty for 
reasons relating to Islamic law on the one hand and for social reasons on the other relating to 
the desire to prevent any resurgence of the phenomenon of revenge’.313 This suggests a 
purposeful attempt to monopolise the interpretation of Islamic law that allows for a wide 
application of the punishment, as demonstrated in Part Two. Nevertheless, and despite its 
apparent support for the punishment, the state affirmed that ‘[a]bolition of the death penalty 
remains a goal of Libyan society’.314 Whether this is a genuine aspiration of the state remains 
to be seen in its third cycle and whether it adopts tangible steps towards abolition. 
On the other hand, Maldives argued that Islam constitutes the basis of all its laws hence it is 
unconstitutional to remove punishments such as the death penalty,315 and did not engage in any 
effort to consider a moratorium and/or abolition. In fact, it decided to reinstate the death penalty 
after a six-decade long moratorium.316 Here we see the constitutionality of the death penalty 
being solidified on the basis of religious grounds, the focus of which is taken up in Part Two 
below. Such statements demonstrate the varying and changing interpretation of Islamic law as 
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both states use Islamic law as a source of their legislation yet appear to have diverging views 
on the status of capital punishment. For example, Libya acknowledges abolition as an ultimate 
aim whilst Maldives remains static on its retentionist views.  
2.8.1 A Note on Cultural Relativism  
In the Islamic context, the promotion of perceived sharīʿa norms is often used as an argument 
against the promotion of universal values and this can be seen, to varying degrees, in the UPR 
of states such as Iran, Maldives, Yemen, and Pakistan.317 An examination of their reports 
reveals a number of expressions of cultural relativism which can be used to justify non-
adherence to international human rights obligations. A vocal proponent in this regard is Iran 
which argued that human rights need to be understood in light of its adherence to Islamic 
principles which it uses to establish the foundation of its legal system.318 Relying upon, ‘the 
principle of cultural diversity, while respecting and avoiding political and cultural pressures’, 
it concluded in its national report that: 
Any change or adjustments in these laws must come about as a result of dynamic 
national dialogue among our own authorities and civil society in the context of 
Islamic principles. Pressure or demands by other countries to accept and adopt 
certain Western standards of human rights will practically have negative impact on 
promotion of human rights.319 
This does not seem to reflect the possibility that the death penalty can be removed ‘in the 
context of Islamic principles’. Iran’s position suggests that any change in domestic laws must 
be preceded by national dialogue and this study informs such dialogue by challenging the 
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perceived necessity of the death penalty within Islamic thought. Hence the question of the death 
penalty in Islam is not simply one based purely on international human rights, but it is also 
based on the theological underpinnings in the religion which need to be elucidated and 
deconstructed. This is presented in Part Two. 
Another Islamic state, Maldives, stressed that it had embraced and maintained Islamic values 
for the last 800 years. Islamic values were part of the national identity and heritage and formed 
the basis of the Constitution and all Maldives’ laws hence, ‘any efforts to introduce values and 
practices that were contrary to the values of Islam…would not be entertained by the people of 
Maldives’.320 This raises the question as to what are the values of Islam which is explored in 
Part Two of the study. In fact, it is the values of mercy, justice, and compassion in Islam which 
serve as an antidote to the death penalty and need to be adequately reflected in current 
discourse. 
During Yemen’s review, the state acknowledged the UPR mechanism ‘as a means of improving 
the human rights situation by applying principles of impartiality, objectivity and full 
transparency’321 but failed to mention the principle of universality thereby lending support to 
the cultural relativism argument. Furthermore, during the interactive dialogue stage, Iran 
applauded Yemen’s efforts to promote human rights and address challenges, ‘with due regard 
to national and regional particularities and historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’.322 In 
a similar vein, Egypt encouraged Afghanistan to ‘[c]ontinue to resist attempts to enforce any 
values or standards beyond the universally agreed human rights norms’.323 
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Consequently, states may unilaterally reject certain recommendations on the basis that they do 
not concern ‘universally recognised human rights,’ as was claimed by Pakistan during its 
review.324 This has become ‘a rather powerful rhetorical device to contend that the West is 
perpetuating false universalisms’325 and allows states to immunise themselves from further 
scrutiny. Strong cultural relativism326 has troubling implications for international law as a 
whole and hinders the ability of different cultures to participate in constructive dialogue. 
Colleen Good argues that in order to ensure greater agreement and reduce instances of cross-
cultural misunderstandings, aspects of weak relativism should be considered in that, ‘different 
cultures have different cultural and ethical histories, and that these histories should not be 
brushed aside and ignored, but should instead be examined closely to allow us to further 
intercultural dialogue on subjects such as human rights’.327 The discussion on the death penalty 
in Islam is an example of this. Exploring the historical, cultural, and religious background of 
capital punishment in Islamic law will help provide a new perspective and enable further 
dialogue with a view to elevating the right to life by subjugating the right to put to death. 
This complements Khaled Abou El Fadl’s approach wherein he challenges the claim of 
‘Muslim exceptionalism’ amongst Islamic states by arguing that, ‘any effort to deal with this 
issue must start by acknowledging that Islam itself, like all religions, is founded on certain 
universals, such as mercy, justice, compassion, and dignity’.328 The sharīʿa embodies rational 
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or natural moral values which precede the law but are also recognised by the law and this is 
reflected in Qurʾānic discourse which consistently employs terminology that presupposes the 
existence of universal values.329 
This provides for common grounds with the death penalty in international human rights and 
the question of the death penalty in Islam which is explored in Part Two. It also illustrates the 
idea that there is a rationality within Islam that has shifted the momentum away from death to 
the fostering of life. There is a mistaken belief that the death penalty is an expression of cultural 
relativism but in fact, Islam respects the right to life in ways consistent with international 
human rights. It is respecting values such as mercy, forgiveness, and justice that facilitates the 
existence of life rather than death. Unfortunately, such an approach is yet to solidify through 
the international fora when it comes to the question of the death penalty in Islamic Member 
States. This is reflected in the case studies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Sudan. 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the Universal Periodic Review by providing the historical 
backdrop to its creation before exploring the process and modalities of the UPR mechanism in 
the context of Islamic states. It then proceeded to analyse the relationship between these states 
and the role of the death penalty in international human rights law and how this translates into 
the UPR. 
Islamic Member States made contributions to the drafting of the UDHR and the ICCPR, namely 
the Second Optional Protocol, where their pro death penalty position was solidified under the 
pretext of religion. Regional instruments such as the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam or the Arab Charter on Human Rights, whilst implicitly providing recourse to the death 
penalty, have not been relied upon by these states when dealing with international human rights 
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standards such as the right to life. Consequently, these cannot be considered as customary 
international law and used as a barrier for the removal of the death penalty. 
The UPR sheds further light on Islamic states and the death penalty by providing a constructive, 
transparent, and cooperative platform to engage in human rights issues. All OIC states have 
engaged with the UPR mechanism albeit to varying degrees. What emerges is a common theme 
of regionalism and ‘religionalism’ used to undermine the review process, and this is often seen 
through the use of vague or mainly congratulatory language. Furthermore, a number of Islamic 
states perpetuate a false relativism narrative and use religion to account for a lack of adherence 
to international human rights law such as Afghanistan, Iran, Maldives, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and Sudan. This is particularly evident from death penalty recommendations which are 


















CHAPTER THREE:  














3. Case Study: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
3.1 Introduction 
A vocal opponent and critic of the ICCPR Second Optional Protocol, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is responsible for a significant number of death sentences and executions that occur 
worldwide. Often viewed as a repeat human rights offender, the country is a staunch defender 
of capital punishment and one of the top executioners in the world. Amnesty International 
records at least 158 executions in 2015;1 154 executions in 2016;2 and 146 executions in 2017.3 
Saudi Arabia’s continued application of the death penalty has always been justified on the basis 
of religion which forms the foundation of its legal system. There is no penal code or official 
interpretation of the sharīʿa that is published by the government and therefore it is utilising a 
fluid interpretation which can allow for a wide scope of the death penalty and a frequent 
application. This chapter presents an analysis of the Kingdom’s UPR, with its first review held 
in 2009 followed by its second review in 2013 and engages with how the death penalty is 
viewed as a product of state sovereignty and internal criminal justice rather than human rights. 
3.2 The beginning of a Kingdom  
Sharīʿa as the basis of all legislation has been upheld since the inception of the Kingdom in 
1932 through to the current reign of King Salman.4 The Kingdom itself was born from two 
religious revivals. The first was a result of an 18th century alliance between Muḥammad Ibn 
Saʿūd, the chief of an agricultural settlement called Diriyah (near Riyadh), and a Muslim 
scholar and reformer named Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb who advocated for a return to 
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puritanical Islam.5 The latter sought to purify Islam from what he labelled as innovations and 
to apply a strict interpretation of the sharīʿa.6 His teachings were situated in the Ḥanbalī 
madhhab7 whose founder Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) followed the sunna (prophetic 
tradition) most meticulously.8 This alliance between Ibn Saʿūd and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
provided the ideological momentum for Saudi expansion and according to David Commins, 
‘this was the origin of the pact between religious mission and political power that has endured 
for more than two and a half centuries’.9 The second revival occurred as a result of ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz, the then leader of the al-Saʿūd family, uniting the two Kingdoms of Hejaz and Najd in 
1932, forming the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as it is known today. 
Saudi Arabia explicitly acknowledges Islam in its constitution with strong constitutional 
structures for the organisation and functioning of power.10 Islam is assigned a privileged status 
and ‘does not merely mean prayers, and fasting and Hajj (pilgrimage) and Zakat (alms-giving); 
it also includes the law of the lands and the institutions of the State’.11 Maududi, a famous 
Islamic scholar and philosopher, elaborates: 
[I]f we want to establish religion of God, the objective will not be achieved by 
merely establishing the institutions of Saum (fast) and Salat (prayer). We shall have 
                                                          
5 TR McHale, ‘A Prospect of Saudi Arabia’ (1980) 56(4) International Affairs 622, 624; Leslie McLoughlin, Ibn 
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Ibn Saud’ (2012) 120 The National Interest 89, 89; Kenneth William, Ibn Sa’ud: The Puritan King of Arabia 
(London: Cape 1933). 
6 Brenda Shaffer, The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press 2006) 127-28. 
7 For a history of the four schools of law (sing. madhhab/pl. madhāhib), see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
8 Jacques Waardenburg, Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspectives (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2002) 
233. 
9 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I.B Tauris 2006) 19. For a detailed analysis 
on Saudi Arabia’s historical and ideological background see Derek Hopwood, ‘The Ideological Basis: Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab's Muslim Revivalism’ in Timothy Niblock (ed), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (London: 
Croom Helm 1981); Natana J DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford: 
OUP 2008).  
10 Nisrine Abaid, Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative 
Study (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) 38; Ayoub M Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial 
Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia’ (2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 5-54. 
11 Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution (Khurshid Ahmed tr and ed, 2nd edn, Lahore: 




to establish side by side with them the Divine Law and make the Shari’ah the law 
of the land. If the latter is not established, then even if the institutions of Salat etc. 
are in force, it will not amount to the establishment of din (religion). It would only 
be partial enforcement of it and not a total one.12 
This argument follows the idea that Islam must be implemented to not only govern the domain 
of spiritual acts but also form the basis of all laws, for organising government, policing, and 
punishment as seen in the legislative framework of Saudi Arabia.13 Sharīʿa is considered the 
exclusive source of legislation and therefore has an intrinsic influence over the state’s legal 
structure which is codified by the Basic Law of Governance 1992.14 Article 23 stipulates that 
the law must be implemented in accordance with the Islamic faith and the state must undertake 
this duty.15 The integral role of Islam in the country is affirmed in Article 1: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state. Its religion is 
Islam, and its constitution is the Holy Qur’an and the prophet’s (peace be upon 
him) sunnah (traditions). Its language is the Arabic language and its capital city is 
Riyadh. 16 
The state is endowed with legislative power over the divine law. God’s sovereignty is expressed 
through human agents however it relies upon the subjective interpretive determinations of the 
state for its production and execution. The Basic Law does not specify a doctrinal school 
(madhhab) whose rules are binding, but in practice the courts tend to apply Ḥanbalī law. This 
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Peter Mansfield, The New Arabians (New York: J.G. Ferguson Publishing 1981) 21; George N Sfeir, ‘The Saudi 
Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) 36(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 729, 753. 
14 Abaid, Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights, 46. 
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is a result of the Royal Decree of 24/3/1347H (1928) which affirmed that rulings are to conform 
with the established decisions found in the Ḥanbalī madhhab. An important exception was also 
included in paragraph (b) where, ‘the courts would apply the opinion of other schools of Islamic 
law if they determined that it was better to apply it so as to reach a more appropriate ruling 
which would best serve public welfare’.17 This is an important feature that can help produce a 
more reasoned interpretation of death penalty laws in Islam and is explored further in Part Two. 
The Constitution treats the Kingdom as ‘a means to an end; the end in this case being the 
absolute rule of Islam and adherence to it by all Saudis’.18 For example, Article 5(a) of the 
Basic Law establishes that a monarchy is the country’s system of governance and demands 
allegiance of all citizens to the King. Concepts such as separation of powers are disregarded 
and instead, executive and legislative branches of government are considered to be extensions 
of the King’s power.19 However a number of provisions laid down in the Basic Law restrict the 
King’s mandate to rule such as Article 5(b) and Article 7. They introduce a concept of 
deference which confines the King’s power to the Qurʾān and the sunna thereby emphasising 
religion as the basis for the legal system.20 
The death penalty is not explicitly provided for under the Basic Law; however, Article 38 
states: 
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There shall be no crime or punishment except on the basis of Shari’a or a statutory 
provision, and there shall be no punishment except for deed subsequent to the 
effectiveness of a statutory provision. 
This suggests that the state’s use of the death penalty rests on sharīʿa grounds21 and Article 10 
of the Law of Criminal Procedure acknowledges the existence of the punishment by affirming 
that the Court of Appeal will, ‘review sentences of death, stoning, amputation or qisas 
(retaliatory punishment) in cases other than death’.22 Since Saudi Arabia has not codified its 
penal system, there is no formal code or legislation which details all the capital offences. This 
is a major obstacle for elevating the right to life as, without the presence of a codified law, the 
state can impose the death penalty arbitrarily. 
The Death Penalty Worldwide database lists the death penalty offences in Saudi Arabia.23 
These include murder,24 robbery,25 burglary,26 terrorism-related offences,27 drug-trafficking,28 
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23‘‘Saudi Arabia’ (Death Penalty Worldwide) <www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-
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adultery,29 apostasy,30 homosexual and lesbian acts,31 espionage,32 sorcery,33 witchcraft,34 
recidivist alcohol consumption,35 ‘corruption on earth’,36 and kidnapping.37 Many of the 
offences can be non-fatal yet are still punished with death, contrary to international human 
rights standards as discussed in Chapter 2 and the country’s UPR below. 
3.2.1 International Human Rights and Saudi Law 
The Basic Law makes direct reference to the state’s obligation to protect human rights under 
Article 26 in that, ‘[t]he State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari’a’. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with human rights has been somewhat ambivalent and 
can be traced back to its role in the creation of the UDHR. Although the Saudi representative, 
Jamil Al-Baroody, was ‘one of the few diplomats to have seen the UDHR and the covenants 
through, from the start, the Third Committee debates in 1948, to the end, with the approval of 
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the covenants in 1966’,38 the Kingdom was one of the eight Member States, and the only 
Muslim country, to abstain from the General Assembly vote on the Declaration.39  
Al-Baroody, representing a country known for its Islamic conservatism, did not focus on points 
of Islamic theology in his arguments but his abstention in the UDHR vote was most likely 
based on Islamic perspectives, in particular, Article 18 which provided freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion.40 Given the religious basis of the newly-established Saudi state, it 
was not surprising that it sought to restrict religious change. Al-Baroody questioned the 
delegates of France and Lebanon as to whether they had consulted the Muslim populations in 
their jurisdictions before accepting the text guaranteeing the right to change one’s religion or 
belief.41 He also asked the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands, whether they were 
‘not afraid of offending the religious beliefs of their Moslem subjects by imposing that article 
on them’.42 This line of questioning seems to indicate that Saudi Arabia considered the text of 
Article 18 to be contrary to Islamic precepts.  
As the UN developed, the practice of Saudi Arabia challenging international human rights 
standards based on religious norms became more visible in the international fora, with the state 
articulating explicit arguments to this effect. It was one of the most vocal opponents to the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR arguing that, ‘the inclusion of capital punishment as 
an item on the agenda was a further attempt to give currency to so-called “universal concepts” 
without taking account of the cultural and religious features or domestic laws of different 
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countries’.43 The Saudi delegate, Mr Al-Rassi, affirmed that in the Kingdom, ‘capital 
punishment provided for under Islamic law was intended simply as a powerful deterrent to 
serious crime, which was fortunately rare’.44 The state’s execution of 146 individuals in 2017 
alone runs counter to this claim.45 
Saudi Arabia’s attitude to capital punishment is perhaps very telling in the first and second 
cycles of its Universal Periodic Review. 
3.3 First Cycle 
Saudi Arabia had its first Universal Periodic Review in 2008.46 It received 113 
recommendations from 43 states and a total of 89 recommendations were accepted.47  
3.3.1 National Report 
In the national report submitted as part of its review, the state declared that ‘human rights are 
a universal human heritage to which all peoples are entitled’48 and emphasised its commitment 
to fully cooperating with ‘every institution seeking to safeguard, promote and enhance human 
rights’.49 This seems to be political rhetoric employed by Saudi Arabia as its interpretation of 
human rights seems to privilege its relative position as discussed below.  
The report begins with the methodology undertaken to prepare the submission and lists the full 
involvement of all governmental and non-governmental bodies, seeking full objectivity and 
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transparency.50 It fails to provide details of these consultations such as the time, location, or 
identity of the NGOs actually involved. As a result, the true engagement and/or impact of 
stakeholders is left unknown. If the document’s word limit is a factor for such an omission, 
then this could always be included as an annex which has not been done.51 
It then proceeds to highlight the normative and institutional framework for human rights in the 
Kingdom which includes the Basic Law of Governance,52 the Statutes of the Judiciary,53 the 
Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure,54 the Code of Practice for Lawyers,55 and the 
international human rights instruments ratified by the Kingdom.56  
The theme of religion is prevalent throughout the report with fourteen references alone to the 
sharīʿa including Qurʾānic verses.57 The report highlights the state’s obligation to protect 
human rights by citing Article 26 of the Basic Law which affords protection of these rights in 
‘accordance with the Islamic sharia’. This demonstrates that human rights are not absolute in 
the Kingdom but are restricted by religious tenants and therefore subject to the dictates of the 
sharīʿa. The state’s frequent reference to the provisions of sharīʿa affirm the level of primacy 
afforded to it; the sharīʿa ‘constitutes the quintessence of the Kingdoms’ legislation insofar as 
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it incorporates a number of constitutional principles to ensure protection of and respect for 
human rights’.58 
Deference to the ‘Islamic sharia’ is a common theme in the Kingdom’s report and is also 
reflected in the state’s establishment of the Saudi Human Rights Commission (SHRC) whose 
objective is to protect and promote human rights in accordance with international standards. A 
caveat is added to this declaration by stating that the SHRC’s objectives are achieved in a 
manner consistent with the Islamic faith.59 Furthermore, the Human Rights Commission is not 
an independent body and functions within a state-sanctioned framework. It reports directly to 
the King who has the authority to appoint its entire membership.60 
Another body referenced in the report is the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), a 
civil society institution, and is highlighted as one of the achievements made by the state. The 
society aims to protect human rights in accordance with Saudi law, the Qurʾān, the sunna, 
‘along with the Declarations and Covenants of Human Rights issued by the Arab League, 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the United Nations and its agencies and 
specialized committees, so long as they do not contradict with Islamic Shariah’.61 
Although depicted as an ‘independent private association’,62 the NSHR operates under 
significant government influence and can therefore be viewed as increasingly partisan.63 It does 
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not have any direct administrative connections to the Saudi government but it does receive 
generous funding from the estate of the late King Fahd.64 In March 2004, the society received 
royal approval from King Fahd to operate as long as it worked in line with the Qurʾān and the 
1992 Basic Law of Governance.65 Therefore, discussion pertaining to the right to life by either 
the SHRC or NSHR is at risk of promoting state-centric ideology, i.e. the notion that capital 
punishment is to be maintained owing to perceived matters of criminal justice, rather than an 
objective discourse on human rights.  
There is no explicit reference to the death penalty anywhere in the national report suggesting 
that Saudi Arabia’s attitude to capital punishment is seen as a matter of state sovereignty as 
opposed to a question of human rights. This is reflected in its voting pattern on the UN General 
Assembly Resolutions on the moratorium on the use of the death penalty and the accompanying 
note verbale of disassociation.66 Saudi Arabia has consistently voted against these 
resolutions,67 including the most recent resolution in 2016, and endorsed the note verbale each 
year which emphasises that capital punishment is ‘first and foremost an issue of the criminal 
justice system and an important deterring element vis-à-vis the most serious crimes’.68 
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The note further claims that ‘[e]very State has an inalienable right to choose its political, 
economic, social, cultural, legal and criminal justice systems, without interference in any form 
by another State’69 and that: 
All Member States are acting in compliance with their international obligations. 
Each Member State has decided freely, in accordance with its own sovereign right 
established by the United Nations Charter, to determine the path that corresponds 
to its own social, cultural and legal needs, in order to maintain social security, order 
and peace. No Member State has the right to impose its standpoint on others.70  
Clear principles of sovereignty and criminal justice are reflected in the above statement and are 
being used to prevent scrutiny of states’ practice of the death penalty. Moreover, to assert that 
all states are adhering to their right to life obligations is a bold claim to make and the UPR 
process itself demonstrates that this is not accurate. The OHCHR and stakeholder reports for 
Saudi Arabia, as discussed below, are a case in point. Furthermore, respecting human rights 
does not deprive a state of its sovereignty and is a false antithesis to claim otherwise. Whilst 
all states have the right to punish, including the use of religion to set criminal sanctions, there 
are limits defined by international human rights as identified in Chapter 2; and a true 
application of Islamic criminal sanctions is reflective of the ideology of promoting the right to 
life which is explored in Part Two below. The Universal Periodic Review is a mechanism that 
can help affirm such a discourse.  
The only reference to the state penal law in the national report is regarding the Code of Criminal 
Procedure which was promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/39 on 16 October 2001. A 
significant legislative instrument that, ‘directly addresses the most important human rights 
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issues by clearly defining the procedures from the time of arrest until the accused is brought to 
trial’.71 However, upon closer inspection, and as highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the 
independence of judges and lawyers, the interests of an investigation seem to be afforded 
priority over the interests of the defendant.72 
The report also highlights the state’s commitment to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, noting its accession to the UN Convention Against Torture 
and lists the measures undertaken as part of its obligation to implement it. This includes the 
Kingdom’s reports to the Committee Against Torture which have been ‘presented and 
discussed’. 73 This is a false narrative as there has only been one report presented to the 
Committee to date, as shown in the OHCHR’s compilation, and this reflects the state’s obscure 
practices towards this human rights issue. Failure to commit to treaty body reporting deadlines 
suggests that it is not deemed as increasingly important on the state’s agenda. This might be 
purposeful, but we are prevented from knowing because of the opaque practices galvanised by 
the propositions of state sovereignty.  
States generally have a vested interest in presenting a positive image of their human rights 
record and with no mention of capital punishment in Saudi Arabia’s national report, it is 
possible for this human rights issue to be overlooked within the UPR. However, the presence 
of stakeholders and the United Nation’s own report differentiates this review process from any 
other UN mechanism as it allows pertinent human rights issues to be brought to the fore, 
making human rights violations more visible.  
The opposing narrative on the human rights situation is reflected in the polarisation of 
submissions received from the principal actors involved in the UPR process. Whilst the 
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sovereign remains silent on the issue of capital punishment, the voices of the United Nations 
and civil society resonate loudly by addressing right to life violations and holding the state 
under review to account. This can be seen from the OHCHR and stakeholder reports below.  
3.3.2 OHCHR Report  
The OHCHR compilation, submitted on 20 November 2008, draws upon reports submitted by 
Special Procedures and treaty bodies, including comments and observations by the State 
concerned, and other relevant UN documentation.74  
Saudi Arabia is not a party to a number of core treaties such as the ICESCR, ICCPR, ICCPR-
OP-1, and ICCPR-OP-2 and has issued reservations under ICERD, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC 
to which it is a party.75 A reservation allows a State Party to exclude itself from the legal effect 
of specific treaty provisions whilst remaining a party to the treaty in general. It has been defined 
as: 
A unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State.76 
A number of states have issued reservations to human rights treaties but what makes Islamic 
countries such as Saudi Arabia so distinctive from other reserving states is that they have 
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justified reservations on the basis of Islamic law.77 For example, under the CRC, Article 37(a) 
prohibits any child to be subjected to ‘torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release 
shall be imposed on offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age’.  Although a 
party to this Convention, Saudi Arabia has entered into ‘reservations with respect to all such 
articles as are in conflict with the provisions of Islamic law’. Such recommendations are 
indeterminate, imprecise, and open-ended which is ‘contrary to the certainty required for the 
acceptance of a clear legal obligation’.78 No detail is given explaining how the reservation 
conflicts with Islamic law. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has therefore urged the 
state to review its general reservation and either withdraw or narrow it.79 The use of general 
reservations makes it problematic in determining the extent to which States Parties undertake 
the obligation to comply with treaty provisions. Ultimately such reservations render States 
Parties’ commitments to be viewed as more symbolic than substantive.80  
The OHCHR report refers to treaty bodies such as the Committee Against Torture, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child when discussing the state’s role in preserving the right to life.81 The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child recommended Saudi Arabia to immediately suspend executions for 
persons who were under 18 years of age at the time of the offence and take the necessary action 
to convert them into penalties that are in line with the CRC.82 It encouraged the state to 
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undertake a critical review of its legislation with a view to abolishing the death penalty for such 
persons.83 
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions raised 
concerns for the imposition of capital punishment on child offenders citing the case of Ahmad 
al-Dukkani, a 13-year-old male sentenced to death in 2005 for the murder of his 3-year-old 
neighbour.84 Such a punishment is incompatible with the state’s international obligations under 
the CRC which prohibits the death penalty for persons under 18 at the time of the offence.85 It 
is also contradictory to Saudi Arabia’s commitment found in its 2004 report to the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child which states that, ‘a juvenile is defined under the Detention 
Regulation and the Juvenile Homes’ Regulation of AH 1395 (1975) as every human being 
below the age of 18’.86 Imposing the death penalty on a 13-year-old is therefore in 
contravention of the state under review’s own domestic legislation.  
As demonstrated above, the Special Rapporteur’s findings are in conflict with the information 
provided in the national report wherein Saudi Arabia affirms its ratification of the treaty and 
‘large-scale dissemination of the articles of the Convention through the information media, at 
schools and among the governmental and judicial authorities’.87 Instances of the juvenile death 
penalty do not reflect an awareness and adequate application of the CRC, particularly at the 
judicial level. 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also expressed concern at 
allegations that foreigners were indiscriminately being sentenced to death and encouraged the 
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state to fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary 
executions.88 Almost half of the 102 executions that took place in 2008, the year of Saudi 
Arabia’s first review, were foreign nationals from poor and developing countries. Most of them 
had no defence lawyer and were unable to follow court proceedings in Arabic.89 Not being 
informed of one’s consular rights is a violation of Article 3690 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, which Saudi Arabia ratified in 1988.91  
Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with human rights mechanisms remains an issue of concern. The 
OHCHR’s contribution in the UPR, viz-à-viz its report, allows for greater transparency on the 
Kingdom’s human rights obligations and enables a more constructive and open dialogue for its 
review. The report details that Saudi Arabia has a number of treaty body reports overdue, for 
example, the second to third CAT reports are outstanding from 2002 to 2006 respectively. 
Although the Committee on the Rights of the Child commended Saudi Arabia’s efforts to 
address a number of concerns identified from its first report, it urged the state to ‘make every 
effort to address the recommendations issued in the concluding observations’.92  
Cooperation with the UN Special Procedures is also lacking with a visit requested by the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary and summary executions in 2005 and no response 
received.93 The Rapporteur sent communications to the government regarding death sentences 
imposed on child offenders,94 confessions extracted under torture and cases falling short of 
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international fair trial standards.95 Sufun Muhammad Ali Ahmed al-Zafifi, a Yemeni national, 
was convicted of abduction and rape, and the Special Rapporteur received reports alleging that 
his confession, ‘was extracted under duress, that the trial took place behind closed doors and 
that he was not afforded defense counsel’.96  
What emerges is a distinct polarisation of attitudes as demonstrated by the state in its national 
report and the Special Procedures in the OHCHR report. Although Saudi Arabia specifies that 
its Code of Criminal Procedure provides ‘comprehensive safeguards’, this does not seem to 
occur in practice. This demonstrates a superficial engagement with the UPR process as the state 
is failing to acknowledge its limitations in protecting the right to life or the occurrence of unfair 
trials which are facilitating the application of the death penalty. 
The OHCHR makes it clear that lack of information or focus on a specific issue could be due 
to the state under review’s non-ratification of a relevant treaty and/or lack of cooperation with 
international human rights mechanisms. In Saudi Arabia’s case, this would suggest a lack of 
discussion on the right to life is due to non-ratification of the ICCPR; however, through various 
treaty bodies and Special Procedures, this has been addressed to some extent especially when 
taking the limited length of the OHCHR submission into account.  
3.3.3 Stakeholder Report  
The stakeholder report97 presents a summary of nine stakeholder submissions to Saudi Arabia’s 
UPR.98 Additional stakeholders submitted statements separately which can be found on the 
                                                          
95 UN Doc A/HRC/8/3/Add.1, 335-37 and 349. 
96 ibid 336. 
97 UNHRC, ‘Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with 
Paragraph 15(c) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Saudi Arabia’ (14 November 2008) UN 
Doc A/HRC/WG.6/4/SAU/3 [hereinafter Saudi Arabia Stakeholder Report 1]. 
98 Participating stakeholders: Alkarama for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, European Centre for Law and Justice, Human Rights Watch, International Commission of Jurists, Islamic 




OHCHR website.99 The infringement of the right to life and administration of the law were 
identified as key concerns across the submissions.100  
Amnesty International noted that the state’s human rights framework is weak and undermined 
by the government’s political, legal, and judicial structures. The only reference to human rights 
is the generic statement provided in the Basic Law that human rights will be protected 
according to the sharīʿa.101 
A number of stakeholders including Alkarama,102 Amnesty International,103 Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty,104 and the International Commission of Jurists105 all raised concerns 
regarding the state’s use of the death penalty for a number of offences including non-violent 
offences; and how Saudi Arabia ‘continues to use [the death penalty] extensively, even against 
children, in defiance of international standards’.106 Furthermore, the disproportionate and 
discriminatory use of the death penalty against the poor, the foreign workers, and women is ‘a 
result of government failure to abide by international standards for fair trial and safeguards for 
defendants in capital cases’.107 Offences such as blasphemy and apostasy are also punishable 
by death according to Saudi law with the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty reporting the case 
of a Turkish national, Sabri Bogday, who was sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2007 and 
also indicated that foreigners are more vulnerable to death sentences.108 
                                                          
99 See <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx> accessed 4 January 2016. 
100 Saudi Arabia Stakeholder Report 1, paras 12-17. 
101 Amnesty International UPR Submission, 3. 
102 Alkarama for Human Rights UPR Submission, 6. 
103 Amnesty International UPR Submission, 5. 
104 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty UPR Submission, 4. 
105 International Commission of Jurists UPR Submission, 7. 
106 Amnesty International UPR Submission, 5. 
107 ibid.   




Alkarama highlighted the case of Khaled Bin Mohamed Issa Al-Qadihi who was sentenced to 
death due to alleged drug trafficking.109 However, he was unable to hire a lawyer, had not 
acknowledged the facts, and argued that the confession was obtained under duress. This is clear 
evidence of fair trial standards not being met in violation of Article 14 ICCPR.110 Although 
Saudi Arabia is not yet party to this Convention, its national report states that, ‘in actual fact 
many of the provisions of these two Covenants are being implemented’.111 Access to a fair trial 
does not seem to be one of those provisions. Alkarama recommended that the state should, 
‘ensure a legal process which offers all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, particularly 
those accused of a crime punishable by death’.112 
The European Centre for Law and Justice noted that judges in Saudi Arabia are guided by 
general principles of Islamic jurisprudence and vaguely-worded laws which are interpreted 
differently by various jurists. One such example being that, ‘it is the judge who decides what 
constitutes apostasy’.113 This echoes the sentiments of the Becket Fund who argued that human 
rights and freedoms are contingent upon the application of the sharīʿa as interpreted by the 
Saudi courts. Furthermore, the secrecy of court proceedings protects judges from legal scrutiny 
by defence lawyers thereby enhancing the former’s discretionary powers.114 
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The International Commission of Jurists argued that the absence of a codified penal law 
coupled with judges’ unfettered power in deciding what constitutes a crime and what is the 
adequate sentence to be applied has led to a steady increase in the number of executions. 
Arbitrary arrests and unfair trials occur often and threaten the rights of the citizens.115 The NGO 
also recognised that under Saudi Arabia’s interpretation of sharīʿa law, the death penalty is 
applied for a wide range of offences including those with non-lethal consequences. It identified 
that the difficulty here is that many principles of sharīʿa law and verses of the Qurʾān are 
subject to different interpretations even amongst renowned scholars; this is investigated below 
in Part Two. Punishments for criminal acts such as death for adultery and apostasy contravene 
Saudi Arabia’s obligations under CAT.116 
Human Rights Watch delivered a scathing report on Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system 
arguing that the deficiencies in both Saudi Arabia’s law and practices are fostering human 
rights violations. Defendants’ rights are so ‘fundamental and systemic’ that Saudi Arabia’s 
current criminal justice system is at odds with a system that should be based upon international 
human rights standards.117 The Code of Criminal Procedure promulgated in 2002 fails to 
protect the basic rights of defendants. The code does not allow a detainee to challenge the 
‘lawfulness of her detention before a court, fails to guarantee access to legal counsel in a timely 
manner, and contains no provision for free legal assistance to the indigent….judges routinely 
ignore, and are even ignorant of, the provisions of the law of Criminal Procedure’.118  
Amnesty international stated that the criminal justice system mainly operates in secret and  
on a summary basis and fosters impunity for human rights perpetrators. It allows 
for prolonged incommunicado detention and detention of suspects without charge 
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or trial for long periods of time. It provides no right for suspects to challenge in 
court the legality of their detention or to lodge complaints about other abuses such 
as torture and other ill-treatment.119 
It called upon the government to declare a moratorium on executions and review all cases with 
the aim of commuting prisoners’ sentences or providing them a new and fair trial without 
recourse to the death penalty.120 
Furthermore, echoing the statements of previous stakeholders, the ICJ highlighted that under 
international human rights standards and jurisprudence, ‘capital punishment can only be 
imposed for the most serious crimes and in all circumstances, any trial leading to the imposition 
of the death penalty must conform to fundamental guarantees of a fair trial by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’.121 It called upon the Human Rights 
Council to urge the government of Saudi Arabia to abolish the death penalty, accede to the 
human rights treaties providing for its abolition, ensure that fair trial guarantees are respected 
and to not impose capital punishment on child offenders. 122 
The concept of most serious crimes, as discussed in Chapter 2, is to be construed in the 
narrowest of circumstances. Stakeholders have recognised this and, using the platform of the 
UPR, challenged Saudi Arabia’s position on the death penalty under international law. 
Although a number of these organisations refer to Islamic law being open to interpretation, 
there is a lack of acknowledgment of the restricted role it plays in the application of the death 
penalty which is analysed in Part Two of the study. 
3.3.4 The Review 
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3.3.4.1  Interactive Dialogue 
The first review of Saudi Arabia took place on 6 February 2009 during the fourth session of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review.123 A list of questions was prepared in 
advance by a number of countries124 of which the Netherlands,125 Sweden,126 Canada,127 
Denmark,128 and the United Kingdom129 addressed the question of capital punishment and fair 
trial guarantees. The questions were transmitted to Saudi Arabia through its troika: Germany, 
Madagascar, and Qatar.130  
In its presentation, Saudi Arabia began by stating that the principles of the UPR complement 
the principles of its faith including God’s command to, ‘help one another in righteousness and 
piety, but do not help one another in sin and transgression’.131 What emerges is a narrative 
whereby God gives religious mandates to make people live the right life (through the Qurʾān 
and sunna);132 and the nation state, as sovereign, enforces those mandates through a legal 
construct (the Constitution). This narrative that conflates the two arguments is in need of 
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revision as the sovereign has taken an aspect of God, the right to put to death, and applied it 
where God has not mandated. The sanctity of life in the sacred texts is therefore being 
exploited. This is dealt with, in detail, in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Saudi Arabia also noted that the UPR process is, ‘comprehensive and consistent with the 
Islamic principle of calling oneself to account, since it is a process of self-assessment and an 
appropriate means to present a true picture that will help states to evaluate the human rights 
situation in a country’s territory’.133 This reflects a practice of self-reflection, not a mandate for 
punishment. Hence, as a process of ‘self-assessment’, Saudi Arabia should reflect on the 
interpretive plurality of Islamic law and be receptive to discussions for a more nuanced 
understanding of the death penalty in an attempt to promote the fostering of life.  
Following on from its introductory comments, the state under review highlighted the primacy 
of Islam above all else by identifying that rights in Islam are derived from the Qurʾān and sunna 
which constitute the basis of all legislation and provide for a comprehensive mode of life in 
Saudi Arabia. These rights precede those mentioned in international human rights 
instruments.134 This is an important observation that indicates Saudi Arabia’s awareness of 
universal rights that precede the law whilst also being recognised by the law. Islam promotes 
universal values of mercy, justice, and forgiveness, as explored in Part Two of this thesis, and 
it is recognising these values that can subjugate the sovereign right to put to death. 
Similar to its national report, the state did not make any reference to the death penalty thus 
reinforcing the argument of state sovereignty and criminal justice trumping human rights. 
Despite this, other Member States issued recommendations in this respect. Fifty-four 
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delegations135 delivered a statement during the interactive dialogue stage of the review and a 
further 24 delegations made statements which, although could not be delivered due to time 
constraints, were made available on the UPR extranet.136 A total of eight recommendations 
were received regarding the issue of the death penalty from: Austria, Chile, Germany, Italy, 
Mexico New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland. None of the OIC or Arab League states spoke 
on this subject which is reflective of their attitudes on the death penalty. This can be seen in 
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) and Arab Charter on Human Rights, 
both of which allow derogation from the right to life. Other states such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, 
France, Lebanon, Morocco, and the United Kingdom issued recommendations regarding issues 
of justice and the state’s conformity to international human rights standards.137 
The United Kingdom recommended that Saudi Arabia amend its Criminal Practice Code to 
ensure that only persons above 18 years will be tried as adults. Those below 18 years of age at 
the time of the offence should have their executions commuted to a custodial sentence.138 This 
is a good example of a S.M.A.R.T recommendation however citing the CRC would make it 
more specific and strengthen the proposal.  
Similarly, Austria and Germany called for a moratorium on the executions of juveniles with 
Germany further recommending the state to review its practice of applying the death penalty.139 
Saudi Arabia accepted this recommendation in accordance with its commitments undertaken 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.140 Austria and Germany issued vague and 
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generic recommendations that lacked any specificity or measurable outcome. Instead, Saudi 
Arabia responded by citing the CRC which forms part of its review criteria (i.e. human rights 
instruments the state has ratified), an approach that the recommending states should have 
adopted. 
Taking note of the wider scope of offences punishable as a capital offence and the increasing 
number of executions, Italy recommended that as a first step, Saudi Arabia should consider its 
domestic legislation on the death penalty with a view to restricting its scope and bringing it in 
line with the international minimum standards on the death penalty. It recommended 
establishing a moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its abolition. This too was 
noted.141 Italy’s recommendation did not make use of the S.M.A.R.T principle and this is 
reflected in its lack of citation to relevant law. This was also seen in Chile’s recommendations 
below. 
Chile recommended (a) eliminating the death penalty and (b) adjusting domestic legislation to 
the requirements and standards of international human rights instruments.142 Whilst noting part 
(a), Saudi Arabia did accept the latter and stated that competent authorities in the Kingdom 
undertake a comprehensive periodic review of domestic legislation to ensure it is consistent 
with international human rights instruments.143 Since Chile did not attempt to specify the 
‘domestic legislation’ in question nor did it elaborate on the ‘international human rights 
instruments’ that Saudi Arabia should adhere to, this allowed the state under review to accept 
such a generic recommendation. As a result, Saudi Arabia is able to increase its acceptance rate 
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of recommendations, which will prove favourable in the international community, without 
making any tangible efforts to affect change in its death penalty laws.  
Mexico and Switzerland recommended that Saudi Arabia establish a moratorium with a view 
to its abolition.144 This was noted by Saudi Arabia. Both recommendations failed to 
acknowledge the review criteria as laid down in HRC Resolution 5/1 which states that the 
review is based upon five elements: the UN Charter, UDHR, voluntary pledges and 
commitments, human rights instruments the state has ratified, and applicable international 
humanitarian law. Failing to cite the source of the recommendation implies that the 
recommending state is not overly familiar with the UPR framework and/or has not invested 
time and effort to formulate a concrete and specific recommendation which is in line with the 
objectives of the UPR.145 
Since Saudi Arabia has not ratified the ICCPR, reference to Article 6(2) has less domestic 
relevance however a recommending state could still refer to Article 3 UDHR which provides 
for the right to life. It is interesting to note that none of the recommendations pertinent to the 
question of capital punishment made any reference to Article 3 UDHR.146 As Saudi Arabia is 
not a state party to ICCPR, Article 3 UDHR would form the basis of any recommendation to 
the state. This would mean that states, such as Saudi Arabia, which have not ratified certain 
treaties would not be able to evade scrutiny in the UPR process.   
Sweden was the only country to refer to the General Assembly resolutions on the death penalty 
by recommending that Saudi Arabia introduce a moratorium with a view to its abolition and 
‘adhere to the General Assembly resolutions in this regard’. 147 This too was noted. Whilst a 
                                                          
144 Saudi Arabia Working Group Report 1, paras 48, 65. 
145 Christina Szurlej, ‘Universal Periodic Review: A Step in the Right Direction?’ (DPhil thesis, Middlesex 
University 2013) 131. 
146 On the significance of Article 3 UDHR, see Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 
ch1. 
147 Saudi Arabia Working Group Report 1, para 71. 
108 
 
commendable effort to refer to the resolutions, particularly since Saudi Arabia is not party to 
the ICCPR, Sweden missed an opportunity to cite Article 3 UDHR or Article 37(a) CRC.  
New Zealand expressed concern regarding the high number of executions during 2007 and 
2008. It recommended Saudi Arabia to strengthen the application of international safeguards 
in relation to the death penalty and thereby protect the rights of those facing death penalty.148 
Saudi Arabia accepted this recommendation. This was the only category five recommendation 
on the death penalty that was accepted notably because it did not require a moratorium or the 
abolition of the death penalty but rather to protect the rights of those facing the death penalty 
(emphasis added). 
Belarus issued a category two recommendation149 urging Saudi Arabia to, ‘continue to give 
priority attention to the protection of the rights of the child’150 which was easily accepted. This 
is because such a vague recommendation lacks specific action for example, the abolition of the 
juvenile death penalty. Like other recommending states, Belarus failed to cite the source of the 
obligation which in this case would be the CRC to which Saudi Arabia is a party. As a result 
of such generic recommendations, the state under review is able to pay lip service to the UPR 
by easily accepting recommendations whilst at the same time lacking any impetus to bring 
about real change.  
In responding to the recommendations on capital punishment, the delegation of Saudi Arabia 
stated that the country, ‘has a clear position on capital punishment, which is considered a 
deterrent in Islamic Sharia. It’s not simple to impose it. The state offers counsel to the accused 
and covers the cost of attorneys’.151  
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Deterrence is one of the most repeated justifications that is advanced for the imposition of the 
death penalty. Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle scrutinise the efficacy of the deterrence 
argument, maintaining that: 
The issue is not whether the death penalty deters some – if only a few – people 
where threat of a lesser punishment would not, but whether, when all the 
circumstances surrounding the use of capital punishment are taken into account, it 
is associated with a marginally lower rate of the kinds of murder for which it has 
been appointed.152 
As identified by Hood and Hoyle, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find empirical 
data on the deterrent effects of capital punishment. The studies do not provide definitive 
evidence on the impact of capital punishment when used on an extensive scale such as China 
and Iran and/or for certain crimes such as drugs153 or economic crimes.154 Therefore, states 
should not rely on the deterrence argument to inform their position on the death penalty. 
3.3.4.2 Adoption of the Outcomes  
Saudi Arabia’s response to the recommendations on capital punishment were included in the 
outcome report adopted by the HRC in its eleventh session.155 During the plenary, the state 
commended the role of the UPR for ensuring the universality of human rights through 
constructive dialogue. It observed that, ‘all people, without exception, [are] entitled to enjoy 
the principle of the universality of human rights’.156  
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However, the state also highlighted that the mechanism needed to consider the characteristics 
and evolution of different societies. The UPR required, ‘a profound understanding of each 
culture and its guiding values and principles, which, by their very nature, converge with the 
humanitarian principles that have made human rights universally acceptable to and recognized 
by all cultures and civilizations’.157 In Saudi Arabia’s case, its guiding principles are based on 
the state’s interpretation of the sharīʿa which it frequently invokes to justify derogation from 
the right to life. This is solidified in its second UPR which is analysed below.  
3.4 Second Cycle 
3.4.1 National Report 
Saudi Arabia’s second UPR took place in 2013. Its national report is a step up from the first 
cycle, offering greater clarification on its human right progress.158 In explaining the state’s 
normative and institutional framework for human rights, the report makes clear that sharīʿa 
law governs the Kingdom and Muslim rulers are ‘mandated to apply its established principles 
and rules to the promotion and protection of human rights, as prescribed in the Holy Koran, the 
Sunnah of the Prophet and Islamic jurisprudence’.159  
The report emphasises that the Kingdom, ‘does not have its own particular interpretation of 
Islam. Jurisprudence does not imply varying interpretations of Islam; strictly speaking, it is an 
intellectual exercise in which sharia scholars are bound by specific criteria and rules’.160 This 
appears to be a nebulous statement at best and does not acknowledge the variations in 
approaches to the sharīʿa. Islamic legal tradition is not a monolithic entity and jurisprudence 
does involve interpretation but is bound by the school’s hermeneutical methodology. No 
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clarification is provided for what the state means by ‘interpretation’ and therefore such a 
statement seems to be a semantical play on words.  
The protection and promotion of human rights is practised on the ground by virtue of the 
application of Islamic law. Ratifying the ICCPR and the ICESR is a matter that remains under 
constant consideration, but no further explanation is given.161 Justifying non-ratification or 
derogation from important human rights instruments, by citing the impossibility of 
simultaneously respecting religious and international obligations, is a common practice 
amongst Islamic states. Such an interpretation is contested since ‘cultural and religious 
specificities may be taken into consideration in order to develop adequate means to ensure 
universal respect for universal human rights, but they cannot jeopardize the very recognition 
of these rights for all’.162 
Four and a half pages are dedicated to ‘the judiciary and criminal procedures’ in the Kingdom 
which is a considerable amount when compared to its initial report in the first UPR cycle. This 
suggests that greater consideration has been afforded to this area of law by the state under 
review, possibly as a result of increased scrutiny by other Member States, the OHCHR, and 
stakeholders during its previous review. 
Training programmes for judges have been created as a continued effort to build and develop 
judicial capacities by the Ministry of Justice.163 It has organised a number of workshops and 
courses, in collaboration with other government and academic bodies, to strengthen judicial 
matters including workshops and seminars held on human rights.164 In order to strengthen 
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arbitration, the practice of law, and their role in improving due process, 1513 courts have been 
registered with the Ministry of Justice as of 30 June 2013 with 2700 lawyers licensed to practise 
and 1300 trainees signed up.165 
Saudi Arabia’s Human Rights Commission has established a unit of expert staff whose job it 
is to attend trial hearings in order to strengthen the principle of fair trials and public hearings.166 
As a result, the Commission has identified a number of effective features. These include the 
fact that counsel for the accused have their fees paid by the Ministry of Justice for those persons 
who are unable to afford it; the attendance of representatives from the National Society of 
Human Rights as well as media and individuals concerned with human rights issues.167 
Negative features have also been identified, and ‘promptly addressed by the Ministry of 
Justice’, such as the case of an accused entering the courtroom with shackled feet.168  
The Supreme Court has been given the responsibility for establishing judicial principles in line 
with international standards by virtue of the new Judiciary Act.169 The codification of sharīʿa 
provisions remains a matter of ongoing deliberation and special researchers have been 
appointed at a number of academic institutions in order to delve further into this matter.170 This 
is particularly relevant for death penalty laws as their codification can help prevent an arbitrary 
application of the punishment. 
The state’s criminal laws are also identified as an area of best practice, providing statutory 
safeguards that guarantee the rights of the accused throughout all levels of criminal proceedings 
from arrest all the way through to detention, investigation, and trial. This is derived from 
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Islamic law principles and upheld by the Basic Law, which together provide the framework for 
fair trials in accordance with international standards. Certain penalties, notably capital 
punishment, have additional safeguards ‘for which the sentencing requirements are more 
stringent with respect to the availability of conclusive evidence, ascertainment of the grounds 
and conditions, and the absence of impediments’.171 
The national report further emphasises that, ‘[c]apital punishment is imposed only for the most 
serious crimes in the narrowest of circumstances and is not carried out until after the case has 
proceeded through every level of court’172 but fails to clarify what these crimes are. The case 
begins in the Court of First Instance (muḥkama al-ʿāma) which is heard by three judges and 
their ruling must be unanimous.173 It then proceeds to the Court of Appeal (muḥkama al-tamyīz) 
where five judges of the criminal division review the ruling even if it is uncontested.174 If the 
Court of Appeal upholds the ruling, the case escalates to the Supreme Court (majlis al-qaḍā’ 
al-aʿlā) to be further analysed by five judges.175 The stages of judicial process are complete if 
the Supreme Court upholds the ruling.176 
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At first glance, this justification would appear to complement international human rights 
jurisprudence on the death penalty and appropriate appeals mechanisms.177 However, as 
demonstrated in the submissions by the OHCHR and relevant stakeholders, Saudi Arabia’s 
interpretation of ‘most serious crimes’ is not in line with international law. The Human Rights 
Committee General Comment No.36 clearly states that the term must be read restrictively and 
limited to crimes of intentional killing.178 Therefore crimes such as drug offences, attempted 
murder, corruption, armed robbery, sexual offences, and apostasy, which are all death penalty 
offences under Saudi law,179 are not considered within the remit of most serious.180  
The national report then proceeds to explicitly state that, ‘[n]o authority in the State is 
empowered to modify or suspend the penalties of retribution and doctrinal punishment 
prescribed, respectively, for qisas and hadd offenses, as they are categorically provided for in 
sharia law, with no leeway for interpretation’.181 This is an apodictic answer which permits 
little discussion on the issue and reveals a lack of self-criticism. It fails to acknowledge the 
very limited role of sharīʿa in capital punishment cases, especially when such offences do not 
enjoy consensus amongst Islamic scholars, or any alternative interpretations as discussed in 
Part Two. The state should use the UPR as a platform to engage in more meaningful intellectual 
discourse in order to promote and strengthen its human rights.   
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Further justifying its use of the death penalty, the government claims that such penalties are 
only applicable to specific offences that require evidence so conclusive that it eliminates any 
room for doubt and that they have been prescribed by Islam in order to:  
preserve life, safeguard the supreme interests of society and deter any attempt to 
violate those interests. Killing thus incurs a qisas penalty as a just retaliation 
equivalent to the offense committed. 
In this regard, it is a feature of the liberality and breadth of sharia law that a person 
convicted of killing may be pardoned by the authorities (the King) in the case of 
ta’zir offences (for which the penalties are discretionary), or, in the case of qisas 
offences, by the next of kin, it being an irrevocable personal right of theirs to do 
so.182  
In murder cases, the consensus of the victim’s heirs is required for enforcement of the sentence 
and:  
determined and frequently successful efforts are made, on the basis of Royal 
Decree No. KH/8/547 of 8 February 2000, to appeal to the relatives of the person 
who has been killed to pardon the killer. In offences involving banditry (hirabah), 
the death penalty is not a requirement per se and may be substituted by exile, i.e., 
imprisonment.183 
It is somewhat ironic that the state is quoting the ‘liberality and breadth’ of the sharīʿa whilst 
at the same time arguing that there is no room for any interpretation on the death penalty and 
having one of the highest execution rates in the Muslim world.  
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Moreover, in its national report, Saudi Arabia identifies imprisonment as ‘one of the most 
damaging penalties’184 and affirms that its judiciary tends to opt for alternative penalties by 
once again, ‘draw[ing] on the breadth of sharia law, on which its rulings are based, and on the 
educational perspectives of sharia whereby punishment is a tool for correction and 
rehabilitation’.185 The reforming and rehabilitative nature of punishments in Islamic law is 
found under a category of discretionary crimes known as taʿzīr whose penalty can include, for 
example, public disclosure, imprisonment, or fines. However, the reality is that a number of 
taʿzīr crimes are sentenced by death in Saudi Arabia and go beyond what has been elucidated 
in the classical fiqh discourse, a fact that the state omits from its discussion. This is explored in 
detail in Chapter 6.  
The imposition of the juvenile death penalty is also addressed by the state. Under the juvenile 
justice system, in order to ascertain whether a child has attained puberty, the courts will 
consider whether he/she is displaying one of the physiological indicators of puberty and 
therefore competent to, ‘perform religious obligations, dispose of assets and be held criminally 
accountable, which is consonant with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child’.186 The report concedes that:  
Establishing evidence of puberty is a doctrinal matter in which the most appropriate 
interpretation is committed, taking into account circumstances and factors arising 
out of modern day shifts. It is (sic) should be mentioned that new child protection 
laws have been passed in which a child is defined as “anyone under 18 years of 
age” as made clear in the report.187  
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Here we see a shift towards embracing the more ‘appropriate’ interpretation that favours the 
preservation of life and perhaps, it could be argued, a gradual softening of attitudes.  
Saudi Arabia’s human rights record is portrayed under a very positive light in its national report 
and this is further highlighted by its discussion on cooperation with NGOs and UN Special 
Procedures. It states that the Kingdom has allowed a number of human rights organisations to 
conduct field missions in order to ascertain the human rights situation on the ground. It has also 
responded to information requests from UN human rights mechanisms including the OHCHR 
and Special Procedures mandate holders. Not only has the state taken the recommendations 
issued by treaty bodies and Special Procedures into consideration but ‘has implemented many 
of those recommendations. Indeed, most of the laws, measures and accomplishments pertaining 
to the promotion and protection of human rights, as described in this report, are in keeping with 
such recommendations’.188 The polarisation of submissions is clear here as the OHCHR report 
does not support this claim and is discussed further in section 3.4.2.  
The report further showcases the achievements of the governmental Human Rights 
Commission which ‘fosters cooperation with national, regional and international human rights 
entities’189 in order to achieve its objectives and expand its relations. It notes that at the national 
level, the Commission organised various conferences, workshops and seminars for human 
rights personnel, aiming to develop their technical capacities and ‘enable them to exercise 
objectivity in their work in accordance with international standards’.190 More detail is also 
provided on the role of the National Society for Human Rights which publishes reports on the 
human rights situation on the Kingdom, identifies any shortcomings, assesses the human rights 
progress achieved, and submits appropriate conclusions and recommendations.191  
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Whilst the state has facilitated the creation of the SHRC and NSHR, in an attempt to avoid calls 
for greater participatory governance and less corruption, it allows them to operate under limited 
freedom.192 Both organisations publish periodic reports detailing information collected from 
complaints and site visits. The SHRC is mandated to produce two annual reports: one on the 
status of the Commission, and the other on the status of human rights in the country. This 
translates to a total of 24 annual reports that should be published between the beginning of its 
operations in 2007 and 2018, but only four are available. Twenty are not publicly available 
which highlights the SHRC’s irregularity in reporting.193 
In its 2012 report that is available to view, the SHRC reveals a number of deficiencies and 
issues recommendations on Saudi Arabia’s death penalty laws, recommending the Saudi 
government to:  
formally delineate the crimes of Hadd, Qisas, and Diyya, and that it codify 
sanctions for current ‘discretionary’ punishments; the state’s lack of a formal penal 
code, and the judiciary’s freedom from any system of precedence, has led to a 
myriad of unfair sentencing practices throughout the kingdom. Another 
recommendation, that the government modify the Law of Criminal Procedure to 
explicitly guarantee the accused’s right to legal counsel at every stage of detention, 
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interrogation, and trial, would close a loophole that various Saudi authorities have 
used to undermine the defendant’s right to legal representation.194 
In comparison to the SHRC’s poor reporting status, the NSHR has consistently published an 
annual report on its activities since 2007 and these are available in full on its website.195 
However, it has only published three annual reports on the status of human rights. These reports 
have been supplemented by standalone publications including a report on ‘Conformity of the 
Saudi Rules and Regulations with the Conventions on Basic Human Rights’.196 This report 
identifies ratification of the ICCPR as an ongoing issue and notes that if the Kingdom ratifies 
the treaty, it will issue reservations against some provisions ‘which the Kingdom considers as 
non-complying with Islamic ordainments’.197 It identifies Article 6 (right to life) and Article 
18 (freedom of religion) as provisions ‘arousing doubt of contravention of the Islamic rules’.198 
However, the NSHR argues that there is no need to raise a reservation against Article 6(2) as 
‘the seriousness of the crime can be measured by the consequences thereof on the Saudi 
Society’.199 Whilst this is a positive development (not raising a reservation), it is an inadequate 
response which ignores the fact that ‘most serious crimes’ are confined to intentional killing 
only. Therefore, whilst Saudi society may find adultery, drug offences, and apostasy deserving 
of the death penalty, they cannot be categorised under the remit of most serious. 
A potential reservation to Article 18 is also identified on the basis that, ‘a Muslim cannot have 
the freedom to convert to another faith as this is prohibited under the Islamic Rules, therefore 
the Kingdom must raise a reservation against this sort of freedom’.200 It does not provide any 
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alternative readings on the status of the death penalty in Islam, for example the interpretation 
that apostasy simpliciter is not a capital offence, but rather acknowledges any reservations as a 
given. This monopoly of interpretation is challenged in Part Two. 
Although the SHRC and NSHR attempt to provide recommendations to ameliorate the human 
rights violations present in Saudi Arabia, their reporting is limited by connections to a 
government that it is supposed to hold accountable. Furthermore, Americans for Democracy 
and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) argue that the organisations do not report on high 
profile cases that are politically sensitive.201 This limits rhetoric on the death penalty and is at 
risk of promoting an interpretation of Islamic law that allows the sovereign to maintain its right 
to sentence individuals to death. 
Furthermore, the thirteen organisations that filed for Saudi Arabia’s review demonstrate that 
the state appears to overstate its cooperation with NGOs since only two reside in the Kingdom: 
the Adala Centre for Human Rights and the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association 
(SCPRA). Both have faced obstacles in operating and registration difficulties from the 
government. At the time of writing, SCPRA members are serving prison terms202 whilst the 
Adala Centre has closed under government pressure.203 This is not indicative of a state that 
declares, ‘[n]o obstacles or barriers are placed in their [NGOs] way and they are assured of 
protection and legal redress under the law in the event of any kind of violation of their rights’.204 
3.4.2 OHCHR Report 
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The second OHCHR report,205 submitted on 6 August 2013, is similar to the first in that it 
highlights Saudi Arabia’s poor reporting status with regards to treaty body reports. The 
Kingdom is overdue on a minimum of two reports for every treaty body. Its second, third, and 
fourth reports are overdue since 2002, 2006, and 2010 respectively for CAT whilst its third and 
fourth reports are overdue since 2011 for CRC.206 This demonstrates that no real progress has 
been made between both review cycles.  
The Kingdom’s cooperation with Special Procedures is also inadequate. A number of visits 
have been requested with no positive outcome. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions requested a visit in 2005 and a reminder was sent in 2008 
however no official response has been received. It is clear that the second cycle did not see 
much change. Reminders for a visit request were also sent by the Special Rapporteur on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (in 2010), the Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (in 2009), and the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights defenders (in 2012).207 
The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences noted that 
there is no codified penal code and recommended the adoption of one which clearly defines 
criminal offences.208 This means that the interpretation and application of sharīʿa is subject to 
‘the competency of the courts and to a council of senior religious scholars, appointed by the 
king’.209 
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Judges are reported to apply guidelines derived from customs and traditions which contravene 
obligations contained within the sharīʿa and international human rights instruments to which 
the state is party. The Special Rapporteur recommended that a training programme for judges 
be created to assist the Kingdom in respecting its international obligations.210 
In 2013, seven Saudi citizens were sentenced to death for theft, including armed robbery.211 
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
expressed serious concern that the individuals were to be executed for crimes that do not fall 
within the ‘most serious crimes’ category and after questionable trials.212 The Special 
Rapporteur on torture, Juan Méndez, was also concerned at allegations of torture and other ill-
treatment in detention and confessions made under duress.213 The chair of the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) noted that the death penalty was to be applied following 
‘possible violation of the right to liberty and security of all seven individuals’.214 Despite 
repeated calls to stop the executions, Saudi Arabia imposed the punishment.215 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights strongly condemned the executions stating that 
they were in clear breach of international safeguards and repeated concerns, ‘as to the nature 
of the alleged crimes, confessions based upon torture and the insufficiency of trials’.216 He 
noted that capital punishment was imposed for crimes which were not ‘most serious’ under 
international law such as drug offences, apostasy, sorcery, witchcraft, and heresy.217  
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In 2012, the Special Rapporteur on summary executions was concerned by the growing number 
of death sentences and the increase of communications dealing with imminent executions. The 
High Commissioner urged the state to join the global momentum against the death penalty and, 
as a first step, establish a moratorium on its use.218 
WGAD highlighted the issue of problematic trials alleging that the accused were detained 
without a warrant, not informed of the charges, not presented before a judge, given no access 
to a lawyer, and held incommunicado for different lengths of time. Ill treatment, torture, or 
inhuman conditions of detention were also a cause for concern in many cases. According to 
WGAD, persons in detention were not provided the opportunity to contest the legality of their 
detention.219 This is in stark contrast to what the Kingdom described as providing 
‘comprehensive safeguards’.220 
The OHCHR is able to challenge state claims of the death penalty being imposed ‘only for the 
most serious crimes and in the narrowest of circumstances’ thereby providing a more balanced 
review of the country’s human rights situation. This is also reflected in the stakeholder 
submissions below. 
3.4.3 Stakeholder Report 
The stakeholder report221 comprised of a summary of 13 stakeholder submissions to the 
UPR.222 A number of stakeholders such as Amnesty International, the Cairo Institute for 
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Human Rights, Adala Centre for Human Rights Saudi Arabia, and Alkarama noted that despite 
the state having accepted certain recommendations in its previous UPR, it failed to ratify core 
international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR, ICESCR, and OP-CAT.223 This suggests 
that Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of recommendations to consider ratification of international 
instruments was superficial and seen as a tick-box exercise as opposed to genuinely reforming 
its human rights obligations.  
The International Publishers Associations and Joint Submission 1 (JS1) expressed concern over 
the lack of explicit protection of basic rights and liberties under the Kingdom’s Basic Law 
which contains vaguely drafted articles.224 There is no clear definition of crimes and authorities 
under existing legislation and ECLJ noted that the legal system is dependent on the 
government’s official interpretation of sharīʿa law.225 It seems as though no genuine attempts 
were made towards harmonising domestic laws with international and regional human rights 
conventions, a key area of concern from the majority of stakeholders.226 
The absence of a codified penal code was identified as a significant issue in Saudi Arabia’s 
justice system with JS3 noting that this could lead to arbitrary murder.227 Punishable crimes 
and their respective penalties are not clearly defined and the definition of a ‘legal infraction’ is 
based upon the judge’s interpretation of sharīʿa law as is the determination and severity of 
punishment meted out. In fact, there is no evidence of any developments pertaining to legal 
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and judicial reform such as the codification of discretionary sentences or amending the criminal 
procedure code since Saudi Arabia’s first UPR.228  
Human Rights Watch noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure lacks basic safeguards. It fails 
to allow detainees the opportunity to question the lawfulness of their detention nor does it 
guarantee access to legal representation in a timely manner.229 Pre-trial detention is granted up 
to six months without judicial review and statements made under duress are not viewed as 
inadmissible in court. Furthermore, judges tend to disregard provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.230 JS3 and Human Rights Watch recommended Saudi Arabia to formulate a penal 
code that restricts punishable crimes as a matter of urgency and amend the law of criminal 
procedure by bringing it in line with international human rights law.231 
Amnesty International regretted that Saudi Arabia failed to accept recommendations to declare 
a moratorium on the death penalty or to restrict its scope in line with international minimum 
standards.232 It also reported that executions are increasing by the year with numbers feared to 
be higher than declared owing to recent reports of secret executions. The death penalty 
continues to be applied for a range of non-violent offences such as drug trafficking and 
apostasy. Foreigners bear the brunt of this punishment and it is also disproportionately applied 
to foreigners’ children for crimes perpetrated under the age of 18. Amnesty International urged 
Saudi Arabia to establish a moratorium on executions and review all pending death penalty 
cases with a view to commuting sentences or providing a new and fair trial without recourse to 
the death penalty.233A number of stakeholders urged for the prohibition of death sentences and 
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recommended the abolition of capital punishment for anyone who was under the age of 18 at 
the time of the offence as well as raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility.234  
The Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children and Child Rights 
International Network noted that in its previous UPR, Saudi Arabia accepted recommendations 
to eliminate capital punishment of under 18s.235 Despite this, capital punishment for children 
remains a lawful sentence in the Kingdom and it is one of the three countries in the world which 
continue to impose the juvenile death penalty.236 Legislation pertaining to children has been 
under review since 2006. Islamic law governs the main laws surrounding juvenile justice and 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility has been increased from seven to twelve years of 
age. Nevertheless, ‘reports are inconsistent and the change does not apply to girls or in qisas 
cases’.237 Under the Detention Regulation and the Juvenile Homes Regulation, a juvenile is 
defined as an individual below 18 years of age however the law does not demand all child 
offenders to be tried in the juvenile justice system nor does it require judges to have regard for 
the child’s age at the time of the offence when making their decision. 
Saudi Arabia’s administration of justice and rule of law are of growing concern. JS1 and JS3 
highlighted that ‘the Public Prosecution of the Specialized Criminal Court lacks independence 
and is subordinate to the minister of the Interior [and] defendants are tried after years of 
detention and in proceedings that violate the right to a fair trial’.238 JS3 also noted that 
according to the sharīʿa, as interpreted in the country, judges are prohibited from accepting 
confessions made under duress however this is not reflected on ground. Alkarama noted that 
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where a confession obtained under torture is the sole evidence in a prosecution, undue 
importance is given to it despite the fact that a number of torture cases have been reported in 
the Kingdom. It recommended Saudi Arabia to effectively establish all provisions of the CAT 
without exceptions.239 
According to Human Rights Watch, detainees are frequently subjected to systematic violations 
of due process and rights to a fair trial. Both Human Rights Watch and JS1 recorded similar 
observations where the Code of Criminal Procedure is not being implemented in practice and 
thereby resulting in defendants being denied counsel for questioning or the trial itself. There is 
no body to hear complaints or appeals concerning the legality of detention. Authorities more 
often than not fail to inform individuals of the crime they are being accused of or present any 
supporting evidence for why they are being held.240 JS2 urged for pre-trial detention to be used 
in exceptional circumstances, in conformity with international human rights standards, and that 
time limits established by domestic law are strictly adhered to.241 
Amnesty International stated that Saudi Arabia’s national human rights framework is 
threatened by a flawed criminal justice system. It highlighted the discrimination faced by 
foreign nationals with no knowledge of Arabic which is the language of interrogation and trial 
hearings. Authorities often fail to act in accordance with international standards for fair trial 
and safeguards for such defendants. Moreover, they are often denied adequate interpretation 
facilities and court hearings generally take place in secret and out of the public eye.242 
The NGO further observed that the Saudi Human Rights Commission, a governmental body, 
and the National Society for Human Rights, also formed by governmental decree, are the only 
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two human rights organisations tolerated in Saudi Arabia to the exclusion of all others. Local 
human rights NGOs have not been authorised to register themselves.243  
Despite Saudi Arabia’s glowing report on its institutional and human rights infrastructure and 
policies, the narrative told by the stakeholders above illustrates the polarisation of attitudes 
towards the Kingdom’s human rights situation on the ground. 
Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with human rights mechanisms is another area of concern. 
Mirroring concerns raised in the OHCHR report, Amnesty International expressed alarm that 
the Kingdom has not permitted any international human rights organisation or UN bodies to 
visit the country, for research purposes, in the past four years. This included Amnesty 
International which has been requesting access over decades.244 JS1 highlighted that the 
country repeatedly denied a number of requests by the UN Special Rapporteur to visit. 
Government reprisals against human rights defenders for their participation and cooperation 
with UN human rights mechanisms are also on the rise.245 
The stakeholder report highlighted the deficiencies in Saudi Arabia’s legal system which 
facilitate the application of the death penalty and made recommendations for improvement. 
However, similar to the first cycle, the stakeholders failed to demonstrate an awareness of the 
theological underpinnings of the death penalty in Islam and the interpretive plurality present 
within Islamic law which can significantly reduce the death penalty at the very least. The focus 
on Islamic law is taken up in Part Two.  
3.4.4 The Review 
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3.4.4.1  Interactive Dialogue 
The review of Saudi Arabia took place on 21 October 2013 during the 17th session of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review.246 In its presentation, Saudi Arabia affirmed 
its commitment to the protection and promotion of international human rights. It highlighted 
its cooperation with other bodies by stating that it prepared its second UPR report through 
cross-collaboration with government authorities, civil society organisations, human rights 
activists, and academics.247 Once again, it failed to disclose any further details regarding such 
consultations.  
Echoing its views from the first UPR report, the Kingdom explained the vital role the Basic 
Law of Governance plays in safeguarding human dignity and protecting fundamental rights 
and freedom. The Basic Law ensures the state protects human rights in conformity with Islamic 
law.248 Furthermore, the independence of the judicial authority ‘provides sufficient guarantees 
to establish fairness and protect rights of everyone, through accountability and according to 
fair and impartial laws’.249 
A list of questions prepared in advance were submitted by Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
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From these, five (Sweden,250 United Kingdom,251 Belgium,252 Czech Republic,253 and Spain254) 
made specific reference to the death penalty whilst others questioned the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and fair trial procedures such as Slovenia255 and the United States.256 None of these 
states addressed the death penalty from a theological perspective which suggests a lack of 
awareness in this area. 
During the interactive dialogue stage, 102 delegations took the floor to deliver statements. 
Saudi Arabia accepted a total of 151 out of 225 recommendations.257 Eighteen countries issued 
a total of 20 recommendations on the issue of capital punishment but only two were accepted 
and the rest noted.258 This was more than double the amount of recommendations received on 
capital punishment compared to the previous cycle which highlights a greater engagement and 
awareness on this issue. 
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These recommending states were largely from the EU and Commonwealth, expressing concern 
at the use of the death penalty, the lack of due process and the absence of a written criminal 
code. It is important to note that the death penalty has been abolished in the European Union 
and is enshrined in the European Convention on Human rights259 hence EU states’ 
recommendations are reflective of this.  
Sweden and Slovakia remained concerned about the increased number of executions, including 
the application of the death penalty for minors.260 Spain expressed regret that Saudi Arabia 
failed to comply with commitments concerning the rights of persons sentenced to death 
particularly children.261 
In response to the comments and questions received, Saudi Arabia stated that:  
[T]he Code of Criminal Procedure contained all the safeguards needed to protect 
the rights of the accused persons, such as the right to a lawyer during investigation 
and trial, the right to a fair and public trial and the right to be present when the 
judgement is handed down. The statutory procedures ensure that juveniles are 
treated in a manner consistent with their age.262 
 [T]he death penalty is imposed only for the most serious crimes and strict 
procedures are applied to safeguard human rights when the death penalty is 
imposed insofar as the judgements are received by three judges at the three levels 
of jurisdiction, in a manner consistent with international standards. Saudi Arabia 
notes that international law does not prohibit capital punishment if it is imposed in 
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accordance with international standards. It requests states to consider all aspects of 
this issue in view of the considerable disparity between viewpoints thereon.263 
Saudi Arabia’s insistence on retaining the death penalty is justified here on the basis of 
international law. Whilst it is true that international law, specifically ICCPR Article 6, does not 
explicitly prohibit the death penalty, it is clear that it envisioned its eventual abolition, as noted 
by the Human Rights Committee:  
States parties that are not yet totally abolitionist should be on an irrevocable path 
towards complete abolition of the death penalty de facto and de jure, in the 
foreseeable future…It would appear to run contrary to the object and purpose of 
article 6, paragraph 5 for States parties to increase de facto the rate and extent in 
which they resort to the death penalty, and to reduce the number of pardons and 
commutations they grant. 264 
The UK expressed its disappointment over Saudi Arabia’s non-implementation of 
recommendations from the previous UPR cycle. It also regretted Saudi Arabia’s ‘failure to 
meet treaty body reporting deadlines and the lack of access for several Special Rapporteurs’.265 
Colombia however noted Saudi Arabia’s ‘commitment to making progress in implementing 
the recommendations from the first cycle of the UPR’.266 This is contradictory to UK’s 
statement showing a stark contrast in states’ level of engagement in the process. It also brings 
into question whether states have a genuine interest in the UPR, as a platform for the protection 
of human rights, or whether they simply view it as a formality. 
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The only two death penalty recommendations accepted by Saudi Arabia were received from 
Italy and Australia. Italy recommended that Saudi Arabia ‘carry out further efforts to increase 
the transparency and openness of legal proceedings contemplating deaths sentences’267 and 
Australia recommended that Saudi Arabia ‘implement legal reforms recognizing a legally-
defined age of minority that prevents early and forced marriage, detention of minors as adults 
and exposure of minors to the death penalty’.268 It is not surprising that these two 
recommendations were accepted because firstly, they did not require any substantive change 
to the death penalty laws and secondly, requesting a state to ‘carry out further efforts’ without 
defining what this encompasses or without providing a measurable outcome is akin to asking 
it to ‘improve the human rights in the country’. In other words, easy to accept without requiring 
any tangible efforts.   
Thirty-six recommendations were partially endorsed meaning 187 recommendations in total 
were fully or partially accepted. Four recommendations were partially endorsed on capital 
punishment. These were submitted by Switzerland,269 Austria,270 Norway,271 Lithuania,272 and 
France.273 Saudi Arabia failed to clarify what parts were accepted but it is most probably those 
parts that do not require the state to abolish the death penalty such as ‘bring the law and judicial 
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practices into line with fair trial guarantees in international standards’274 or ‘suspend the 
application of the death penalty for people who were minors at the time of their crimes’.275 
The Kingdom clarified that full or partial endorsement of recommendations is in line with the 
principles of Islamic law which protect human rights; and partial endorsement highlights its 
approval of only part of the recommendation ‘or its approval of the objective of the 
recommendation while holding a differing opinion concerning the manner of its 
implementation or the requisite timeframe thereof’. On the other hand, the non-endorsement of 
recommendations may signify incompatibility with Islamic law, failure to reflect the current 
reality, matters that are beyond the scope of the review, and/or inclusion of false allegations.276 
This suggest that the idea of a moratorium or abolition of the death penalty is incompatible 
with Islamic law which is challenged in Part Two of this study. 
In responding to the recommendations on capital punishment, Saudi Arabia reiterated that the 
death penalty is imposed only for the most serious crimes as previously mentioned in 
paragraphs 34, 35, and 38 of its national report. The Kingdom’s regulations, the Statue of the 
Judiciary, and the Code of Criminal Procedure are all consistent with international standards 
and include safeguards that ensure a fair trial.277 The Code of Criminal Procedure has been 
amended to make it more consistent with international standards.278 Relying on the notion of 
‘most serious crimes’ and claiming adherence to international human rights standards is a 
misleading and inaccurate argument by the state. Saudi Arabia imposes the death penalty for 
crimes that do not meet the most serious threshold and neither does it explain what the 
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amendments to the Criminal Code are. We are therefore prevented from knowing the true 
extent of its conformity with international standards. 
The state further explained that, ‘no authority is empowered to modify or abolish the legally 
established fixed penalties (hudud) prescribed in the Islamic sharia’.279  Whilst the ḥudūd are 
indeed a part of Islamic law, this answer fails to acknowledge the interpretive plurality of such 
a tradition. Different schools of law have laid down differing criteria as to what can be 
categorised as a capital crime, and this is demonstrated in Part Two. 
Furthermore, in an effort to downplay its use of capital punishment, the state mentioned that 
the judiciary tends to waive capital punishment charges in accordance with the ḥadīth 
(prophetic narration) which states: ‘Ward off the hudud (fixed penalties) with specious 
argument’.280 This is an important ḥadīth that shows Islam does not insist on applying the death 
penalty. It also demonstrates the reluctance of imposing capital punishment for fixed offences; 
hence, it is argued, the prohibition for discretionary offences should be greater. Although 
classical jurists used a number of procedural hurdles to avoid the death penalty, including the 
concept of doubt (shubha) and repentance (tauba), as discussed in Part Two, this is not reflected 
in Islamic state practice. For example, Saudi Arabia executed 146 individuals in 2017 alone.281 
Instead the state is protecting its sovereign right to apply the death penalty by using religion as 
a false pretext. 
The Kingdom also emphasised that the death penalty is not imposed for minors and children. 
Specific criteria such as age is taken into account by the Kingdom’s judiciary in order to 
determine criminal responsibility and ‘the Kingdom’s legislation defines a child in a manner 
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consistent with Article 1 of the Law on the Rights of the Child’.282 Islamic law provides various 
interpretations for the age of criminal liability283 however Saudi Arabia has adopted a more 
liberal interpretation that sets the age to 18 years. This is a welcome change in the protection 
of juveniles against the death penalty however the state under review should also embrace a 
more enlightened reading of fiqh that will protect all individuals against a sentence of death.  
3.4.4.2 Adoption of the Outcomes  
Thirteen states made statements during the adoption of the outcome of the review: Lebanon, 
Libya, Malaysia, Montenegro, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Senegal, South 
Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. All these countries expressed their appreciation and support to 
Saudi Arabia, congratulating and applauding its efforts to promote and strengthen human rights 
locally and globally. There was no mention of the right to life or the use of capital punishment. 
The silence on the state’s use of the death penalty is quite telling especially since nine of these 
states belong to the OIC and/or Arab League, all of which retain the death penalty. The 
laudatory comments are also reflective of using regionalism to protect allied states from 
scrutiny.  Montenegro was the only state to provide some constructive criticism encouraging 
the state to strengthen its legislative framework ‘in accordance with international law standards, 
particularly the ICCPR and its optional protocols’.284  
Other relevant stakeholders also made comments at the plenary session. Amnesty International 
expressed regret that Saudi did not provide any explanations in its report, as it indicated it 
would, for which parts of the partially accepted recommendations it rejects.285 As a result, 
Saudi Arabia’s stance on these recommendations remains questionable since there is no real 
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and tangible response. This hinders the review process as it prevents substantive discussion 
taking place and achieving a solution.  
The organisation also stated that the death penalty continues to be applied to juveniles and for 
a wide range of non-lethal offences. The Indian Council of South America recommended the 
establishment of a moratorium on the death penalty with the state seeking to explore alternative 
avenues to such a punishment.286  
Human Rights Watch expressed regret that Saudi Arabia missed an important chance created 
by the UPR to ‘make concrete pledges to address important human rights shortcomings raised 
by many states during the UPR debate’.287 UN Watch noted that the UPR aims to scrutinise the 
human rights record of every UN Member State in order to protect and promote human rights 
however it is questionable whether the report on Saudi Arabia actually lives up to this goal.288 
A number of statements made by delegations such as Chad,289 Iraq,290 Vietnam,291 and  
Yemen292 indicate towards a glowing human rights record of Saudi Arabia and it is worth 
asking if these statements are indeed an accurate and comprehensive portrayal of the human 
rights situation on the ground.  
Such generic statements of praise undermine the UPR process as they illustrate a lack of 
understanding of the UPR framework, highlight political and regional biases, and show state 
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engagement with the process to be superficial and symbolic rather than effective and 
substantive.  
In the Kingdom’s concluding remarks, the state delegate took the opportunity to ‘reaffirm, 
firstly, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is proud to abide by the Islamic sharia and we are 
also proud to be a member of this distinguished Council’.293 This is an expression of theocratic 
sovereignty with the state, in essence, declaring that it abides by the transcendent power, and 
not a secular one. The delegate further emphasised that consideration of cultural diversity is 
needed for the success of the UPR as: 
The difference between cultures of the world is an undeniable fact and an inevitable 
reality and the attempts to impose certain cultures on communities in matters of 
human rights brings more harm than good to those same human rights. Hence, it is 
necessary to take into account the cultural diversity and reinvest it in the protection 
and promotion of human rights, and that this should be considered as part of the 
concept of ‘universal human rights’.294 
In fact, Libya also noted that specific recommendations did not enjoy the support of Saudi 
Arabia due to ‘religious, cultural specificity and social regards’.295 Cultural relativism can be 
seen at play here. The notion of cultural relativism is a common challenge to the idea of human 
rights being inalienable and applicable to all. What may be considered a universal norm in 
human rights by the West will not necessarily be applicable in other cultures.296  
The idea of cultural relativism is further highlighted when examining the recommendations 
received from Muslim majority states over both cycles. During the first cycle, it is interesting 
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to note that Saudi Arabia received the majority of recommendations from OIC and Arab 
League states, constituting a total of 37 recommendations. What is more interesting is that all 
of these recommendations were accepted by Saudi Arabia (emphasis added). Eighteen of them 
fell under category 1 or 2 and were therefore generic in nature, for example, Oman: ‘continue 
efforts and endeavours to improve overall human right’s protection in the country’297 and 
Azerbaijan: ‘continue efforts and endeavours to improve overall human rights protection in the 
country’.298 None were on capital punishment.  
As a recommending state, Saudi Arabia made a total of 78 recommendations during the first 
UPR cycle. Fifty-six of these recommendations were made to states belonging to the Arab 
League and/or OIC and all 56 were accepted by the state under review. Interestingly, 38 of 
these recommendations were either category one or two recommendations therefore not 
requiring concrete action. It is evident that states are not investing enough time and effort into 
the process and failing to understand the purpose for which the UPR was created.  
During the second cycle, Saudi Arabia made a total of 120 recommendations, of which 59 were 
made to Arab League and/or OIC states. All 59 were accepted. As a state under review, it 
received 78 recommendations from Arab League and/or OIC states. Sixty-four were accepted 
and 14 noted.  One recommendation was received on the death penalty from an OIC state, 
Albania, to ‘abolish juvenile death penalty and corporal punishment’. This, however, was not 
accepted. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Arab Charter contains the right to life however Articles 6 and 7 
permit the death penalty for the most serious crimes and for under 18s if stipulated in the laws 
in force at the time of the crime. Similarly, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
prohibits taking away the right to life unless it is for a sharīʿa-based reason. Although state 
                                                          




interaction with these regional instruments has been minimal, their silence on the death penalty 
indicates a sense of regionalism at the UPR. 
3.5 Mid-term Update 
Saudi Arabia did not submit a mid-term report in its first UPR. Although this is optional, it 
does suggest a lack of genuine engagement with the process. Nevertheless, in June 2016, 
ADHRB issued a 120-page long midterm report on Saudi Arabia’s implementation of its 
accepted recommendations from the second cycle. Of the 187 recommendations fully or 
partially endorsed, 113 were identified as not having been implemented. This included the 
recommendations relating to the use of capital punishment and the right to a fair trial. A number 
of concerning cases were also highlighted to demonstrate the state’s continued use of the death 
penalty in violation of fair trial standards.  
In May 2012, Dawood Hussein al-Marhoon and Abdullah Hasan al-Zaher were arrested for 
participating in anti-government rallies. They were 17 and 16 years old at the time.299 Two 
years later, in 2014, Ali al-Nimr was sentenced to death for crimes committed when he was 17 
years old. This included non-violent offences such as ‘going out to a number of marches, 
demonstrations and gatherings’.300 In October of the same year, two other individuals were also 
sentenced to death for crimes committed as minors.301 
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The families of the accused argued that fair trial guarantees were not upheld and confessions 
were obtained under torture.302 The individuals were denied access to legal counsel for their 
trials which is in clear contravention to Saudi Arabia’s obligations under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, namely ‘every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right 
to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance’.303 
On 2 January 2016, 47 prisoners were executed including two individuals who were minors at 
the time of the alleged offence. Mustafa Akbar, a Chadian national, was amongst them and was 
arrested in 2013 at the age of 13. A Saudi court sentenced him to death in 2014, eleven years 
after his arrest and without recourse to legal counsel. The case has been described as 
‘completely secret’ by Al Qst, a Saudi human rights organisation.304  
Mishaal al-Faraj was another individual executed on 2 January for purportedly joining Al-
Qaeda in 2004 when he was 17 years old. His detention was accompanied with reports of 
torture, no access to a lawyer and being held for years without trial.305 A third individual was 
executed a month after the mass execution, Ali Saeed al-Rebh. He was sentenced to death for 
allegedly participating in protests when he was 17.306 
Although Saudi Arabia accepted a recommendation to increase the transparency and openness 
of death penalty cases, ADHRB reports no improvement on the matter. Trials are still being 
held in secret even when there are no exceptional circumstances as identified in Article 55 of 
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the Law of Criminal Procedure. Defendants in death penalty cases are rarely provided legal 
counsel nor are they regularly informed of the progress of their case.307 
ADHRB notes that:  
The increasing use of the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) to adjudicate cases 
involving the death penalty has exacerbated this lack of transparency, as the SCC 
has more expansive authorities by which to conduct trials in secret and in the 
absence of the accused. Since the start of Saudi Arabia’s second UPR cycle, the 
SCC has sentenced several men to death after closed legal proceedings.308 
It is clear that Saudi Arabia must do more to improve its human rights situation namely 
protecting the right to life and utilise the UPR mechanism effectively in order to do so. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the UPR, its justification for the use of 
the death penalty, and the manner in which principal actors such as stakeholders and the 
OHCHR address this human rights violation. 
As a Kingdom whose legal structures are based primarily on Islamic law and principles, this is 
clearly reflected in the state’s interaction in the UPR and its constant references to the sharīʿa 
in its national reports. During its first review, Saudi Arabia remained silent on the issue of the 
death penalty whilst stakeholders used the UPR platform to make transparent the human rights 
violations on the right to life. A number of them addressed the fact that due to a lack of codified 
laws, the law is based on the judge’s interpretation of the sharīʿa which can be flexible and 
lead to arbitrary outcomes.  
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In its second review, after receiving much attention on its questionable use of the death penalty, 
Saudi Arabia finally addressed this issue in its national report. It argued that ‘there is no leeway 
for interpretation’ when it comes to the death penalty in Islam, thus reinforcing its pro death 
penalty stance. It failed to embrace or acknowledge an alternative reading of Islamic law and 















































4. Case study: Sudan 
4.1 Introduction 
Sudan is another retentionist state that continues to apply the death penalty albeit to a lesser 
degree than Saudi Arabia.  Amnesty International reported at least 18 death sentences in 2015,1 
21 death sentences in 2016,2 and 17 death sentences in 2017.3 Two executions were recorded 
in 2016 and none were reported to have occurred in 2017 which shows a possible trajectory 
towards de facto abolition in the future. 
The death penalty has remained a distinctive feature of Sudan’s penal system prior to the 
country’s independence through to President Bashir’s reign as discussed below. This chapter 
serves two purposes: (1) to provide the historical background of the death penalty in Sudan, 
and; (2) to analyse the extent to which Sudan maintains its sovereign right to impose capital 
punishment in its Universal Periodic Review of 2011 and 2016 respectively.  
4.2 A complex history 
Prior to a single unified government or administration, different kingdoms dominated Sudan 
such as the Funj Kingdom of Sinnar (1504-1821) and the Dar Fur Sultanate (1650-1916).4 The 
justice system in Sinnar was largely based on customary law, as interpreted by the Sultan or 
provincial kings, with a limited knowledge of the sharīʿa.5 Judges (qāḍīs) did not play an 
important role in the early phase of the Kingdom.6 The death penalty was the exclusive 
prerogative of the King who issued judgements on all capital cases.7 All persons found guilty 
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by the King were executed, irrespective of the magnitude of the crime.8 A visitor to the Sinnar 
in 1523 observed: ‘Whoever commits a fault, be it great or small, is slain; and every day they 
have courts of justice’.9 
During the end of the sixteenth century, a centre of Islamic justice based on one of the four 
sunnī schools of law, the Mālikī school, began to develop and reached its peak in the 1700s.10 
The Mālikī doctrine was taught and disseminated by scholars from Hijaz, Egypt, and West 
African pilgrims alongside a minority of Shāfiʿīs.11 The institution of qāḍīs gradually rose to 
prominence, however, intentional homicide and other capital crimes continued to be tried by 
the King himself. In cases of intentional homicide, the judge would provide the victim’s heir 
the choice of blood money but if he insisted on the killer’s execution then the case would be 
handed over to the King. The killer was then executed immediately.12  
In the Dar Fur Sultanate, similar to the Sinnar, Islamic law existed alongside customary law 
but to a lesser extent.13 The King would consult with a group of fuqarā’ (Islamic jurists) before 
dispensing justice whilst crimes were resolved internally in village communities. Fines played 
a dominant role in the Fur and were paid for homicide, theft, adultery, and libel. However, 
persons found guilty of intentional homicide were sent to al-Fashir for execution and were 
hanged or beaten to death.14 Despite the presence of fuqarā’ in Dar Fur, penal law appears to 
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have operated entirely under customary law with Sean O’Fahey and MI Abu Salim observing 
that, ‘there is no evidence that sharia punishments were ever imposed’15 in this Sultanate. 
Sudan as a ‘unified geopolitical entity, with all its social, cultural, ethnic and political 
diversity’16 emerged in 1821 with the invasion of the Ottoman ruler of Egypt, Khedive 
Mohamed Ali.17 The Turko-Egyptian administration brought a strong influence of the Ḥanafī 
school into Sudan but this was limited to the law of personal status and family relations such 
as marriage and inheritance.18 The criminal law was secular in nature and administered by 
criminal courts.19 Zaki Mustafa argues that ‘[o]ne cannot say with any degree of certainty what 
law was applied during that period, the innumerable documents available in the Abidn Archives 
in Cairo show that sharīʿa was applied in some cases whereas Egyptian military and civil codes 
were applied in others’.20 The paucity of studies of this area can be attributed to the Mahdi’s 
army which destroyed the relevant archives.21 
The oppressive regime of the Ottoman rule paved the way for the Mahdist uprising (1881-
1898) led by Muhammad Ahmad b. Abdallah, the self-proclaimed ‘Mahdi’, who sought to 
emancipate the country from foreign rule of the Turks and impose the sharīʿa for the general 
governance of Sudan.22 After a successful military campaign, the Mahdi imposed a dominant 
and subjugating system of rule through a literal application of the Qurʾān and sunna. This was 
complemented by his legal directives (manshūrāt qawāʿid al-aḥkām), and later, of his 
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successor, Khalifa Abdallah (r. 1885-1898).23 PM Holt notes that the Mahdi’s manshūrāt 
frequently contradicted the traditional sunnī schools of law. For example, women entering 
public places were punished with 100 lashes and smoking also carried a penalty of 100 lashes 
which was more severe than the punishment for consuming alcohol.24 Crimes such as 
intentional homicide, adultery, and blasphemy were all deemed capital offences.25 Financial 
compensation in cases of unintentional homicide was replaced with the mandatory punishment 
of qiṣāṣ.26 The death penalty, amputations, and life imprisonment were common punishments 
with the latter also inflicted on judges who dared to dissent against the Khalifa’s authority.27  
The Mahdist rule played a significant historical role as the first coordinated attempt to apply 
sharīʿa, albeit questionably, in Sudan.28 The conquest of Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces in 
1898 marked the end of the Mahdist rule and established the Anglo-Egyptian condominium 
agreement. The new administration introduced the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes of 
1899 which were based on Anglo-Indian colonial legislation and adapted to Sudanese 
conditions.29 This was the first codification of criminal laws in modern Sudan and did not 
incorporate any sharīʿa elements.30 The death penalty remained a prevalent feature of 
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sovereign power in this period and was provided for under Articles 41 and 42 of the Penal 
Code: 
41. The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code 
are first, death; secondly, forfeiture of property; thirdly, imprisonment; fourthly, 
fine; fifthly, flogging; sixthly, whipping.  
42. In every case in which sentence of death shall have been passed, the Governor 
General may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for any 
other punishment provided by this Code.31 
After Sudan’s independence in 1956, the role of sharīʿa in the legal system became more 
prominent especially after the military coup of Colonel Jafar Nimeiry in 1969.32 The status of 
the death penalty evolved to take on a more ‘Islamic’ role. The first permanent Constitution of 
Sudan was instated in 1973 with Article 9 expressing that: 
The Islamic law and custom shall be main sources of legislation. Personal matters 
of non-Muslims shall be governed by their personal laws. 
Provisions for the death penalty remained, although restricted in application, under Articles 74 
and 75:  
Any person sentenced to death is entitled to apply for pardon or commutation of 
the sentence. Mercy, pardon and commutation of the death sentence may be granted 
in all cases. 
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No person under eighteen years of age shall be sentenced to death and such 
sentence shall not be executed on women who are pregnant or suckling their babies 
unless two years of suckling have lapsed.  
Numayri tasked a three-member committee to Islamize Sudanese law33 and in September 1983, 
he declared sharīʿa as ‘the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan’.34 Numayri’s 
presidential decrees became known as the ‘September Laws’35 and incorporated sharīʿa crimes 
into Sudanese law based on the committee’s work. As a result, the Penal Code of 1983, which 
drew heavily on its 1974 predecessor, introduced the Islamic punishments of ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ. 
This included stoning, crucifixion, and retaliatory punishments36 and signalled the first instance 
where the use of the death penalty, based on Islamic law, was made constitutional.  
It is important to note that two of the committee members, Abū Qurūn and al-Jīd, did not have 
specialist training in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) which resulted in a high degree of 
inconsistency between the fiqh and the Penal Code of 1983.37 For example, contrary to the 
strict fiqh requirement of four male witnesses to the act of unlawful sexual intercourse (zinā), 
the testimony of others was also acceptable.38 Olaf Kӧndgen notes that:  
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The use of ‘legal uncertainties’ (shubha), which are used in the fiqh to restrict the 
execution of ḥadd punishments, were limited. This, in combination with the 
admission of witnesses not approved by the fiqh, meant that the application of ḥadd 
punishments was facilitated considerably. Further, the new penal code introduced 
ḥadd punishments for crimes that would not be considered ḥadd, but which, 
according to the fiqh, would be taʿzīr crimes.39  
The September laws were applied in an arbitrary and biased manner. Authorities would 
confront men and women in their houses, cars, and elsewhere and present them before courts 
that were established under the state of emergency and did not follow fair rules of procedure 
and trial (kangaroo courts). Men and women found in cars together were charged with 
‘attempted adultery’ unless evidence of marriage or intimate blood relation was supplied.40 
Severe punishments were meted out ranging from amputation, cross-amputation, floggings, to 
the death penalty.41 Abdelsalam and Medani have observed that these laws were viewed as a 
clear deviation from the true principles of Islam.42 Opposition to the September laws was 
widespread and Mahmud Mohammad Taha, the leader of the reformist ‘Republican Brothers’ 
argued that: 
The September laws have distorted Islam in the eyes of intelligent members of our 
people and in the eyes of the world…These laws violate Sharia and violate religion 
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itself…We call for the repeal of the September 1983 laws because they distort 
Islam, humiliate the People and jeopardize national unity…43 
Taha was executed in 1985 for his uncompromising views and charged under the offence of 
apostasy although no such offence was recognised by the Penal Code at the time.44  
Following a bloodless coup d’état in 1989, a new regime under the leadership of Brigadier 
Umar al-Bashir set out to transform Sudanese society into a model Islamic society.45 This 
included the introduction of a new Islamized Penal Code which was adopted in early 1991, 
repealing the Penal Code of 1983.  
The Criminal Act of 1991 amended Islamic law provisions for the death penalty by attempting 
to ‘remedy many of the major inconsistencies between earlier codes and the fiqh’.46 The revised 
Act also included the addition of apostasy as a death penalty offence which marked the first 
time that apostasy was criminalised under statutory law.47  
Bashir’s government was also responsible for the creation of two constitutions in Sudan: the 
1998 Constitution and the 2005 Interim National Constitution.48 The 1998 Constitution ensured 
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Muslim dominance by stipulating that, ‘Islamic law and the consensus of the nation, by 
referendum, Constitution and custom shall be the sources of legislation; and no legislation in 
contravention with these fundamentals shall be made’.49  
The religious foundation of the Constitution was further strengthened by vesting sovereignty 
in God who delegated power to the people unlike the 1973 Constitution which vested 
sovereignty in the people alone.50 Under Article 4 of the 1998 Constitution:  
Supremacy in the State is to God the creator of human beings, and sovereignty is 
to the vicegerent people of the Sudan who practice it as worship of God, bearing 
the trust, building up the country and spreading justice, freedom and public 
consultation. The Constitution and the law shall regulate the same.  
The Constitution differed from all its predecessors by incorporating a larger degree of the 
principles of sharīʿa however it also ‘validated the expansion of the number of crimes to which 
the death penalty could be applied and limited protection for minors’.51 
Although Article 20 provided the right to life,52 Article 33 permitted its derogation: 
(1) No death penalty shall be inflicted, save as retribution or punishment for 
extremely serious offences by law.  
(2) No death penalty shall be inflicted for offences committed by a person under 
eighteen years of age; and such penalty shall be executed upon neither pregnant 
nor suckling women, save after two years of lactation; nor shall the same be 
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inflicted upon a person who passed seventy years of age other than in retribution 
and prescribed penalties (hudud).53  
In 2005, the government signed an agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army, known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signalling the end of 
the Second Sudanese Civil War and laying down a timetable for a South Sudan independence 
referendum. The CPA confined the application of sharīʿa to the North and exempted the South. 
It aimed to democratically transform Sudan through reconciliation of national laws with the 
Interim National Constitution (INC) of 2005, which includes a Bill of Rights containing 
fundamental rights and freedoms.54  
The INC denotes a significant departure from previous constitutions in that Sudan does not 
assume a specific identity based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious unity, rather it 
embraces a plurality of religions and cultures.55 Sudan is not defined as an Islamic republic nor 
is Islam considered the state religion as enumerated by its 1998 predecessor and sovereignty is 
vested back in the people under Article 2. However, this is not reflected in practice. The 2014 
trial of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese Christian woman sentenced to death for apostasy, is a case 
in point. The implications of this are discussed further in Sudan’s second UPR below. 
In fact, only three articles in the Constitution refer directly to Islam. Section 5(1) identifies that 
‘[n]ationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of the Northern states of the 
Sudan shall have as its sources of legislation Islamic Sharia and the consensus of the people.’ 
It fails to clarify what will happen if consensus goes against the former and can therefore be 
seen as poor wording to maintain Islamic law. Article 156(d) calls on judges and law 
enforcement agencies to observe ‘the long-established Sharia principle that non-Muslims are 
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not subject to prescribed penalties and therefore remitted penalties shall apply according to 
law’. Finally, under Article157(1)(b), the Non-Muslim Rights Commission must ensure that 
‘Non-Muslims are not adversely affected by the application of the Sharia law in the National 
Capital’.56 This contradicts the position of non-Muslims in the Criminal Act 1991 which does 
not make such a distinction.  
Although the INC ‘omits most other articles from the 1998 Constitution that relate to Islamic 
precept and notions’, it maintains the sovereign right to impose the death penalty. Article 28 
provides every human being with the inherent right to life and Article 36 follows the same 
limitations as the 1998 Constitution, namely that ‘no death penalty shall be imposed, save as 
retribution, hudud or punishment for extremely serious offences in accordance with the law’ 
but fails to define what it considers as ‘extremely serious offences’. Those under 18 or above 
70 are exempt from the death penalty, except in cases of retribution (qiṣāṣ) or fixed offences 
(ḥudūd). This is an inadequate provision which implicitly allows for the juvenile death penalty. 
The death penalty is maintained for reasons owing to Islamic criminal justice which is 
challenged in Part Two. 
There is a procedural nuance within the INC as Article 27(3) (incorporating international 
obligations) and Article 28 (inherent right to life) suggest the non-application of the death 
penalty in general but Article 3657 explicitly permits the use of the punishment including its 
application to juveniles. Therefore, instead of confining the death penalty, contradictory 
provisions facilitate its execution.  
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Furthermore, the death penalty remains a lawful punishment for offences and conduct which 
contravene the evolving jurisprudence on ‘most serious crimes’ under international law.58  For 
example, in Sudan’s Criminal Act 1991,59 Firearms and Ammunitions Act 1986,60 Drugs and 
Narcotics Act 1994,61 The Anti-Terrorism Act 2001,62 Armed Forces Act 2007,63 The National 
Security Act 2010,64 The Child Act 2010,65 and The Combating Human Trafficking Act 2013.66 
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions has addressed death 
sentences for: 
adultery, apostasy, blasphemy, bribery, acts incompatible with chastity, corruption, 
drug possession, drug trafficking, drug-related offences, economic offences, 
expressing oneself, holding an opinion, homosexual acts, matters of sexual 
orientation, manifesting one’s religion or beliefs, prostitution, organization of 
prostitution, participation in protests, premarital sex, singing songs inciting men to 
go to war, sodomy, speculation, acts of treason, espionage or other vaguely defined 
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62 Incitement to commit an act in furtherance of the purposes of a terrorist state (article 5) and committing an act 
of terrorism (article 6).  
63 Non-compliance with orders and instructions (article 142); abandonment of military posts (article 143 (1)); 
forcing subordinates to surrender (article 145); surrender or unconditional truce, (article 146); assistance of the 
enemy (article 147); joining the enemy (article 148 (1)); rebellion against constitutional order (article 162 (1)); 
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information and secrets (article 164); violations related to firearms and ammunition (article 182); offences related 
to military equipment, gear and uniforms (article 183 (1)). 
64 Crimes related to collaboration with an enemy (article 55); Conspiracy and Mutiny (article 56); Endangering 
the internal or external security of the country (article 57). 
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acts usually described as ‘crimes against the State’, and writing slogans against a 
country’s leader.67  
This suggests that problems of non-compliance have remained widespread. The above offences 
cannot be grouped in the same category as intentional killing and many of these offences violate 
the very Covenant they purportedly adhere to. For example, criminalising apostasy, blasphemy, 
manifesting one’s religion or beliefs, and freedom of expression is a breach of Articles 18 and 
19 of the ICCPR.  
Not only do the breadth of crimes punishable by death in Sudan conflict with international 
human rights law, which restricts the death penalty to crimes of intentional killing,68 it is also 
not reflective of the limited role of capital punishment in Islamic law as discussed in Part Two 
of this study. A substantial reform of Sudan’s penal laws is required for a genuine application 
of the INC. Below we now consider how Sudan’s preservation of the death penalty translates 
into its Universal Periodic Review, first cycle in 2011, and second cycle in 2016. 
4.3 First Cycle 
Sudan’s first Universal Periodic Review took place on 10 May 2011; however, the content was 
dominated by the ongoing crisis in Darfur. It received a total of 160 recommendations of which 
121 were accepted.69  
4.3.1 National Report 
The state national report was written after consultations with civil society organisations and 
the state recognised that the UPR ‘should not be a mechanism for which the government alone 
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prepares’.70 Although Sudan acknowledged the importance of stakeholders in the review 
process, it did not provide further details on the consultations except that they were, ‘conducted 
in a number of sessions and workshops organized for that purpose’.71 This reduces the 
transparency of the mechanism as we are prevented from knowing the level of  contribution 
made by civil society and whether their comments had any reflection in the final national report. 
Hence, any comments and/or recommendations on the death penalty are at risk of being 
precluded from the state narrative in order to protect the sovereign power to apply the 
punishment. 
The report begins by affirming Sudan’s ‘sincere desire to comply and cooperate with United 
Nations human rights mechanisms, including the universal periodic review’72 and 
acknowledges that human rights are ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated’.73 It highlights Sudan’s legal framework for human rights protection74 and refers 
to Sudan as a multi-racial, multi-cultural, and multi-religious state.75 There is no official state 
religion declared, Sudan embraces different religions and cultures which are considered 
sources of strength, inspiration, and harmony.76  
All rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed under Part Two of the Constitution which 
incorporates the Bill of Rights set forth in Article 27. The Constitution prohibits detraction or 
derogation from any of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein and prohibits their 
suspension, ‘treating them as laws that can be neither undermined nor amended by legislative 
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71 Sudan National Report 1, para 5. 
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institutions without the matter being put to a referendum’.77 This is not accurate since Article 
28 of the INC guarantees the inherent right to life yet the very same Constitution permits its 
derogation under Article 36.  
The government further claims that in accordance with Article 27(3) of the Constitution, all 
international human rights treaties, covenants, and instruments ratified by the state form an 
integral part of the Constitution, ‘[i]ndeed, many of the provisions of these conventions are at 
the heart of the national legislation’.78 If international human rights are so important to the state 
as it alleges, then this should be reflected in its domestic law and practice. Sudan has ratified 
the ICCPR yet remains in violation of its obligation to restrict the death penalty to ‘the most 
serious crimes’ which is affirmed by the Human Rights Committee in its concluding 
observations79 and the Secretary-General in his quinquennial report that, ‘non-violent acts such 
as financial crimes, religious practice or expression of conscience and sexual relations between 
consenting adults’80 are crimes for which the death penalty should not be applied.  
The national report further states that, ‘various existing laws were reviewed in order to bring 
them into line with the Constitution and relevant international conventions’81 and mentions a 
number of statutes by way of example.82 One such example being ‘the Sudanese Criminal Code 
of 1991, which was amended in 2009 by the addition of a full chapter on crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocide’.83 It is noteworthy that Sudan’s exercise in reviewing 
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domestic laws did not extend to its death penalty provisions which conflict with the Sudanese 
Constitution and the international human rights obligations of Sudan. This discrepancy is best 
illustrated by Article 126 of the Criminal Act 1991 which punishes apostasy with death, 
contrary to the government’s claim that the Constitution, ‘guarantees to every individual the 
right of freedom of conscience and religious creed, in addition to the associated right of 
manifesting his religion or creed...It also provides that no person shall be coerced into adopting 
a creed in which he does not believe’.84 Whilst all religions are given an equal standing in the 
Constitution (Article 1(3)), Sudanese criminal law protects a certain interpretation of Islamic 
law over others. It also runs contrary to Article 18 ICCPR which guarantees freedom of 
religion.85 Hence Sudan’s assertion that domestic legislation has been amended to complement 
relevant international law is insufficient as a principle of law.  
A number of rights under the ICCPR are identified as being incorporated into the Constitution 
and national legislation such as the right to a fair trial (Article 14),86 freedom of expression 
(Article 19),87 equality and non-discrimination (Article 26),88 but, unsurprisingly, the right to 
life is absent from discussion.89 Discussion on the right to life is confined in the national report 
which is consistent with Sudan’s expression of sovereignty. The section on children’s rights is 
the only area which addresses capital punishment, albeit as a fleeting reference. It does not deal 
with the legality of the death penalty nor does it provide any justification for its continued 
application. However it does remove the sovereign’s right to impose the juvenile death penalty 
through the introduction of the Child Act 2010.90 The new Act, repealing the Child Act 2004, 
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‘raise[s] the age of criminal liability for children from seven to twelve years and categorically 
prohibits the death penalty for any person under eighteen years of age’.91 The Child Act 2010 
also states that, ‘the provisions of this Act shall prevail over any other provisions in any other 
law’ which ensures that children are protected from execution. This is an important 
advancement considering that under Article 3 of the Criminal Act 1991, ‘adult means any 
person whose puberty has been established by definite natural features and who has completed 
fifteen years of age, and whoever attains eighteen years of age shall be deemed an adult even 
if the features of puberty do not appear’.  
The national report identifies Sudan’s cooperation with international and regional mechanisms 
as one of its best practices. In terms of its regional commitments, the report affirms that ‘the 
Sudan effectively participates in the work of the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights’92 however at the time of this report, Sudan was behind on its fourth periodic report to 
the African Union and approaching the deadline for its fifth report. It eventually submitted its 
fourth and fifth reports together in 2012.93 The report also notes that Sudan, ‘continues to 
participate in the work of the present Human Rights Council [and] it has also continued to 
submit periodic reports to the conventional mechanisms for the treaties to which it is a party’.94 
This seems to be political rhetoric intended to boost Sudan’s image in the international 
community as the OHCHR compilation demonstrates Sudan’s inconsistency in treaty body 
reporting. The state’s twelfth to sixteenth reports for CERD have been overdue, with the last 
report submitted in 2000 and its second and third reports for CESCR have been overdue since 
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2003 and 2008 respectively.95 The state submitted its third report on the implementation of the 
ICCPR in 2006, nine years late with the Human Rights Committee urging the state to ‘respect 
the schedule it has established for the submission of reports’.96 Its fourth report was due in 
2011, the year of its first UPR, and this too was submitted late.97 We can see that the OHCHR 
report provides a much-needed balance to Sudan’s self-affirming report and is discussed further 
below. 
4.3.2 OHCHR Report 
The OHCHR compilation, submitted on 24 February 2011, notes that Sudan is not party to 
ICCPR-OP-1, ICCPR-OP-2, CEDAW, CED, and CAT (only a signatory, 1986). It is however 
party to the ICCPR and CRC, acceding to the treaties in 1986 and 1990 respectively with no 
declarations or reservations issued.98 Consequently, it is expected to fulfil its human rights 
commitments in accordance with these obligations, which includes protecting the right to life.  
However, certain national laws conflict with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
the 2005 Interim National Constitution and violate the state’s international obligations. One 
significant example being the 1991 Criminal Act.99 The Secretary-General also made similar 
comments calling for a reform to the national criminal laws.100 He further noted that the 
imposition of the death penalty continues to be a matter of concern especially when individuals 
on death row have not been provided with legal representation during their trials.101  
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On 10 February 2010, two Special Rapporteurs issued an urgent appeal to the government of 
Sudan concerning the continued application of the death penalty against minors.102 This was a 
follow-up to previous communications sent in 2008 which remained without a response from 
the government. The subject of appeal were ten male minors who were sentenced to death in 
violation of international standards on safeguards and restrictions relating to the imposition of 
the death penalty.103  Eight were found guilty by the Anti-Terrorism courts and one by the 
Nyala General Court in South Darfur. In the case of Mahmood Adam Zariba, the court failed 
to grant a medical examination to determine his age. He was sentenced to death on 31 July 
2008 by Anti-Terrorism Court 4 in Omdurman.104 As to the cases of Mohamed Hashim Ali 
Abdu, Ishag Yaseen Ali Adam, Abdelsalam Yahya Abdallah Adam, Mohamed Al Duma 
Yahya Abaker, Mohamed Al Talib Mustafa Al Sanousi, and Mansour Ibrahim Abaker Hashim, 
it is reported that the courts relied exclusively on a report of a police medical committee for 
the determination of the defendants’ age which was found to be over the age of 18. The defence 
counsel were denied access to the report in question and the courts failed to consider doubts 
cast on the methodology of the report during cross-examination. The defendants were all 
sentenced to death by the Anti-Terrorism Courts.105 
The Special Rapporteur challenged that:  
While the authorities have denied that any minors were sentenced to death in these 
trials, they have never produced court records nor medical certificates to show that 
                                                          
102 UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.1, para. 1072; UN Doc A/HRC/14/26/Add.1, para. 1046. 
103 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, 
‘Communications to and from Governments’ (18 June 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.1, para 1072; Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva, 
‘Communications to and from Governments’ (18 June 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/26/Add.1, para 1046. 
104 UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.1, para 1073.  
105 ibid para 1074-1075. Mohamed Hashim Ali Abdu and Ishag Yaseen Ali Adam were sentenced to death on 31 





adequate medical examinations had been conducted to assess the age of 
the…defendants. The information received indicates that under Sudanese law 
neither the defence lawyers nor the interested public can download disclosure of 
the court records in this respect.106 
In Al Sadig Mohamed Jaber Al Dar Adam’s case, the defendant’s birth certificate was accepted 
by the Khartoum Anti-Terrorism Court as valid documentation of his age which proved that he 
was 17 at the time of the offence. However, Article 27(2) of the Criminal Act 1991 permits the 
juvenile death penalty for ḥudūd crimes and Al Sadiq was therefore able to be prosecuted under 
the ḥudūd offence of ḥirāba, pursuant to Article 167, and sentenced to death. 
Turning to the case of Abdulrahman Zakaria Mohamed, the Nyala General Court in South 
Darfur sentenced him to death on 3 May 2007 after finding him guilty of murder and robbery.107 
He was aged 17 at the time of the trial. The court held that, under the INC and Criminal Act 
1991, ḥudūd offences were exempt from the general prohibition of the juvenile death penalty. 
The court affirmed the primacy of the Sudanese constitution over any other domestic law and 
therefore, ‘the victim’s family’s right to retribution (qiṣāṣ) prevails over the 2004 Child Act 
which prohibits the death penalty for offences committed by minors’.108 
The judgement was appealed and subsequently quashed by the Nyala Appellate Court which 
held that Abdulrahman’s death sentence was a violation of the Child Act 2004.109 The case was 
returned to the Nyala General Court for reconsideration, instructing it to, ‘apply the appropriate 
alternative measures stipulated in the Child Act, and to decide on the compensation (blood 
money) for the family of the deceased’.110 The victim’s family refused this alternative and the 
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case then reached the Supreme Court in Khartoum.111 In December 2008, the Supreme Court 
upheld the original decision of the Nyala General Court and sentenced Abdulrahman to death.  
In the Special Rapporteur’s engagement with the age of a juvenile, he noted that the Court’s 
decision was based on two arguments. Firstly, the prohibition of the death penalty for children 
did not apply to ḥudūd cases which was in accordance with both the INC and Criminal Act 
1991. Secondly, the definition of a child was interpreted under Article 3 which meant that as 
long as the defendant reached 15 years of age and exhibited natural signs of puberty, the 
provisions of the Criminal Act applicable to adults should be applied. Abdulrahman was 
executed on 14 May 2009.112 
The Special Rapporteur argued that, whilst not wishing to prejudice the accuracy of the 
information received, Article 37(a) CRC and Article 6(5) ICCPR provide that the death penalty 
will not be imposed on persons below 18 years of age.113 These provisions are absolute and 
without exception. Whether the crime is a ḥudūd offence or not is immaterial for the purposes 
of Sudan’s international law obligations as the CRC and ICCPR are binding upon the state. 
Addressing the Supreme Court’s reliance on the Criminal Act’s definition of an ‘adult’, the 
Special Rapporteur noted that under Article 37(a), the CRC is explicitly clear that the minimum 
age for an individual to be potentially subject to the death penalty is 18 years. He further added 
that ‘[u]nlike other provisions of the covenant, this prohibition is not flexible when account is 
taken of the individual development and maturity of the offender. The ICCPR similarly admits 
no flexibility in terms of execution of the death penalty for persons under 18 years of age’.114 
                                                          
111 ibid. 
112 ibid. 
113 ibid para 1079. 




The government replied to the communications on 18 March 2010.115 However a translation 
of the response from relevant services was not received at the time the report was finalised. 
The response was produced in the following report.116 The government noted that: 
According to information provided by the defendants during the preliminary 
investigation, all the defendants were over 18, except for Mohamed Jabar Al Dar 
Adam, who said that he was 17 but provided no proof of age. He did show all signs 
of having reached his majority, however. For these reasons, the court sent him to 
medical experts for an age assessment. They reported back that he was over 18, 
and therefore he was sent for trial and convicted under article 168 of the Criminal 
Code of 1991. 117  
In this statement of fact, we see an enumeration of criminal liability and the age of majority in 
Sudanese law, but no definition is provided. The government did not expand upon the meaning 
of ‘all signs’ resulting in a vague and unhelpful response.  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child urged Sudan to ensure that children are exempt from 
the death penalty, including in cases of retribution or ḥudūd, and to substitute any death 
sentences already handed down to persons under 18 years with an appropriate alternative 
sanction.118 Similar concerns were raised by UNICEF, the Independent Expert, and the Human 
Rights Committee with the latter also recommending that the number of crimes liable for the 
death penalty should be restricted.119 It stated that the death penalty for offences which do not 
fall under  the threshold of the most serious crimes are incompatible with Article 6 ICCPR and 
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should be repealed. In August 2007, the Human Rights Committee also called upon Sudan to, 
‘guarantee the death penalty will not be applied to persons aged under 18 years’.120 
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) raised grave concerns regarding the 
fairness of the trial of 10 men sentenced to death for murder in 2007, arguing that, ‘no judicial 
system could consider valid a confession obtained under torture and revoked before a court, 
nor a death sentence based on such confession’.121 The case was brought before the WGAD in 
August 2008 and in its opinion, it found that the defendants were not provided with a fair and 
public hearing in accordance with Article 14 ICCPR. All ten defendants recanted their 
confessions in court arguing that they had been compelled to make such statements due to 
threats, intimidation, torture, and ill-treatment; a patent violation of Article 7 ICCPR. These 
‘confessions’ were produced during four months of incommunicado detention, and without 
access to legal counsel and family visits.122 This was a gross violation of fair trial guarantees 
which includes the right to ‘have adequate time and facilities for preparation of [one’s] defence 
and to communicate with counsel of [one’s] own choosing’123 and the ‘right not to be 
compelled to confess guilt’.124 The Human Rights Committee noted that ‘[i]n cases involving 
capital punishment, it is axiomatic that the accused must be effectively assisted by a lawyer at 
all stages of the proceedings’.125 The General Assembly also declared that prolonged 
incommunicado detention ‘may facilitate the perpetration of torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment and can in itself constitute a form of such treatment’.126 
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A request to medically examine the defendants was made to the lead prosecutor, on the basis 
of alleged torture. The prosecutor and judge denied the request despite the fact that when the 
trial proceedings began, physical signs of injuries and scars were clearly visible on many of the 
defendants’ arms, hands, thighs and shoulders due to the alleged torture.127 The Commission 
on Human Rights Resolution 2005/39 urged states to disregard any statement made as a result 
of torture, ensuring it is not used in any proceeding yet such confessions were exclusively relied 
upon to sentence the defendants to death, thus eliminating the possibility of a fair trial. 
Although several mandate holders of the Human Rights Council appealed to the government 
to stay the executions, the defendants were hanged on 13 April 2009 in a Khartoum prison.128 
This runs contrary to the state’s claims in its national report that: 
The Criminal Code of 1991, for instance, emphatically provides that detainees 
under investigation must be treated in a manner conducive to the preservation of 
their dignity, must not be subjected to any physical or mental harm and must 
receive suitable medical care. The National Security Act of 2009 and the 
regulations on the treatment of detainees also include separate provisions to ensure 
that detainees are treated in an appropriate and humane manner.129 
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions emphasised that 
‘only the full respect for the stringent due process guarantees distinguishes capital punishment, 
as permitted by Article 6 of the Covenant “in countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty”, from a summary execution which violates the most fundamental human right’.130  
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Violations of fair trial guarantees and due process in Sudan were also addressed by UNMIS 
who attributed this to an inadequate legal framework in place for the protection of human rights. 
This included the 2010 National Security Act and 1991 Criminal Procedure Act.131 
Additionally, the continued reliance on the 1993 Evidence Act, which allows the use of 
confessions obtained under duress as evidence in court, was further hindering the country’s 
administration of justice. The Human Rights Committee recommended that Sudan prohibits 
the use of confessions obtained in contravention to Article 7 of the ICCPR in any court.132 
4.3.3 Stakeholder Report133 
The stakeholder report for the Sudan comprised of a summary of 22 stakeholder submissions 
to the UPR.134 Amnesty International, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Joint 
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Submission 3 (JS3), JS7, and JS9 recommended the ratification of a number of international 
human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR-OP-2 and CAT.135 They called for all state laws 
to be revised in conformity with the Interim National Constitution and the treaties to which 
Sudan is a party.136  
Amnesty International stated that the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in 
Sudan was the only mandate that could offer a comprehensive overview of the human rights 
situation. It recommended that Sudan continues to cooperate with the Independent Expert and 
accept outstanding mission requests by the Special Procedures, without delay.137 It documented 
16 death penalty cases between 2008 and 2010 and recommended ‘an immediate moratorium 
on executions, a commutation of all death sentences to terms of imprisonments, [and] rigorous 
compliance with international standards of fair trial, including in cases punishable by the death 
penalty’.138  
UNICEF and JS5 expressed concern regarding Sudan’s use of the juvenile death penalty which 
is a direct violation of Article 37 CRC, noting that the state’s domestic law is at odds with its 
international human rights obligations on protecting the right to life.139 JS5 also noted that 
individuals under the age of 18 were exempt from the imposition of the death penalty in 
accordance to Article 36 of the INC however it did not apply in cases of retribution or ḥudūd 
crimes.140 This could be a fruitful avenue to discuss the age of criminal liability from a sharīʿa 
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perspective as interpretations exist that put the minimum age at 18, which is discussed further 
in Chapter 5, thereby challenging the legitimacy of maintaining such a provision. However, the 
stakeholders failed to engage with this aspect of the law. 
Although a January 2010 amendment to the Child Act determined 18 years as the firm age of 
majority, courts have continued to apply the death penalty to juveniles in ḥudūd offences as 
seen in the case of nine individuals sentenced to death by the Special Court in Nyala, on 21 
October 2010, for a carjacking incident. The defendants were allegedly affiliated with the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and four of them were believed to be under 18 years old 
at the time of the sentence. They were charged pursuant to Articles 50 (offences against the 
state), 51 (fomenting war against the state), 168 (armed robbery), and 182 (criminal damage) 
under the Criminal Act.141 
The Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC) criticised the Special Criminal Courts 
for lacking due process and fair trial guarantees and administering harsh punishments which 
are disproportionate to the crimes committed.  On 29 May 2008, the government created four 
Anti-Terrorism Special Courts ‘to try individuals accused of participating in JEM’s attack 
against Khartoum’.142 These courts were given Exceptional Rules of Procedure (ATSCRP) 
which DRDC identified as being inconsistent with universal human rights standards and falling 
short of satisfying minimum standards of justice in both customary and international law.143 
The ATSCRP prevented defendants from bringing habeas corpus petitions. Judges 
systematically denied access to legal counsel of their choice in private or to investigate 
allegations of torture and ill-treatment. One hundred and eleven death sentences were 
reportedly handed down by these courts thus far. The Anti-Terrorism Special Court of Appeal 
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confirmed these sentences which are now awaiting the signature of the president for the 
executions to be carried out.144 The Society for Threatened Persons expressed similar concerns 
and added that 50 of the individuals sentenced to death were released in February 2010 
following an agreement between JEM and the Sudanese Court.145   
Another key concern identified by stakeholders was the use of confessions extracted under 
torture in death penalty trials, in violation of Article 7 ICCPR. The National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) agents had powers to detain individuals up to four and a half months 
‘without judicial oversight which enabled them to commit human rights violations such as 
torture and other ill-treatment and to extract ‘confessions’ under duress’.146 
Referencing WGAD’s opinion regarding the 10 men accused of a newspaper editor’s murder, 
Redress noted that ‘this case, as well as convictions pursuant to trials under the anti-terrorism 
law, raise serious concerns over their compatibility with the right to life, which requires that 
the death penalty should only be imposed following a fair trial’.147 The defendants were denied 
legal counsel and confessed under duress yet the convictions were upheld in three appeals and 
a petition to the Constitutional Court. UN Special Procedures issued several submissions urging 
Sudan to reconsider the convictions but they were ignored.148 
Since then, six men were charged with the murder of 13 police officers in the Soba Aradi riots 
of 2006 and were executed, in Khartoum, in January 2010.149 Similar to previous cases, the 
defendants were not provided with pre-trial legal counsel and revoked confessions they had 
made. Yet again, the convictions were upheld at all stages of appeal despite submissions made 
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by UNMIS and UN Special Procedures.150 UNMIS also reported 158 people tried in 11 special 
trials by the Omdurman Anti-Terrorism Court from June 2008 until January 2010; and 106 
persons were sentenced to death (50 of whom were later released). In each trial monitored, 
defendants alleged they had been forced to confess.151 
DRDC referred to Article 206 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1991 which expressly permits the 
use of evidence and confessions obtained under torture to be admitted in legal proceedings, 
also noting that this practice was encouraged by the National Security Act and the Emergency 
and Public Safety Protection Act (Emergency Act) 1997.152 The procedural rules employed by 
courts were inconsistent with universal human rights standards nor did they meet the minimum 
standards of justice required under customary and international law.153 
Minority Rights Group International highlighted the right to freedom of religion under Article 
18 ICCPR and 18 UDHR, encouraging the state to guarantee full religious freedom.154 
Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) noted that apostasy continued to be a statutory crime 
in accordance with the 1991 Penal Code. It recommended that the government uphold the 
enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief, ‘repeal its apostasy law; and extend a standing 
invitation to the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief’.155 Minority Rights Group 
and CSW did not engage with the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) of the punishment which would 
have strengthened their recommendations. The status of apostasy as a death penalty offence, in 
Islamic law, needs to be challenged and a more nuanced understanding reveals that the 
punishment does not apply to apostasy simpliciter, a discussion that is taken up in detail in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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The above comments from the stakeholders demonstrate how they utilised the UPR platform 
to make important observations on Sudan’s use of the death penalty and how it continues to 
remain a major challenge to the right to life. Although they identified shortcomings in Sudan’s 
legal system which facilitate the application of the death penalty, they missed an important 
opportunity to address the punishment from an Islamic law perspective.  
4.3.4    The Review 
4.3.4.1 Interactive dialogue 
Sudan’s review took place at the 14th meeting of the Working Group on the UPR, on 10 May 
2011. Belgium, China, and Mauritania were selected as the troika to facilitate the review.156 A 
total of 189 recommendations were received of which 163 were accepted by the state. Twenty-
two recommendations were received on the death penalty and ten were accepted.157 
A list of questions prepared in advance by 12 states was submitted via the troika. Five of these 
states addressed the application of the death penalty in Sudan: Canada,158 Denmark,159 
Ireland,160 Switzerland,161 United Kingdom.162 Whilst most questions asked the state under 
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review about its plans to establish a moratorium, none engaged with the fiqh of the death 
penalty in order to more effectively challenge the sovereign’s right to put to death. 
In the state under review’s presentation, the delegation of Sudan reaffirmed the views 
expressed in its national report. It voiced its desire to cooperate with the Human Rights Council 
stating that its presence at the UPR was recognition of this.163 Although this is a commendable 
effort, the state must do more than simply be present at the UPR; it needs to fully engage with 
the process which includes full transparency of its human rights situation, any challenges it 
faces such as the conflict between the INC and death penalty laws, and enable a forum for 
constructive discussion. 
The state noted that legislative reform was a continuous process with a number of amendments 
made to existing national laws in order to fulfil its obligations under international human rights 
treaties. It did not explain what was being done regarding those domestic laws that are in 
violation of international human rights standards nor did it provide a timeframe for when this 
could be achieved.  
It hoped that the UPR mechanism could replace other mechanisms ‘including special country 
mandates which are characterised by selectivity and double standards and used for purposes 
unrelated to human rights, and which have been proven to be ineffective and in need of 
reform’.164 This is an example of the state engaging in superfluous debate as Sudan’s desire for 
the UPR to replace other mechanisms indicates to its lack of awareness of the purpose and role 
of the UPR which is to complement, not duplicate or replace, their work.165  
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Furthermore, geographic mandates increase, in principle, the visibility of the human rights 
situation in a country however the politicisation of the old Commission limited the success of 
the Special Procedures.166 This was partly attributed to the criticism that certain countries 
benefitted from some kind of informal immunity from country mandates.167 Nevertheless, 
Oliver Hoehne makes a convincing argument that as the system of country mandates has gained 
considerably in scope and legitimacy:  
geographic mandates now bother countries to the extent that they would often wish 
to do away with them. This may arguably be seen as a sign of their success and 
development. The geographical imbalance of the system certainly needs to be 
tackled, but the way forward should be through the establishment of country 
mandates wherever reasonably justified, and not through the abolition of this 
important focused mechanism.168 
Fifty-two delegations delivered statements during the interactive dialogue stage and 160 
recommendations were made. Switzerland made reference to reported executions of children 
despite the Children’s Act 2010 prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.169 It also referred to the 
Independent Expert’s reports on torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention committed by the 
NISS.170 It recommended the commutation of death sentences already imposed against minors 
                                                          
166 See Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
167 Oliver Hoehne, ‘Special Procedures and the New Human Rights Council – A Need for Strategic Positioning’ 
(2007) 4(1) Essex Human Rights Review 1, 3; Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System 
for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 148; 
Phillip Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: OUP 1992) 164; Rosa 
Freedman, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of the Same?’ (2013) 31(2) Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 209, 220-23. 
168 Hoehne, ‘Special Procedures and the New Human Rights Council – A Need for Strategic Positioning’, 8. See 
also Tomas Husak, ‘In Defence of the United Nations Special Procedures’ in Lars Muller (ed), The First 365 Days 
of the United Nations Human Rights Council (Geneva 2007); Marc Limon & Hilary Power, ‘History of the United 
Nations Special Procedures Mechanism Origins, Evolution and Reform’ (Universal Rights Group 2014). 





to appropriate alternative sentences, and to ensure that the death penalty is not applied for 
crimes committed before the age of 18.171  
Saudi Arabia enquired about the measures taken to implement the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and issued recommendations in this regard.172 It would be beneficial for Saudi Arabia 
to adopt the same concern for itself as it has been criticised for its lack of adherence to the CRC 
as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Belgium also echoed concerns regarding the imposition of the death penalty against minors 
and recommended that Sudan respect the principles enshrined in ECOSOC resolution 1984/50, 
ensuring that the death penalty will be applied to the most serious crimes and individuals over 
18 years at the time of the offence.173 Similarly, other states such as Uruguay,174 Spain,175 
Italy,176 Brazil,177 Palestine,178 France,179 and Slovenia180 expressed concerns regarding the 
application of the death penalty against minors and recommended its abolition. France181 and 
Slovenia182 also recommended the commutation of death sentences in general. Recommending 
actions varied from ‘establishing a moratorium’, ‘immediately prohibiting’ to ‘considering the 
abolition of the death penalty’. 
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France was the only recommending state to make reference to Sudan’s domestic law whilst 
Belgium was the only state to cite ECOSOC Resolution 1984/50 on safeguards against the 
death penalty. Although a commendable effort to include some aspect of law into their 
recommendation, these did not meet the criteria set out in HRC Resolution 5/1 for the review 
of a state.183 
In fact, no recommending state relied on the review criteria. Since Sudan is party to the ICCPR 
and CRC, it would prove beneficial for recommending states to refer to Article(s) 6, 7, and/or 
14 of the ICCPR when dealing with the question of the death penalty, notwithstanding Article 
3 UDHR. This would enable states to produce more concrete recommendations. 
All recommendations concerning the death penalty as applied to juveniles were accepted by 
Sudan which observed that its Constitution and the Child Act 2010 were in place to protect 
children from capital punishment, noting that persons below 18 years of age are exempt from 
the death penalty.184 Again, no recommendation relied on the review criteria such as Article 
37(a) of the CRC.  
Several near identical recommendations were issued for the establishment of a moratorium on 
the death penalty with a view to its abolition.185 These recommendations did not enjoy Sudan’s 
support. Instead, Sudan stressed that: 
In compliance with Sudan’s commitment to the ICCPR, the death penalty in the 
Sudanese laws is confined to the most serious crimes. In murder cases there is room 
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for pardoning by the relative(s) of the deceased and in such case the death penalty 
will not be imposed.186  
Although recommending states did not acknowledge the relevant international law in their 
recommendations, i.e. the ICCPR, the state under review did - albeit incorrectly. Sudan’s 
response to maintaining the death penalty ignored previously raised concerns by the Human 
Rights Committee that the death penalty continues to be applied for crimes not considered ‘the 
most serious’.187 Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions has taken the view that a subjective approach to interpreting ‘most serious crimes’ 
is not viable as relying upon what individuals or Governments consider to be serious would 
‘render the relevant international law standard meaningless’.188  
Paragraph 6 of Article 6 ICCPR is most relevant here as it explicitly states that, ‘nothing in this 
article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State 
Party to the present Covenant’ therefore continued justification of the death penalty, that too 
based on incorrect assumptions of the law, is inadequate as it is delaying abolition.  
Whilst recommendations on the death penalty were generic and lacked any reference to 
Sudan’s international human rights obligations, some were based on inaccurate information. 
The state noted that: 
While the recommendation itself seems to be accepted in its objective, the wording 
adopted gives false assertion to a situation which is not true. In such cases we 
accepted some of the recommendations. Also we received some recommendations 
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to do something that we have already done or already doing. Also in this case we 
accepted the recommendation and noted to the action already taken to enforce the 
recommendation.189 
A prime example of this was Switzerland’s recommendation for Sudan to ratify the ICCPR.190 
This recommendation is clearly inaccurate as Sudan ratified the ICCPR in 1986 and this was 
highlighted by the state under review.191 What it is not party to, however, is the ICCPR’s 
Optional Protocols. Recommending states need to ensure that their recommendations are 
accurate or risk diluting the review process.  
Another example was Honduras’ recommendation to ‘abolish the law that legalizes the 
Sunna’192 which is generic and vague. It is unclear what law Honduras was referring to and 
neither did it base its recommendation on the review criteria. Based on the Jubilee Campaign’s 
submission,193 it is possible that Honduras was referring to a form of FGM practised in Sudan, 
which is termed ‘sunna’, however this was not made clear in the recommendation. On the other 
hand, it could be referring to the use of ‘Islamic sharia’ as stipulated in Article 5(1) of the 
Constitution which would suggest a misunderstanding of the applicable law. Islamic law is not 
based on the sunna alone but is constituted from primary and secondary sources.194 Sudan 
responded that it did not understand what ‘law that legalizes the Sunna’ meant and nor is there 
such a law in place.195 
Freedom of religion was another area of recommendation to the state, especially since apostasy 
is a capital crime in Sudan. Poland noted that freedom of religion was restricted in Sudan and 
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like Spain, it recommended a revision of the 1991 Penal code and to decriminalise apostasy.196 
Whilst it is commendable that both states made reference to domestic law, they failed to note 
its inconsistency with Article 18 of the ICCPR, a treaty to which Sudan is party. Sudan did not 
accept these recommendations, stating that ‘freedom of religion is guaranteed by the 
constitution and the laws’.197 The 2014 case of Meriam Ibrahim, a woman sentenced to death 
for apostasy and adultery, contradicts this position and formed a large part of Sudan’s second 
UPR and is discussed in the next cycle. 
4.3.4.2 Adoption of the Outcomes  
In the adoption of the outcome of the review, Sudan reiterated that the human rights treaties to 
which it is party are considered an integral part of its Constitution.198 New laws had been 
enacted which included that ‘the death penalty for those under 18 years of age is strictly 
prohibited’.199 The provisions for the death penalty in its penal system, which have been 
identified to be in violation of international law, were not reformed nor did Sudan give any 
indication that this area was a work in progress. When compared to submissions made by the 
OHCHR and stakeholders, there is an apparent polarisation of views as Sudan does not seem 
to be making any substantive progress on preserving the right to life. Instead it seems to be 
cementing its sovereign right to impose the death penalty by refining its capital judicial process.  
Ten states made statements during the adoption stage none of which addressed the question of 
capital punishment.200 The views expressed by these states, Algeria, Cuba, USA, Egypt, 
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Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, UAE, and Qatar were overwhelmingly positive 
except for the United States. This is not surprising considering most are regional allies of 
Sudan; however, a lack of objective feedback risks undermining the process. 
Saudi Arabia noted Sudan’s positive interaction with the UPR and that it:  
cooperated with all UN human rights mechanisms, respected its commitments and 
declared its readiness to cooperate with the international community. This clearly 
showed that Sudan considered human rights important and was concerned with 
implementing them through legislative and institutional initiatives.201 
Such praiseworthy and inaccurate statements undermine the UPR process. Sudan is behind on 
its treaty body reporting and has failed to implement substantial legislative reforms to remove 
death penalty laws which contradict its own Constitution let alone international human rights. 
Recommending states should provide constructive critique and issue recommendations that 
strengthen the process, not diminish it. 
The stakeholders depicted a different version of events on the ground with majority of the 
narrative surrounding the state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan since the 
cessation.202 As a result, rhetoric on the death penalty was limited.  
Nevertheless, in its oral statement, Amnesty International expressed regret over Sudan’s 
rejection of recommendations to establish a moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its 
abolition. Highlighting the discrepancy between the state report and the human rights situation 
on the ground, the NGO recognised that Sudan accepted recommendations to prohibit the death 
penalty for persons under 18 years however at least nine persons (three children and six adults) 
were in the death row section of Shalla Prison in Darfur where they are awaiting retrial. 
                                                          
201 ibid para 594. 




Amnesty International called upon the state to commute these death sentences and for an appeal 
in line with international fair trial standards.203  The Cairo Institute for Human Rights similarly 
echoed concerns over due process and lack of basic fair trial guarantees, ‘a blatant example is 
19 people accused of apostasy’.204 It called upon the state to ‘promote religious freedom, 
expressly outlawing the strict application of sharia law and decriminalising apostasy’.205 
4.4 Mid-term Update 
Sudan submitted its midterm report in 2013 detailing the progress made regarding the 
implementation of the accepted recommendations in its first UPR. Considering the large 
majority of African and OIC states failed to produce a midterm report, Sudan’s submission 
suggested an increased level of engagement with the mechanism and, therefore, was a 
meaningful step in the right direction.206 
Since the state did not accept most of the recommendations on the death penalty, these were 
not included in the report. It did, however, accept recommendations concerning the abolition 
of the death penalty against juvenile offenders, to which it responded that, ‘the Child Act 2010 
explicitly prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on persons below 18 years old and the 
Constitutional Court affirmed the same in one of its decisions’.207 
UPR-Info released its own Midterm Implementation Assessment (MIA) report which included 
responses from stakeholders involved in Sudan’s UPR. The purpose of the MIA is to 
demonstrate how all stakeholders are expected to follow through on, and to implement, their 
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commitments. States should implement accepted recommendations and civil society should 
monitor that implementation.208 
In a joint submission, Asmaa Society for Development and Awn Center for Advocacy and 
Consultancy noted that Sudan’s rejection for the abolition of the death penalty is based on 
sharīʿa law but there are many crimes which do not fall under this remit and continue to be 
punishable with death.209 The joint submission failed to provide further clarification as to what 
these crimes were or how they are devoid of any theological basis which would have given 
greater credibility to the report and allowed for a more productive discussion on the issue. 
The human rights NGO, Redress, highlighted Sudan’s indifference to concerns raised by the 
UN Human Rights Committee in 2007 that the death penalty is being applied to crimes that do 
not fall within the remit of ‘most serious’ and neither have they been followed by any legislative 
changes.210 The state is also silent on:  
serious concerns over procedural shortcomings, such as the anti-terrorism laws, 
and practices, such as reliance on confessions in death penalty cases that defendants 
alleged had been extracted under torture. Any death penalty imposed following an 
unfair trial constitutes a violation of the right to life contrary to Sudan’s obligations 
under the ICCPR and other relevant treaties.211 
Moreover, Sudan did not accept any recommendations to become subject to individual 
complaints procedures such as the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Ratification of the 
Protocol would allow Sudan to recognise the jurisdiction and competence of the Human Rights 
Committee to hear complaints relating to its use of the death penalty. It responded that, ‘Sudan 
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has a Constitutional Court which is the guardian for the human rights stipulated in the 
Constitution and the international human rights treaties to which Sudan is a party’.212  
This justification fails to acknowledge that complaints would only be heard by the UN Human 
Rights Committee after effective remedies have been exhausted. It would not infringe upon the 
Constitutional Court’s role as guardian. However, there may be situations where the 
Constitutional Court fails to discharge its role as guardian due to its limited mandate, 
misinterpretation of applicable standards, or delays. And ‘[i]t would be in those cases that the 
Human Rights Committee could play an important role as supervisory body ensuring respect 
of Sudan’s obligations under the ICCPR’.213  
Sudan’s first cycle revealed a lack of engagement, by the state under review, on the right to 
life. Whilst this was taken up by other recommending states and stakeholders, there was a lack 
of awareness by these actors on the Islamic position of the death penalty which would provide 
a better critique of state death penalty laws since the sharīʿa is the primary source of its 
legislation. 
4.5 Second Cycle 
4.5.1 National Report 
Sudan’s second UPR occurred in May 2016.214 Its national report is a marked improvement 
from its first especially regarding the role of civil society in the national consultation process. 
In preparation for the report, ‘70 such organisations were directly invited to participate while 
the event was also announced over the media. Twenty-four NGOs working in the field of 
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human rights also took part’215. An annex is also attached detailing the nature of the 
consultations and names of participants.216 
Moreover, since the first report was adopted, ‘Sudan has issued a series of laws to promote 
fundamental freedoms and protect human rights’.217 This includes the Criminal Act of 1991 
which was revised in 2015 ‘with the addition of the offence of sexual harassment and the 
separation of the offence of rape from that of adultery in Article 149, thereby removing all 
ambiguity and ensuring just and fair treatment for victims’.218 Pre-2015, Article 149 defined 
rape as ‘whoever makes sexual intercourse, by way of adultery (zinā), or sodomy (liwāṭ), with 
any person without his consent’. Defining rape as ‘zinā without consent’ was highly 
problematic due to the evidentiary requirements for zinā which are based on a virtually 
impossible burden of proof. This ‘evidentiary threshold has attributed to impunity for rape, as 
conviction can realistically only be secured where the perpetrator confesses to the crime’.219  
The revised Article disassociates zinā and liwāṭ from the definition of rape220 and ‘an added 
victory is that rape is not defined just by penal [sic] penetration, but also now includes foreign 
objects on other parts of the body’.221 
Whilst this is considered to be a positive step by Sudan, the Article still has some shortcomings. 
Although rape is now distinct from zinā and liwāṭ as crimes, this separation does not extend to 
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punishments. The revised Article 149 has kept subsection (3) (now renumbered as subsection 
(2)) which stipulates: 
Whoever commits the offence of rape, shall be punished, with whipping a hundred 
lashes, and with imprisonment, for a term, not exceeding ten years, unless rape 
constitute the offence of adultery, or sodomy, punishable with death. 
Another amendment which the government fails to mention in its report is Article 126 of the 
same Act which introduces further crimes under the capital offence of apostasy. Apostasy now 
includes ‘anyone blaspheming or insulting the Prophet Muhammed’,222 ‘speaking evil, 
contradicting or distorting the Quran’,223 ‘Cursing the Prophet’s companions in general or Abu 
Bakr, Umar, Uthman or Ali or speaking evil of Aisha’.224 The state does not make any reference 
to this change nor provide any justification however Sudan’s curtailment on freedom of religion 
formed the main critique of the OHCHR and the stakeholder report when discussing the right 
to life. This shows the importance of non-state actors in addressing the gaps left by the state 
under review. 
Similar to the first national report, the right to life is precluded from the narrative. No 
justification is provided for the state’s use of the death penalty and its apparent inconsistency 
with international law especially when it received a number of recommendations in this respect. 
This can be interpreted as the state clinging to its sovereign right to determine its criminal 
justice practices and is further supported by Sudan’s comments made at the 2015 Human Rights 
Council’s High-level Panel on the Death Penalty. During the discussions, Sudan referred to 
‘the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country and each country can 
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choose its own legal and judicial system based on national legislation in order to guarantee 
peace and stability to all citizens’.225 
Section IV, of the national report, deals with the implementation of recommendations accepted 
in the previous cycle and the report addresses these recommendations in a thematic order. 
Responding to ‘recommendations concerning the rights of children’, the government claims 
that under Article 4 of the Child Act 2010, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 12 
and the Act defines a child as any person under the age of 18. Additionally, children are exempt 
from the death penalty and ‘Article 69 lays down the punitive measures which may be 
applied’.226 
On the other hand, in its submission to Sudan’s UPR, the Child Rights International Network 
observed that the death penalty remains lawful for offences committed before the age of 18.227 
It reported that the Special Court upheld a death sentence in December 2011 for two children 
charged with carjacking and a woman believed to be under 18 was sentenced to death by 
stoning for adultery on 31 May 2012.228 CRIN argued that although the Child Act 2010 
provides that all children are to be sentenced by a child court (Articles 62 and 67) and does not 
provide the court with the death penalty as a sentence (Article 77), the impact of the Act 
remains unclear. Under Article 77, the Act requires the court to have ‘due regard’ that ‘death 
sentence is not inflicted on the child’. CRIN questioned what ‘due regard’ means in this context 
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as ‘the wording appears to fall short of a categorical prohibition on the death penalty for 
offences committed while a child’. This means the death penalty could remain a possibility for 
offences committed before 18 years of age.229  
Since no recommendations on the death penalty were accepted in Sudan’s first UPR, there is 
no mention of the right to life in the implementation section nor anywhere else in the report. 
However the OHCHR and Stakeholders’ report provide an alternative narrative, one that 
focuses on the right to life specifically in relation to freedom of religion. 
4.5.2 OHCHR Report 
The Human Rights Committee urged Sudan to ratify both OP-CRC-IC and ICCPR-OP-2 aimed 
at the abolition of the death penalty.230 The Committee expressed concern that the national 
legal framework and INC did not recognise rights enshrined in the ICCPR. It recommended 
that Sudan ensures its criminal law is compatible with its obligations under the Covenant.231 
The Human Rights Committee and the Independent Expert expressed concern over the death 
penalty being applied to crimes that fell under the ‘most serious crimes’ threshold which was 
contrary to the ICCPR.232 Both recommended a moratorium on the death penalty and/or its 
abolition including the abolition of the juvenile death penalty. They recommended that Sudan 
ensure that ‘all allegations of torture and ill-treatment be promptly, independently and 
thoroughly investigated’ and confessions obtained in violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR are 
not used by the courts. 233 
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The Independent Expert addressed the issue of freedom of religion citing the case of Meriam 
Ibrahim who was sentenced to death, on 15 May 2014, for allegations of apostasy under Article 
126 of the Sudanese Criminal Act. The case received widespread media coverage and 
international outcry with the Independent Expert receiving numerous complaints about the 
case.234 The defence petition held that Meriam’s personal faith and beliefs had been 
misrepresented. A man claiming to be Meriam’s brother informed the authorities, in September 
2013, that she had married a Christian and committed adultery. It is only then that the 
authorities became aware of the Ibrahim family. The defence argued that Meriam had been a 
devout Christian and met her husband, Daniel Wani, whilst a practising Christian. The Court 
of Appeal overturned the conviction on 23 June and Meriam was released from prison.235 
According to the Independent Expert, Mashood A Baderin, ‘the Court of Appeal’s ruling 
overturning the decision of the lower court in this case is commendable in the interest of justice 
from the perspective of both Islamic law and that of international human rights’.236 He also 
noted that in Sudan’s second periodic submission to the Human Rights Committee on the 
implementation of the ICCPR, the state expressed that the Act does not criminalise conversion 
from Islam ‘but only the manifestation of such conversion if such manifestation affects public 
safety’.237  
This interpretation was supported by Court of Appeal judge, Osman Atigani Mahmoud, who 
quashed the conviction observing that: 
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Sudanese law does not criminalise the abstract offence of apostasy unless it is 
combined with manifestation and propagation. This view is adopted by those who 
believe that the offence of apostasy applies only to apostates who fight against 
Islam. The Sudanese law only criminalises the conduct of fighter apostate and not 
the Muslim who only changed his religion.238 
Mahmoud held that in order to prove the apostasy charge, Meriam would need to have ‘stated 
that she is Muslim and that she propagates or publicly promotes the renunciation of the creed 
of Islam’.239 Nevertheless, Meriam’s acquittal was in fact a result of her being deemed mentally 
unfit, by a majority of two to one, as identified by the stakeholder report below. 
The Independent Expert urged Sudan to uphold the right to freedom of religion and belief 
without discrimination, in accordance to both the Sudanese Constitution and ICCPR Article 18 
to which Sudan is a State Party. The Sudanese Bar Association and National Commission for 
Human Rights stated that Meriam’s case ‘raised important legal questions about the scope of 
the right to freedom of religion and belief in Sudan, which needed to be re-examined’.240 The 
case demonstrated a lack of appropriate judicial training in Sudan, particularly at the lower 
bench of the judiciary.241 
4.5.3 Stakeholder Report242 
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The stakeholder report comprised of 24 stakeholders’ submissions to the UPR.243 In dealing 
with the scope of Sudan’s international obligations, Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) 
recommended Sudan ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR with an aim to abolish 
the death penalty.244 
JS6 and MPV noted that courts have continued to pass death sentences, some in absentia. They 
recommended an immediate moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its abolition.245 
MPV reported that Sudan’s imposition of the death penalty is not restricted to the most serious 
crimes. The death penalty is provided for crimes against the state, offences which have been 
used increasingly often since 2011 to punish and silence political opposition party members 
and other activists who have criticised government policy. An example is Ibrahim el Sheikh, 
leader of the Sudanese Congress party, who was charged in 2014 with the death penalty offence 
of undermining the constitutional order after he criticised the actions of the Government’s 
Rapid Support Forces. Furthermore, since its previous review, the scope for the application of 
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the death penalty has been broadened with apostasy now including additional prohibited acts 
and the creation of a new crime of trafficking.246  
JS6, ECLJ, Jubilee Campaign, and MPV recommended reconciling the Criminal Act with the 
Interim Constitution to ensure religious freedom and repeal Articles 125-126. Several 
stakeholders cited the case of Meriam Ibrahim on the restriction of freedom of religion in 
Sudan.247 ADF International reported that Ibrahim was raised a Christian by her mother; her 
father, a Muslim, had abandoned the family when she was 6 years old. Nevertheless, she was 
considered to be a Muslim under the government’s interpretation of sharīʿa law, because her 
father was a Muslim, and therefore charged with apostasy.248  
Meriam’s lawyers challenged the constitutionality of proselytising from Islam under Article 
126 of the Criminal Act 1991 and argued that it was a violation of Article 38 INC. The lawyers 
were harassed and given death threats for being ‘un-Islamic’. Despite guarantees in the 
Constitution to protect religious liberty, Sudan’s national laws and practices contradict this 
fundamental right.249 
The Sudanese Human Rights Initiative (SHRI) observed that a group of UN human rights 
experts condemned Meriam’s death sentence and held that her trial was a violation of basic fair 
trial and due process guarantees.250 In particular, she was unable to call upon witnesses to 
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present her defence or effectively challenge any witnesses. Furthermore, Article 2(e) of the 
African Commission’s Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa provides that ‘the essential elements of a fair trial including adequate 
opportunity to prepare a case, present arguments and evidence and to challenge or respond to 
opposing arguments or evidence’ which the state failed to do.251 SHRI recommended Sudan to 
bring ‘its hudud offences in line with human rights and urged that those penalties are applicable 
to Muslims exclusively’.252  
CSW reported that Meriam was acquitted on the basis of mental health as opposed to her right 
to choose or change her religion which is a concerning development.253 A reading of the court 
transcript does indeed reveal that appeal judge, Kawthar Abd Al-Rahman, held ‘the appellant’s 
mental sickness and her attempt to commit suicide, which was supported by a medical report, 
provides reason to excuse her of criminal responsibility for her actions because any person who 
is not fit to stand trial cannot be held criminally liable’.254 Similarly, the third appeal judge, Dr. 
Ahmad Hamdein Tabiq, held that the Merit Court applied a correct understanding of the law 
but ‘the appellant still benefits from the likelihood of being mentally ineligible due to mental 
and psychological instability and illness’. He denied that Meriam’s conviction was a violation 
of Article 18 ICCPR, turning the argument on its head by stating that:  
Depriving Muslims of their right to apply these punishments and interference in 
their religion could be considered as a restriction on their freedom of religion…A 
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convert from Islam constitutes a danger to the Muslim community and there is a 
duty to keep the Muslim community safe by confronting outlaws of Islam. So 
dealing with apostasy is at the heart of the Islamic religion and depriving Muslims 
of the opportunity to punish apostates is a violation of the international human 
rights articles referred to above (Article 18 ICCPR)255 
There are no legitimate grounds for this judicial reasoning and instead it shifts the focus away 
from the state’s abuse of the right to freedom of religion and the right to life.  
MPV addressed the role of shari’a which advocates for freedom of expression and justice ‘in 
dealing with difference of opinions in a non-violent manner. Killing an individual for 
exercising his/her right to free speech is contrary to a main principle of sharia – the right to 
life- and is denounced in the Qur’an’.256 Moreover, cases such a Meriam’s and another in Al 
Gaderaf, where a woman was charged with apostasy but acquitted after she converted back to 
Islam to avoid punishment, are clear violations of the Constitution and international law. It also 
contradicts the Qurʾān which does not criminalise apostasy and provides no earthly 
punishment, but rather one’s religion is a matter between the individual and God.257 MPV was 
the only stakeholder to address the death penalty from an Islamic law and international law 
perspective and attempt to reconcile the two. The submissions could have been strengthened 
by also referencing the role of the sunna which is considered to play a large part in maintaining 
apostasy laws. 
Meriam was also charged with adultery as Islamic law does not recognise marriages of Muslim 
women to non-Muslim men and sentenced to 100 lashes.258 MPV challenged that under Article 
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146 of the Criminal Act 1991, ‘Sudanese women are overwhelmingly accused and convicted 
of crimes related to sexual conduct outside a legally recognised marriage: fornication and 
adultery’.259 
In 2015, two South Sudanese Christian pastors, Reverend Yat Michael and Reverend Peter 
Yein Reith, were detained on charges of espionage, blasphemy, inciting hatred against sects, 
and other charges but in reality, they were targeted because of their Christian faith. Those 
charges had varying penalties including the death penalty. In August 2015, they were convicted 
on lesser charges and released from prison.260 
In its submission, ECLJ noted that since 2011 more than 170 persons have been convicted of 
apostasy and nearly all, under government intimidation, have recanted out of fear of death. 
Suspected converts to Christianity have been intimidated by authorities and sometimes 
tortured. In December 2012, two priests and three Christians were arrested for baptising a 
young convert from Islam. The priests were eventually released however the fate of the other 
three Christians and the convert are undetermined.261  
ECLJ argued that ‘Sudan did not express any reservations to any provisions of the ICCPR, nor 
did it issue any interpretive declarations when it acceded to the ICCPR’s authority thus it has 
no excuse for failing to abide by its provisions’.262 The state was also in violation of Article 8 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which guarantees the free practice of 
religion.263 
It is clear that Sudan’s apostasy and blasphemy laws violate Articles 18 (freedom of religion) 
and 19 (right to freedom of expression) of the ICCPR. ADF International cited the Human 
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Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 on the right to freedom of expression, which 
declared that blasphemy laws are incompatible with the ICCPR. Amnesty International 
recommended Sudan abolish the criminalization of apostasy.264 
Alkarama reported that NISS have powers to arrest individuals without legitimate suspicion 
that the individual in question is guilty of a criminal offence. He/she can be detained without 
charge for up to 45 consecutive days, ‘often incommunicado, and without any obligation to be 
brought before a judge during the first 45 of detention’. This has been used against opposition 
members and human rights defenders in particular.265  
The criminal law does not specify whether an individual is to be brought before a judge within 
48 hours of arrest. Defendants are frequently denied the right to presence of a lawyer during 
interrogations. The introduction of a special courts system by the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act 
allows for trials to be held in absentia and ‘leave open the possibility of these courts to convict 
the accused on basis of confessions, notwithstanding the manner in these were obtained’.266 
SHRI expressed concern over fair trial guarantees in Sudan. Many defendants are tried by 
public order courts and a lack of due process such as the right to legal counsel and a fair trial 
hinders the administration of justice. Defendants are often tried promptly or in the space of a 
few days of being arrested. They have limited access to defence counsel and in many cases, 
contact with friends or relatives is prevented. Judges fail to inform the accused about the 
appeals process.267 
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A harrowing example of the lack of due process was a case of 39 persons arrested and charged 
with causing a public disturbance. They appeared before different public order courts on the 
same day and were denied legal representation. The trial duration was less than an hour.268 
This is inconsistent with state claims of establishing a council of human rights to disseminate 
a human rights culture and holding a number of workshops, for participants from the judiciary 
and law enforcement agencies, in order to ensure fair trial guarantees are effectively 
implemented as enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties.269 With 
violations of the right to a fair trial being violated so frequently in Sudan, it begs the question 
of how the death penalty can be administered ‘justly’.  
4.5.4   The Review 
4.5.4.1  Interactive Dialogue 
The working group on the UPR held its review of Sudan on 4 May 2016. The troika selected 
to facilitate the review comprised of Albania, Indonesia, and Togo.270 A list of questions was 
prepared in advance and transmitted to Sudan through the troika. Slovenia271 and Belgium272 
asked questions specific to the application of the death penalty whilst the United Kingdom273 
addressed the issue of religious belief namely the right to change one’s religion. This was not 
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270 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Sudan’ (11 July 2016) UN Doc 
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271 We note the development of judicial practice on exemption of persons below the age of 18 from the application 
of the death penalty. What measures will the Government of Sudan take to strengthen this practice throughout the 
country? 
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Expert that the death penalty was maintained for crimes below the threshold of the ‘most serious crimes’, contrary 
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crimes for which those death sentences were imposed in Sudan? 
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answered by the state under review which can be interpreted as the state expressing its 
sovereign right in addressing the questions it chooses to answer.  
In the state under review’s presentation, Sudan highlighted its engagement with all stakeholders 
in preparing the national report in the form of broad public consultations, dialogue, and national 
and state level workshops. It further evidenced its commitment to the UPR mechanism by 
presenting a midterm report; however, the right to life was absent from its discussion save with 
respect to the juvenile death penalty. 274 
During the interactive dialogue, 102 delegations made statements and a total of 244 
recommendations were issued.275 Twenty-two recommendations were issued on the death 
penalty and all were noted by Sudan.276 
Ireland expressed concern regarding the application of the death penalty.277 Portugal noted that 
the death penalty was being applied for crimes that were not considered serious under the 
ICCPR.278 Lithuania urged Sudan to continue to review its Constitution, calling for the primacy 
of the ICCPR over domestic law. 279 Poland,280 Madagascar,281 Honduras,282 Montenegro,283 
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276 ibid part II. 
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279 138.16 Continue the constitutional review process in full transparency and clarity on the primacy of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights over domestic law. 
280 140.2 Ratify international human rights treaties, including the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.  
281 140.14 Ratify the international treaties to which the state is not yet party, particularly the Convention against 
Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its Optional 
Protocol, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty. 
282 141.1 Ratify the two Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
283 141.2 Ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming 
at the abolition of the death penalty (Montenegro) (Albania); ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the 




Albania,284 Uruguay,285 Portugal,286 and Luxembourg287 all recommended Sudan to ratify the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
Costa Rica,288 Congo,289 and Slovakia290 recommended Sudan to abolish the death penalty. 
Italy,291 Australia,292 Portugal,293 Belgium,294 Austria,295 Mexico,296 Namibia,297 Spain,298 
France,299 Georgia,300 and Sierra Leone301 recommended a moratorium on the death penalty. 
Austria, Mexico, and Namibia also urged Sudan to ensure that the death penalty is never 
applied to persons under the age of 18. Sudan reaffirmed that the death penalty was not imposed 
against children under 18 years.302 These recommendations are inadequate as they are generic, 
lack specificity, are not measurable, or time-bound. They consider the result to be achieved 
rather than the specific actions that reach the result and therefore implementation cannot be 
appropriately assessed. 
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286 141.3 Adopt an official moratorium aiming at the formal abolition of the death penalty in the country and to 
ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
287 141.4 Initiate the process of ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights with the view of definitely abolishing the death penalty.  
288 141.6 Ratify the Convention against Torture and abolish the death penalty. 
289 141.23 Put an end to the death penalty.  
290 141.24 Abolish immediately the death penalty.  
291 141.25 Establish a moratorium on capital executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty and to repeal 
all legislation that allows for the application of corporal punishment.  
292 141.26 Establish a formal moratorium on the use of the death penalty with a view to ratifying the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
293 141.3 Adopt an official moratorium aiming at the formal abolition of the death penalty in the country and to 
ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
294 141.27 Establish a moratorium on executions and reduce the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty  
295 141.28 Impose an immediate moratorium on the death penalty with a view to abolishing it, and to ensure that 
it is never applied to persons under the age of 18.  
296 141.29 Establish a moratorium on the death penalty and consider its eventual abolition, especially and urgently 
in relation to the execution of children under the age of 18 years.  
297 141.30 Consider imposing a moratorium on the death penalty with a view to abolish it and to take measures to 
ensure that it is never applied to persons under the age of 18 years.  
298 141.31 Establish a moratorium on the application of the death penalty with a view to its abolition (Spain); 
establish a moratorium on the death penalty as a first step towards complete abolition (France); introduce a 
moratorium on death sentences with a view to abolishing the death penalty (Georgia); consider establishing a 








A further six recommendations (Poland,303 Slovakia,304 Spain,305 Australia,306 Italy,307 
Honduras308) were issued on freedom of religion with Spain, Australia, and Italy specifically 
urging Sudan to revise the 1991 penal code and abolish the penalisation of apostasy. All six 
recommendations on this issue were accepted and whilst this may be attributed to their generic 
nature, it also suggests Sudan’s changing attitude to this area of law. 
Reflecting the previous cycle, none of the recommending states acknowledged the review 
criteria in their recommendations. No reference was made to Sudan’s obligations under Articles 
6, 7, 14, and 18 of the ICCPR and/or Article 37(a) CRC which could have strengthened 
recommendations on the death penalty.   
Four out of the 22 countries issuing recommendations on the death penalty belonged to the 
African Union (Madagascar, Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Sierra Leone). These countries 
are abolitionist309 and their anti-death penalty recommendations are reflective of the African 
Union’s evolving position on capital punishment. Article 4 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights states, ‘[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled 
to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life’.310 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has evolved its language over 
                                                          
303 138.28 Adopt legislation prohibiting the dissemination of ideas based on racial and ethnic hatred and incitement 
to racial discrimination and violence and ensure full respect for freedom of religion or belief and the human rights 
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304 138.95 Take effective measures to respect the right to freedom of religion without discrimination. 
305 140.24 Make progress towards the abolition of the crime of apostasy and the elimination of other laws and 
practices contrary to freedom of religion and/or belief. 
306 140.25 Revise the 1991 Penal Code and abolish the penalization of apostasy (Australia) (Italy). 
307 ibid. 
308 141.17 Adopt measures in the legislative and political spheres, including appropriate budget allocation, to 
guarantee, prevent and eradicate discrimination on religious grounds, ethnic composition, gender or sexual 
orientation. 
309 Sierra Leone is abolitionist de facto. 
310 For a detailed review of the death penalty in Africa, see Lilian Chenwi, Towards the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights Perspective (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press 2007); Andrew Nowak, 
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the years calling for a more strengthened approach to the restriction, and ultimate abolition, of 
the death penalty.311 In 2008 it adopted the Resolution Calling on State Parties to Observe a 
Moratorium on the Death Penalty and further endorsed abolition in Africa by imploring ‘all 
State Parties to give their full support to the Working Group on the Death Penalty of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its endeavour to work towards the abolition of 
the death penalty in Africa’.312  The Resolution’s aspiration evolved from ‘urging states to 
envisage a moratorium’ in 1999 to a ‘calling to observe a moratorium’ in 2008.313  
Two recommendations were received from the OIC (Albania and Sierra Leone). Although both 
countries are Muslim majority, they are secular states. No other recommendations were 
received from OIC states or the Arab League which is indicative of their attitude towards 
capital punishment, that it is an effective administration of punishment and a matter of state 
sovereignty rather than human rights.314   
4.5.4.2 Adoption of the Outcomes  
The outcome of the review of Sudan was adopted by the Human Rights Council at its 21st 
meeting on 21 September 2016.315 In its introductory statement, the delegation reaffirmed 
Sudan’s full commitment to the UPR process and ‘commended the mechanism for its effective 
role in the promotion and protection of human rights through constructive cooperation’.316 
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After highlighting the positive steps taken by Sudan to implement its accepted 
recommendations, the delegation also referred to the recommendations that did not comply 
with the legislative system of the state. Sudan noted them and remained open to dialogue and 
cooperation ‘in accordance with its convictions…while taking into consideration the social and 
cultural specificity of their people’.317 This study engages with such a dialogue by 
acknowledging that the state’s capital punishment laws are principally derived from Islamic 
law and, therefore, challenges the Islamic use of the death penalty. This is addressed in Part 
Two by providing a reading that promotes the right to life over the right to execute. 
Seventeen states expressed views on the review outcome of which only Belgium made 
reference to Sudan’s application of the death penalty. It regretted that the state under review 
did not accept a moratorium on the death penalty and invited them to reconsider their stance 
and restrict the number of crimes punishable by death.318 
Ten stakeholders made statement during the adoption of the review. Human Rights Watch 
noted that Sudan failed to implement majority of the 2011 UPR recommendations it 
accepted.319 The International Federation for Human Rights and African Centre for Peace and 
Justice expressed regret over Sudan’s failure to align domestic law with international human 
rights obligations such as implementing a moratorium on executions.320  
4.6 Conclusion 
Precolonial practices of the death penalty in Sudan were largely characterised by customary 
law. Present laws on the death penalty are, to a large degree, the result of Islamization efforts 
of the 1980s and the early 1990s. However, during both reviews in the UPR, Sudan failed to 
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acknowledge the role of Islamic law in maintaining the death penalty even though it forms the 
basis of its criminal laws and is the primary source of all legislation as stipulated in Article 5(1) 
of its Interim National Constitution. In fact, the state did not address the role of capital 
punishment in its legal system, in its first or second national report, which is consistent with 
the notion of the death penalty being a question of state sovereignty and criminal justice as 
opposed to human rights.  
The only reference to its use of the death penalty came in response to state recommendations 
to abolish the punishment arguing that its application was consistent with the ICCPR and 
reserved for the most serious crimes. This demonstrates Sudan’s lack of engagement with the 
evolving human rights jurisprudence on the death penalty, particularly when considering the 
Secretary-General’s quinquennial reports, the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 
no. 36, and its concluding observations on the implementation of the ICCPR.  
As the UPR is a state-led process, recommending states should issue specific and measurable 
recommendations to the state under review and desist from issuing unnecessarily praiseworthy 
comments that risk undermining the process and detract from the main issues at hand. In 
Sudan’s case, reliance on relevant articles of the ICCPR and CRC would strengthen 
recommendations on removing the sovereign state’s right to apply the death penalty.  
Perhaps one issue, which has become apparent from a review of the state’s UPR reports, is a 
lack of understanding on the true fiqh of the death penalty in Islam, a subject that is now 


















































5. Ḥudūd Crimes 
5.1 Introduction  
Islamic states tend to frame the death penalty as a mandatory application of Islamic law. A 
common defence by these states, on their failure to align with international human rights 
standards on the right to life, is the attractive claim of exceptionalism. In other words, Islam is 
afforded a privileged role over international law and therefore exempt from adhering to notions 
of universal human rights. This is because God mandated the punishment, so it is a legitimate 
expression of Islamic sovereignty to maintain a criminal justice process that includes the death 
penalty. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the Islamic use of the death penalty through a 
closer reading and deconstruct the notion that this punishment is a religious necessity.  
This chapter critiques those punishments, under Islamic law, which are held to necessitate the 
death penalty and are considered to be God’s right and therefore immutable. These fall under 
the category of what are known as ḥudūd crimes and encompass: 1) adultery; 2) sodomy; 3) 
apostasy; and 4) highway robbery. The chapter analyses the variety of doctrinal and procedural 
hurdles laid down by classical Muslim jurists to circumvent the application of the death penalty 
and considers the implications for ḥudūd today.  
5.2 Islamic Legal Theory 
It is pertinent to note that the sharīʿa is considered the ideal law in an objective and independent 
sense. It is commonly used to refer to the ‘universal, innate, and natural laws of goodness’.1 
Islamic law encompasses the jurisprudential thought of the interpretive schools of thought and 
their legal determinations, all of which seek the divine will and its relation to public welfare.  
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It is undeniable that the existence of the death penalty is recorded in the religious texts of Islam. 
The history of Islamic law extends from the 7th century to the present.2 Its primary sources, 
the Qurʾān and sunna, provide an authoritative basis for juristic study and interpretation. 
Islamic legal tradition is based upon these two sources due to their underlying theology which 
recognises the ‘importance of the Qur’an as God’s guidance to humanity, and the significance 
of the hadith as inspired prophetic guidance that both gives additional insight into the Qur’an 
and addresses those issues not covered expressly or impliedly by the Qur’an’.3 
The Qurʾān has been preserved for fourteen centuries4 hence verses dealing with ḥudūd have 
remained unaltered. It was initially preserved via oral transmission and the emergence of a 
canonical codex (muṣḥaf) has been dated to the caliph ʿUthmān’s reign, approximately year 
30/650.5 He commissioned one of the Prophet’s scribes, Zayd b. Thābit (d. 42-56/663-676), 
and others to collate an official copy after quarrels rose on the correct reading of the Qurʾān 
                                                          
2 For a historical overview on the origins and evolutions of Islamic law, see Joseph Schahct, An Introduction to 
Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1964); NJ Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
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4 See Behnam Sadeghi and Mohsen Goudarzi, ‘Ṣan'ā’ 1 and the Origins of the Qur'ān’ (2012) 87(1) Der Islam: 
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been in a form that is very close to the form of the Koran read today, supporting the view that the text has 
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Prophet Muḥammad himself (The Collection of the Qur’ān (Cambridge: CUP 1977) 230-40) whilst John 
Wansbrough attributes it to the Abbasid era circa 200/815 (Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural 
Interpretation (Andrew Rippin ed, New York: Prometheus Books 2004) 144). However, these views have not 
found many supporters, see CHM Versteegh, Arabic Grammar and Qurʾānic Exegesis in Early Islam (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill 1993) 48, and Fred M Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins: The Beginning of Islamic Historical 
Writing (Princeton: Darwin Press 1998) 35-63. See also Harold Motzki, ‘The Collection of the Qurʾān: A 
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and ‘at this point, the number and order of sūras were fixed as was the consonantal text’.6 
ʿUthmān then sent copies of his recension of the Qurʾān to other major Muslim territories and 
all other versions were burned.7 
The Qurʾān has a non-linear structure and comprises of 114 chapters (sūras) and 6236 verses 
(āyas) however only a small portion of its content can be classified as legal. Commentators 
suggest that verses with legal content range anywhere from 80 to 6008 and vary from concise 
to detailed injunctions.9 The provisions for the death penalty would therefore fall under the 
legal content of the Qurʾān and need to be understood in their correct historical and social 
context in order to understand their implications for today.10 
The traditional doctrine of legal theory acknowledges that where a certain matter may be 
ambiguous and requiring further clarification, the sunna must be relied upon.11 The literal 
meaning of sunna is ‘habitual practice’, ‘customary procedure or action’, or ‘usage sanctioned 
by tradition’.12 In Islam it symbolises all the acts and sayings of the Prophet. Scholars have 
divided the sunna into his sayings (sunna qawliyya), actions (sunna fiʿliyya), and tacit approval 
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(sunna taqrīriyya). It is important to note, only that sunna which is said to be of a legal nature 
forms part of Islamic law.13 The details of the sunna have been derived from ḥadīth, a term 
used for an aphorism of the Prophet as related by his companions. A ḥadīth consists of the 
chain of transmitters (isnād) and the text of the Prophet’s statement (matn).14  
Most of the authoritative compilations of ḥadīth were recorded in the mid-ninth century which 
means the ḥadīth were written more than two centuries after the Prophet’s death.15 One of the 
concerns of legal theory was the reliable transmission of the ḥadīths from one generation to the 
next. In order to verify the ḥadīth literature and guarantee the authenticity of sacred knowledge, 
jurists developed a complex taxonomy categorising the ḥadīths according to the chain of 
transmission and reliability of transmitters.16   
Only that isnād which was found to have been transmitted reliably from the Prophet was 
accepted. Hence, ʿ Abdullah b. Mubārak (d. 181/797) observed that ‘the isnad is part of religion, 
were it not for the isnad, whoever wanted could say whatever they wanted’.17 Each chain had 
to extend unbroken to the Prophet himself. A ḥadīth with a defective chain was considered 
weak and lacking in legal authority, for example, a narrator quoted from an untrustworthy 
source or from a person they had never met. This methodology was aptly summarised by al-
Shāfiʿī who stated that, ‘if a trustworthy person transmits [a ḥadīth] from another trustworthy 
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person until the chain ends with the Messenger of God, then it is established as being from the 
Messenger of God’.18  
The study of ḥadīth transmitters developed into a separate science known as ʿilm al-rijāl. 
Ḥadīth scholars researched and compiled many voluminous works19 on ḥadīth transmitters 
which included biographical notes on their teachers, students, and proof of his or her credibility 
or the lack of it.20 Therefore, ḥadīths on the death penalty must be reliably transmitted in order 
to guarantee their credibility. 
Islamic law was not constituted by the Qurʾān and ḥadīth alone but rather through additional 
recourse to techniques of juristic analysis. Legal texts are finite whilst new circumstances are 
infinite and provide new areas for religious and legal reflection.21 As a result, premodern 
Muslim jurists developed different methods that formed the authoritative bases of legal 
analyses. This enabled the law to respond to social realities without simultaneously 
undermining the legal tradition’s authority.22  
The jurists’ debates surrounding the feasibility of these methods can be found in a genre of 
Islamic legal literature named uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). All human beings are fallible 
and therefore there will inevitably be differences of opinions amongst jurists. Such differences 
are born out of a range of factors including different methodologies that are adopted by certain 
jurists in interpreting the Qurʾān and sunna to derive sharīʿa-based laws, jurists giving 
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preference to certain sources over others, and the specific needs of the communities which is 
linked to the time and geographical location of the jurists.23  
5.2.1 Schools of Law (Madhāhib) 
The result of the application of uṣūl al-fiqh is fiqh, which is the ‘legal rulings of the Muslim 
scholars derived from the sharīʿa’24 and is viewed as the human effort to understand and apply 
the divine ideal. The development of fiqh evolved throughout the first five centuries of Islam, 
namely the 7th to 12th centuries C.E.25 Some of the greatest intellectual and literary 
achievements of Muslim scholarship are found in this juristic discipline which has been 
described as the ‘epitome of Islamic thought’.26 As a result of the different factors influencing 
the opinions of Islamic jurists, various doctrinal schools of law known as madhāhib (sing. 
madhhab) emerged.  The four prominent ones being the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī 
schools which were all named after their founders who were master-jurists.27  
Contemporary Islamic scholar, Jonathan Brown, summarises the foundations of each madhhab: 
Each madhhab was an ocean of diversity and constant scholarly activity. The 
Hanafi school was based on the often contrasting opinions of Abu Hanifa, his two 
main disciples Shaybani and Abu Yusuf, as well as a more independent student 
named Zufar. The Maliki school built on the opinions of Malik and his senior 
disciples, who often disagreed with him and each other. Shafi‘i’s long years of 
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travel and intellectual maturation led to two whole eras in his legal opinions, ‘the 
Old’ and ‘the New’, both of which were incorporated into his madhhab. Ibn 
Hanbal’s close attention to Hadiths led him to change his opinion on legal issues 
as new Hadiths were uncovered, and the Hanbali madhhab thus enjoyed a wide 
range of opinions even at its founding level.28 
This highlights the pluralistic nature of Islamic law with each school developing its own legal 
methods and interpretations. Over time, each madhhab occupied its own geographical territory. 
The Ḥanafī school flourished amongst the Turks of Central Asia, becoming prevalent in India, 
and later in the Ottoman Empire. The Shāfiʿī school was based in Egypt and Yemen and spread 
to Southeast Asia where it is the central madhhab today. The Mālikī school proliferated from 
North Africa to the west, becoming the main madhhab from Andulusia to West Africa as well 
as Sudan. The Ḥanbalī school was the least wideapread of all. It was dominant in Baghdad 
through the fourteenth century and became ‘increasingly influential in the eighteenth century, 
when the isolated Ḥanbalīs of Central Arabia formed the powerful Wahhabi movement’.29  
The diversity of the madhāhib and the resulting interpretative plurality was explained by the 
scholars as different understandings of fiqh. Although there was difference of opinions amongst 
scholars from different schools, they recognised each other’s legitimacy. The twelfth century 
Ḥanafī scholar, Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142) articulated this 
approach by stating, ‘[o]ur school is correct with the possibility of error, and another school is 
in error with the possibility of being correct’.30  
In order to interpret the primary sources of Islamic law, the jurist brought a wealth of 
knowledge and training about the Qurʾān and sunna, coupled with the rulings of his own legal 
                                                          
28 Brown, Misquoting Muhammad, 49. 
29 ibid 53. 
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school and possibly others, into his legal analysis. This required ‘an awareness of the authority 
of source-texts, of where they were dispositive, of where they were ambiguous, and of the 
lacuna in the source-texts that needed to be supplemented with disciplined legal analysis’.31 
This encompassed laws derived through secondary sources.32  
Hence if one seeks to discover a rule of Islamic law, the general starting point is a fiqh manual 
of a certain madhhab, rather than the Qurʾān or ḥadīth literature. These legal manuals are 
available in different sizes depending on the purpose of their usage. This can be in the form of 
a summary (mukhtaṣar) or an elaborate encyclopaedia where the jurist addresses opposing 
schools’ doctrine too.33 It is important to note that criminal law only takes up a small percentage 
of these books. The core subjects of the sharīʿa deal with forms of worship such as prayer, 
fasting, charity, Hajj, and slaughtering animals.34 
5.3 Classification of Crimes 
Penal law in sharīʿa adopts a classical trichotomy of crimes: ḥudūd, qiṣāṣ, and taʿzīr.35 Rights 
are categorised as ‘rights of God’ (ḥuqūq Allah) and ‘rights of God’s servants’ (ḥuqūq al-
‘ibād). Ḥudūd primarily deal with violations of the ‘rights of God’.36 
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Ḥadd (pl. ḥudūd) literally means limit or a separation between two things so that one does not 
intrude on the other.37 In Islamic law, ḥudūd have been defined by jurists as offences whose 
punishments are fixed and are God’s right (‘uqūba muqaddara wajabat ḥaqqan lillāh).38 
The Qurʾān discuses ‘ḥudūd Allah’ (limits of God) cautioning Muslims against transgressing 
them or approaching them. It appears 14 times in the Qurʾān39, indicating the ‘limits’ of 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, be it moral or legal.40 Six references to ḥudūd are made 
in just one passage in the Qurʾān which deals with the subject of divorce. Ḥudūd Allah in this 
context refers to conduct of marital life and acting in accordance with good custom (bi-l-
maʿrūf), advising the reader to not transgress these limits.41  
The term is also used in sūra al-Baqara and sūra al-Ṭalāq concerning marital relations, the 
former dealing with spousal relations during the month of Ramaḍān and the latter with the 
waiting period (idda) a wife must observe after divorce.42 A passage in sūra al-Nisāʾ deals with 
kindness to orphans and the destitute and stipulates fixed shares of inheritance for legal heirs.43 
In all these instances, the text warns against violating the ḥudūd Allah.  
Ḥudūd is used in the Qurʾān to suggest a set of broad moral and legal guidelines that must be 
adhered to. It is thus evident that ḥudūd in the context of designating particular crimes and 
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punishments is non-existent in the Qurʾān. Rather, this is a concept that has been characterised 
by the juristic formulations of fiqh. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) noted that the identification of 
crimes, their definitions, and corresponding punishments were the result of human reasoning 
rather than from scripture.44 Brown has argued that ‘early Muslim jurists probably inherited 
the concept of a category of crimes called Ḥudūd from references to it made by the Prophet 
(peace be upon him) and the early generations of Muslims’.45 
There are five ḥudūd offences that are agreed upon: adultery/fornication (zinā), accusing 
someone of fornication (qadhf), consuming intoxicants (shurb al-khamr), certain types of theft 
(sariqa), and armed robbery or banditry (ḥirāba).46 Some jurists have also added sodomy 
(liwāṭ) and apostasy (ridda).47 Punishment for these offences vary from amputation, flogging, 
stoning, to crucifixion.  
A frequently invoked argument, particularly by classical jurists, for such harsh ḥudūd 
punishments is the concept of deterrence (zajr).48 However, the deterrent effects of the death 
penalty is a question that is empirical and practical in nature, not a theological one. 
Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence to support this claim,49 particularly in an Islamic 
context. In fact, ‘there is much to suggest that criminal deterrence, as opposed to moral 
denunciation and censure, was not part of the relevant epistemological dynamic of the hudud 
Qur’anic verses’.50 This is further supported by the numerous procedural barriers to 
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enforcement as discussed below, which suggest that ḥudūd penalties were not centred on the 
theme of deterrence.51  
Of the ḥudūd offences, four have been interpreted to incur the death penalty: zinā, liwāṭ, ridda, 
and ḥirāba. Despite such severe punishments, stringent evidentiary criteria have been laid 
down which places an exorbitantly high burden of proof upon the prosecution. The 
establishment of a harsh regime of punishments alongside an almost unattainable standard of 
proof is indicative of a system based on maximising mercy. This is illustrated in the ḥadīth 
wherein the Prophet stated: 
Ward off the Ḥudūd from the Muslims as much as you all can, and 
if you find a way out for the person, then let them go. For it is better 
for the authority to err in mercy than to err in punishment.52   
Muslim scholars have translated this ḥadīth into the well-known legal principle of ‘ward off 
the ḥudūd by ambiguities (idraʾū al-ḥudūd bi-l-shubuhāt)’.53 This concept of shubuhāt 
(ambiguities) is demonstrated clearly in the offence of zinā. 
5.4 Adultery/Fornication (Zinā) 
Zinā is linguistically defined as al-fujūr (immorality; iniquity; debauchery and 
licentiousness).54 The word zinā can be used as a general or a specific term. In its general usage 
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Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Sīwāsī (Ibn al-Humām), Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr ʿalā al-Hidāya 
Sharḥ Bidāya al-Mubtadī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya 1424/2003) 5:237; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, 9:38. 
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it indicates any prohibited act which may lead to illicit sexual relations. This is based on the 
ḥadīth of the Prophet:  
Allah has decreed for every son of Adam his share of zinā which he will commit 
inevitably. The zinā of the eyes is the sight (to gaze at a forbidden thing), the zinā 
of the tongue is the speech, one may wish and desire, and the private parts confirm 
that or deny it.55  
The specific meaning of zinā relates to the criminal act which necessitates the ḥadd. Its 
technical juristic definition is sexual intercourse; a) involving penile penetration, b) by persons 
of full legal competence, c) outside the legal bonds of marriage (nikāḥ) or lawful ownership of 
a slave woman (milk yamīn),56 d) and without any element of doubt/ambiguity (shubha).57  
Zinā encompasses both fornication and adultery however it is the latter which incurs the death 
penalty.58 It is considered to be one of the greatest sins after shirk (practising idolatry or 
polytheism) and murder due to the Qurʾānic verses:  
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And those who do not invoke with Allah another deity or kill the soul which Allah 
has forbidden [to be killed], except by right, and do not commit unlawful sexual 
intercourse. And whoever should do that will meet a penalty. Multiplied for him is 
the punishment on the Day of Resurrection, and he will abide therein humiliated. 
Except for those who repent, believe and do righteous work. For them Allah will 
replace their evil deeds with good. And ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful.59  
And do not approach unlawful sexual intercourse. Indeed, it is ever an immorality 
and is evil as a way.60  
It is also mentioned in a ḥadīth that ʿAbdullah b. Masʿūd asked the Prophet which sin is the 
greatest according to God. He said (in descending order) that you make partners with God, that 
you kill your child out of fear that he would eat with you, and that you commit zinā with the 
wife of your neighbour.61  
5.4.1 Conditions (shurūṭ) 
Jurists have detailed the conditions which must be met for the ḥadd of zinā to be liable upon a 
person. These have been derived from both the Qurʾān and ḥadīth literature, as discussed 
below.  
One of the main conditions is the insertion of the penis (dhakar, sometimes ḥashfa, or glans) 
in the vagina, the absence of which nullifies the ḥadd because the act will not be considered as 
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intercourse.62 The jumhūr (majority) opinion (Mālikī, Shāfiʿī,63 Ḥanbalī, Abū Yūsuf, and 
Shaybānī) also includes anal penetration because it is a natural genital orifice like the vagina. 
Abū Hanīfa does not consider zinā through anal intercourse subject to ḥadd but rather deems 
it a taʿzīr offence.64 
The act must be committed by persons who are compos mentis (mukallaf), which includes being 
sane (ʿāqil) and mature (bāligh).65 The insane and the minor are exempt from the ḥadd due to 
the ḥadīth, ‘[t]he pen has been lifted from three (i.e. their deeds are not recorded): from the one 
who is asleep until he wakes, from the minor until he matures, and from the insane until he 
regains sanity or recovers’.66  
5.4.1.1 Age of Criminal Liability  
The juvenile death penalty is absent from Islamic textual references with ḥadīths such as the 
above clearly exempting minors. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to ascertain who 
qualifies as a minor under Islamic law. Muslim jurists maintain that the criminal responsibility 
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of a child increases with age.67 Once the child reaches the age of puberty, they are considered 
completely responsible for their actions.68  
The age of puberty in Islam varies across the madhāhib. Some jurists determine puberty 
according to its physiological signs whilst others stipulate a certain age. Most jurists agree that 
it is 15 years of age whilst some Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs say 18.69 This highlights a valid 
interpretation which sets the age of criminal liability to 18 years and can therefore be used to 
prevent the juvenile death penalty in Islamic states. 
The Ḥanafīs also attach the condition of being able to articulate speech (nāṭiq) in order for the 
ḥadd to apply. Hence there is no ḥadd liable upon the mute (akhras) unless he confesses to zinā 
four times by way of writing or indication. Even if witnesses testify against him, the testimony 
is not accepted due to shubha because he may have an excuse but is unable to express himself 
properly.70   
The perpetrator of the offence must be aware that the person he/she is having intercourse with 
is prohibited i.e. outside the legal bonds of marriage. Consequently, there is no ḥadd upon the 
one who is mistaken (ghāliṭ), the ignorant (jāhil), and the forgetful (nāsī).71 If a man claims he 
is married to the woman in question (provided she is single) or vice versa, the ḥadd will drop. 
Even if a man claims that due to the darkness of the night, he slept with a woman assuming she 
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was his lawful wife, he is absolved.72 Similarly, if a blind man called his wife to his bed but 
another woman responded, and he had intercourse with her, there will be no ḥadd due to the 
emergence of shubha.73 Although such claims are quite far-fetched, it shows the extent to 
which scholars were willing to go in order to waive the ḥadd and preserve the right to life in 
Islam. 
Even if a man and woman get married and later discover they are forbidden in marriage to each 
other (maḥrams), i.e. through blood or foster relations, there is no ḥadd upon them. Even if 
they knew of this relation and got married, there is no ḥadd but taʿzīr will apply.74 
Knowledge of the prohibition of zinā must also be present as rulings in Islamic matters are not 
established without knowledge. This is due to the narration of Saʿīd b. Musayyib that a man 
committed zinā (fornication) in Yemen. ʿUmar wrote regarding that: ‘If he knows that Allah 
has made zinā unlawful then flog him. If he does not know, then teach him. If he repeats it, 
then flog him’.75 It is also narrated from ʿUmar that he excused a man who fornicated in al-
Shām and then claimed ignorance regarding the prohibition of zinā. The same incident occurred 
with a young non-Arab woman.76  
Ibn ʿĀbidīn (d. 1252/1836–7) clarified this issue stating that a claim of ignorance will not be 
accepted except from the one who exhibits signs of that. For example, the person in question 
was brought up alone on a mountain peak or amongst similar ignorant people who were not 
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aware of the prohibition of zinā or they believed it was lawful. The existence of such a scenario 
is probable, however unlikely, and cannot be denied. As a result, the one who commits zinā in 
this state of ignorance will undoubtedly be exempt from the ḥadd because the legal 
responsibility of rulings is based on knowledge of them.77  
The act must be voluntary i.e. with consent. There is no ḥadd upon the woman who is raped 
due to the saying of the Prophet: ‘Allah has pardoned from my nation, mistakes and 
forgetfulness and that which they have been forced to do’.78 It has also been narrated from ʿ Abd 
al-Jābir b. Wāʾil, from his father, that a woman was raped during the era of the Prophet so the 
ḥadd was dropped from her.79  
Jurists have restricted the application of the ḥudūd through a narrow construction of the law, 
particularly through the doctrine of shubha. This can also be seen when it comes to proving 
zinā which can be established in two ways: testimony and/or confession.  
5.4.2 Testimony (shahāda) 
Oral testimony (shahāda) is considered the most authoritative of evidences and thus a 
prerequisite in ḥudūd cases.80 The shahāda must be based on ‘certain knowledge’ (ʿilm al-
yaqīn) which involves seeing and hearing the incident in question. All testimony based on 
probability and/or conjecture is inadmissible.81  
                                                          
77 Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Ḥāshiya Radd al-Muḥtār, 3:142. 
78 Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, no. 2043. 
79 Ibn Qudama, al-Mughnī, 12:347. Juristic discussions of rape are usually considered under ikrah (compulsion) 
and not zinā see eg Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad Halabī, Multaqā al-Abḥūr (Wahbī al-Albānī ed, Beirut: Mu’assasat al-
Risāla 1409/1989) 2:81. 
80 Ibn Naqīb Misrī, ‘Umdat al-Sālik (NHM Keller ed and tr, Evanston: Sunna Books 1991) 635-38; Muhammad 
b. Ahmed Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer (Imran Khan Nyazee tr, Reading: Garnet Publishing 
1994–96) 2:556-60. 
81  Ramlī, Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj (Cairo: Muṣṭafā Bābī al- Ḥalabī 1357/1938; repr. Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-
ʿArabī 1939) 8:251-54; Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāma, al-Kāfī fī Fiqh al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (Ṣidqi Jamīl 
and Salīm Yūsuf eds, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr 1992) 4:290; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, 4:593-94; Ibn al-Humām, 




In cases of ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ, the witnesses have a choice between concealing or disclosing their 
testimony because they are between two laudable actions: establishing the law or preserving 
the accused’s character.82 The concealment of vice is preferable due to the ḥadīth where the 
Prophet said, ‘it would have been better for you if you had concealed it’83 and ‘whoever 
conceals the vices of his brother, Allah will conceal his vices in this world and the hereafter’.84 
With respect to zinā, four male witnesses must testify to the act because it is from the most 
severe indecencies (aghlaẓ al-fawāhish) and therefore the testimony needs to be subject to 
greater standards in order to conceal sins (satr) and protect the integrity of the accused.85 
Expounding upon this, the seventeenth century jurist ʿAlī al-Qāri al-Harawī held that ‘it is a 
condition that the witnesses are four […] because God the Exalted likes [the vices of] his 
servants to remain concealed, and this is realised by demanding four witnesses, since it is very 
rare for four people to observe this vice’.86  
The requirement of four males is derived from the Qurʾānic verses: 
Those who commit unlawful sexual intercourse of your women - bring against 
them four [witnesses] from among you. And if they testify, confine the guilty 
women to houses until death takes them or Allah ordains for them [another] way.87 
                                                          
82 al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, 5:416. 
83 ibid. 
84 Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, no. 2699. See also Ramlī, Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj, 8:307 where he states that concealing 
ḥudūd is preferable (al-sirr fī al-ḥudūd afḍal). 
85 Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Ḥāshiya Radd al-Muḥtār, 3:142; al-Shaykh Niẓām, al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyya, 2:151; Ibn al-Humām, 
Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 5:197-98, 265-67; al-Dusūqī, Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī, 4:319; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, 
4:588; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 6:101; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 12:362-63. 
86 ʿAli b. Sulṭān al-Qarī al-Harawī, Fatḥ Bāb al-ʿInāyah bī Sharḥ al-Niqāyah (Muḥammad Nizār Tamīm and 
Haytham Nizār Tamīm eds, Beirut: Dār al-Arqam 1418/1997) 3:195, quoted in Khaled El-Rouayheb, Before 
Homosexuality in the Arab-IslamicWorld, 1500-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005) 123. See also 
Ramlī, Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj, 8:310. 




And those who accuse chaste women and then do not produce four witnesses - lash 
them with eighty lashes and do not accept from them testimony ever after. And 
those are the defiantly disobedient.88 
Why did they [who slandered] not produce for it four witnesses? And when they 
do not produce the witnesses, then it is they, in the sight of Allah, who are the 
liars.89 
It is also narrated in a ḥadīth that, ‘Abū Hurayra reported that Saʿd b. Ubāda said: Messenger 
of Allah, if I were to find my wife with a man, should I wait until I bring four witnesses? He 
said: Yes’.90 
A number of conditions have been laid down regarding who qualifies as a valid witness in 
Islamic law and the subject of witnessing can be found in lengthy chapters solely dedicated to 
this topic in books of fiqh.91 Amongst the numerous conditions are that the witness must be 
mature,92 sane,93 free94 (not a slave), and upright (‘adl).95 An upright person is described as one 
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who abstains from major sins, does not persist on minor sins, his goodness exceeds his 
corruption, and his virtue exceeds his vice.96 
Evidence of a blind man is inadmissible in ḥudūd cases.97 If a witness becomes blind after 
having testified, the judgement is annulled because the witnesses must be competent at the time 
of passing judgment (emphasis added). The same principle applies if the witness, after 
testifying, becomes insane, dumb, or unjust.98 
In cases of ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ, the probity of witnesses must be investigated both openly (tazkiya 
al-‘alāniya) and privately (tazkiya al-sirr)99 because in such cases punishment is to be averted 
due to doubt.100 According to Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf, one investigator is sufficient whilst 
Shaybānī asserts that two are minimum. Furthermore, in an open investigation, the investigator 
must also possess all the qualifications necessary for a witness. Shaybānī maintains that the 
probity of witnesses in zinā cases require four investigators.101 
5.4.2.1 Conditions of the testimony 
The testimony must be detailed to such an extent that the witnesses must have seen the penis 
entering the vagina like the kohl stick entering the kohl container (kamā yaghību al-mirwadu 
fī-l-mukḥula) or a rope in a well (rishāʾ fī-l-biʾr).102 They are required to expound upon the 
intimate details of the act such as the sexual position. Such detail is necessary in a confession 
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of zinā and therefore it is also required in testimonial evidence. There is also the possibility 
that the witness(es) may consider something zinā which, in fact, is not zinā.103  
Therefore, even if a man and woman were found in a highly compromising position, such as 
naked in a bed in a position that implies zinā, unless four witnesses can testify to having seen 
the penis inserted into the vagina, it will not be considered as zinā.  
The Ḥanafīs clarify that if the judge questions the witnesses and they do not elaborate upon 
their testimonies which are simply restricted to the fact that ‘they committed zinā’, then there 
is no ḥadd. Jumhūr deem it necessary that the witnesses are also able to specify the woman 
involved. If they testify that a man committed zinā with a woman whom they are unable to 
recognise, there is no ḥadd.104  
It is necessary for all the witnesses to specify the locality where the alleged zinā took place. 
Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Imām Zufar from the Ḥanafī school extend this further and require the 
witnesses to specify the exact place such as the area or room in a house whereas the Ḥanafīs 
and Ḥanbalīs don’t require this unless it is a big house. The witnesses must also specify the 
time of the incident and any discrepancies in the date or time will nullify the ḥadd.105 
According to the majority of scholars, the testimonies must be given in one court session with 
all four witnesses present. If some of the witnesses testify in one session and the remaining in 
another, their testimony is not accepted. The Mālikīs stipulate that after gathering all the 
witnesses before the judge, they are separated for individual questioning. Any inconsistency 
between them will invalidate the ḥadd.  The Ḥanbalīs permit both concurrent or separate 
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testimonies due to the story of Mughīra.106 If any witnesses arrive after court is adjourned, their 
testimony is not accepted. The Shāfiʿīs are the most flexible in this regard and allow the 
testimonies to be given in single or multiple court sessions, concurrently or separately.107 
However, this will expand the application of the death penalty as it allows greater flexibility in 
convicting a person of the death penalty whereas the Mālikī method is more rigorous in 
ascertaining the truth. 
Testimony of a secondary witness (shahāda ʿalā al-shahāda), although generally admissible 
in law, is not permitted in zinā cases because ḥudūd are based on concealing and dropping due 
to doubts.108 Secondary testimony increases doubt because ‘the channels of communication are 
multiplied [and so] the doubt of its truth increases in proportion’.109 Only the Mālikī school 
permit secondary witnessing, with the condition that each original witness has to bring two 
witnesses for corroboration.110 
Furthermore, there must be no conflict of interest attached hence testimony of a spouse against 
the other is not accepted according to the Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Ḥanbalīs due to the possibility 
of doubt.  The Ḥanafīs have a dissenting opinion which permits the admissibility of such a 
testimony because it will have negative repercussions on both the accused and the accuser; 
hence, it is unlikely that he will lie. For example, if the husband testifies against his wife, it 
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will bring shame to himself, especially if there are children involved, and it is as though he is 
accusing himself due to the close relation.111  
The testimony in zinā cases must be timely. A lapse of time, without a reasonable excuse,112 
between the alleged zinā and the testimony will render it void. The Ḥanafīs have a twofold 
argument here. If the witness attributes the delay in testimony to the fact that he wished to 
conceal the vices of the accused, it thus follows that any subsequent evidence could only arise 
from malicious intent or personal interest which would raise doubt in the testimony. If the delay 
is for reasons other than what is mentioned, the witness is ‘held unworthy of attention as having 
for so long a time neglected that which was incumbent upon him, namely the giving of 
evidence’.113 
Jurists have differed regarding what is the appropriate time limit for witnesses to come forward. 
Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/932) mentions six months whilst Abū Ḥanīfa leaves it to the 
judge’s discretion which is to be determined according to societal norms and customs of each 
country.114 Shaybanī stipulates a time limit of one month and this is the commonly agreed upon 
limit.115 
5.4.3 Confession (iqrār) 
Jurists agree that zinā can be established by way of confession because the Prophet ordered 
Māʿiz b. Mālik al-Aslamī and the woman from the tribe of al-Ghāmid (al-Ghāmidiyya)116 to 
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be stoned to death as a result of their confessions.117 The Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs require the 
confession to be made four times, once is not deemed sufficient. The Ḥanafī school also 
stipulates each confession to be made in a different session with the judge sending the 
individual back each time. The Ḥanbalīs permit the four confessions to occur in one session or 
four separate sessions. The Mālikī and Shāfiʿī school consider one confession to suffice as 
valid proof of zinā.118 
The confession should be clearly detailed to verify the occurrence of actual intercourse and 
remove any shubha or tuhma (suspicion). This is evidenced by the ḥadīth regarding Māʿiz: 
…The Prophet asked: “Perhaps you have only kissed, or touched, or looked at her?” 
He said, “No, O Messenger of Allah!” The Prophet said (using no euphemism): 
“Did you have sexual intercourse with her?” The narrator added: At that, (i.e. after 
his confession) the Prophet ordered that he be stoned (to death). In another 
narration he asked, “Have you done it so that your sexual organ penetrated hers?” 
He replied: “Yes”. He asked: “Have you done it like a collyrium stick when 
enclosed in its case and a rope in a well?” He replied: “Yes”. He asked: “Do you 
                                                          
1421/2000) 7:115; Muḥammad b. ʿAlī  al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awṭār min Asrār Muntaqā al-Akhbār (Muḥammad 
Ṣubḥī Ḥasan Ḥallāq ed, Jeddah: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī 1427/2006) 13:288; Muḥammad Ashraf b. Amīr al-ʿAẓīm Ābādī, 
ʿAwn al-Maʿbūd Sharḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd (2nd edn, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1410/1990) 12:80; Mullā 
ʿAlī Qārī, Mirqāt al-Mafātīḥ Sharḥ Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr 1422/2002) 11:170) or whether they 
refer to two separate women (see Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tahdhīb al-Āthār Musnad ʿAlī  wa 
Musnad ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb wa Musnad ibn ʿAbbās (Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir ed, Cairo: Maṭbaʿa al-Madanī 
n.d) 3:264; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Ayman Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī and 
Muḥammad al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb eds, Cairo: Dār al-Rayyān 1407/1987) 12:150). 
117 The incident of Māʿiz is a well-known narration and can be found in the majority of hadith books. See eg al-
Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 5270, 6820, 6824, 6825, 7167; Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, no. 1692-1695; al-
Tirmidhī, Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī, no. 1427; al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, no. 3188, 4423, 4427, 4428, 4434; Ibn 
Ḥanbal, Musnad Aḥmad, no. 2129, 2202, 2433, 2874, 2998, 3028; Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, no. 2004; Ḥākim 
al-Naysābūrī (d. 415/1014), al-Mustadrak ʿala al-Ṣaḥīḥayn, 4:402, no. 8076; al-Dāraquṭnī, Sunan al-Dāraquṭnī, 
4:133, no. 3220; al-Dāramī, Sunan al-Dāramī, 1:12, no. 2361; al-Mawṣilī, Musnad Abī Yaʿla, 10:524, no. 6140 . 
118 Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 5:203-205; al-Dusūqī, Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī 4:318; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī 
al-Muḥtāj, 4:194; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 6:98; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 12:354; Ibn Rushd al-Qurṭubī, 




know what zinā is?” He replied: “Yes. I have done with her unlawfully what a man 
may lawfully do with his wife”.119 
The judge is expected to actively investigate the confession to seek extenuating circumstances 
and offer the possibility of retraction. Jurists agree that even after confession, the defendant is 
at liberty to retract it at any point which will abate the punishment. This is demonstrated in the 
aforementioned ḥadīth of Māʿiz where the Prophet offered the chance to recant his confession 
and turned away from him repeatedly. A similar incident also occurred with the woman from 
the tribe of Ghāmid.120    
The majority of doctrinal schools do not constitute pregnancy out of wedlock as an automatic 
confession of zinā.  It is not considered the sole evidence of the crime unless four witnesses are 
able to testify against the woman or she confesses herself. It is enough to waive the ḥadd 
punishment for the accused to claim that she was raped.121 The argument that external signs 
such as pregnancy are not considered conclusive proof of zinā is illustrated by the example that 
if a woman’s husband was absent for a number of years ‘he could have been miraculously 
transported to be with her’.122   
                                                          
119 al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, no. 4428.  
120 The narration found in Muslim recounts how Ma'iz came to the Prophet and said: ‘Allah's Messenger, I have 
wronged myself; I have committed adultery and I earnestly desire that you should purify me. He turned him away. 
On the following day, he (Ma'iz) again came to him and said: Allah's Messenger, I have committed adultery. 
Allah's Messenger turned him away for the second time and sent him to his people saying: Do you know if there 
is anything wrong with his mind? They denied of any such thing in him and said: We do not know him but as a 
wise good man among us, so far as we can judge. He (Ma'iz) came for the third time, and he (the Holy Prophet) 
sent him as he had done before. He asked about him and they informed him that there was nothing wrong with 
him or with his mind. When it was the fourth time, a ditch was dug for him and he (the Holy Prophet) pronounced 
judgment about him and he was stoned’. See Luqman Zakariyah, ‘Confession and Retraction: The Application of 
Islamic Legal Maxims in Safiyyatu and Amina’s Cases in Northern Nigeria’ (2010) 30(2) Journal of Muslim 
Minority Affairs 251, 254. 
121 al-Māwardī, al-Hāwi, 13:227. See also Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 5:260; al-Dusūqī, Ḥāshiyat al-
Dusūqī 4:319; al-Rahaybānī, Maṭālib Ulī al-Nuhā, 6:193; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 12:347. 
122 Brown, ‘Stoning and Hand Cutting’, 10 citing ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-Kubrā, 2 vols. in 1 




It has also been narrated from Saʿīd that ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb questioned an unmarried pregnant 
woman about her pregnancy. She replied that she was a very deep sleeper and a man had 
intercourse with her whilst she was asleep. She did not awaken until he had finished and so the 
ḥadd was not applied. 123 Similarly a woman called Shurāḥa Hamdānya came to ʿAlī b. Abī 
Ṭālib and confessed that she was pregnant due to zinā. ʿAlī responded that perhaps a man had 
come upon her whilst she was asleep, or perhaps she was forced, or that her master had married 
her and she was concealing this; the purpose of these suggestions being to persuade her to say 
yes and thus exempt her from the ḥadd.124 Furthermore, ʿAlī and Ibn ʿAbbās are reported to 
have said that ‘if there is a “perhaps” (laʿalla) or “maybe” (ʿasā) in a case of ḥadd, it cannot 
be applied’.125  These incidents show the reluctance of the authorities to impose the ḥadd and 
preserve the right to life. 
Only the Mālikī school considers such pregnancy as proof of zinā, provided the woman does 
not claim to have been raped,126 however the school also endorses the sleeping foetus doctrine 
(al-rāqid) which allows the period of gestation to extend up to seven years.127 This allows a 
sufficient defence against the crime of zinā and clearly demonstrates the humanitarian concern 
                                                          
123 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 12:347-48; 378. 
124 ʿAwdah, al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī, 1:208; al-Zaylaʿī, Naṣb al-Rāya, 3:319; Ibn Rushd al-Qurṭubī, Bidāya 
al-Mujtahid, 972; Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 5:213.  
125 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 12:378. 
126 According to the Mālikīs, the woman’s claim of rape will only be considered provided there is evidence (direct 
or circumstantial) to support her testimony such as she went asking for help; her physical state; she lodged a 
complaint with the authorities etc. See Abū al-Walīd Sulaymān b. Khalaf al-Bājī, al-Muntaqā Sharḥ Muwaṭṭa’ al-
Imām Mālik (2nd edn, Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī n.d) 7:146; Ibn Abī Zayd, al-Risāla fī Fiqh al-Imām Mālik 
(ʿAbd al-Wārith Muḥammad ʿAlī ed, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya n.d) 93-94; Abū Muḥammad b. ʿAlī ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb, al-Maʿūna ʿ alā Madhhab ʿ Ālim al-Madina (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya 1998) 2:134; Abū ʿ Umar 
Yūsuf b. ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istidhkār li Madhāhib Fuqahāʾ al-Amṣār (Sālim Muḥammad ʿAṭāʾ and 
Muḥammad ʿAlī Muawwaḍ eds, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya 2000) 7:145-47; Hina Azam, Sexual Violation 
in Islamic Law: Substance, Evidence, and Procedure (Cambridge: CUP 2015) 204-209. 
127 See Susan Gilson Miller, ‘Sleeping Fetus: Overview’, Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures (2009) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1872-5309_ewic_EWICCOM_0205> accessed 11 August 2017. Imām Mālik was 
reported to have been a sleeping foetus. See Willy Jansen, ‘Sleeping in the Womb: Protracted Pregnancies in the 
Maghreb’ (2000) 90 The Muslim World 218–37; Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family 




to protect women from the death penalty. Thus all schools tried their best to make it impossible 
for a conviction of zinā to stand. 
Brown has argued that ‘[n]ormally in the Shariah, such miraculous or fantastic claims would 
carry no weight in legal matters. But as possible ambiguities to prevent application of the 
Ḥudūd, they were accepted’.128 The significance of the discretion provided for ‘ambiguities’ in 
ruling on sexual offences illustrates the historical theological affirmation for the inherent ḥudūd 
restriction and thus the rarity of implementing ḥudūd punishments. 
5.4.4 Stoning (rajm) 
The punishment for adultery is death by stoning (rajm) according to the consensus of scholars. 
Although there is no mention of rajm in the Qurʾān, this view is supported by ḥadīths in which 
the Prophet administered such a punishment, namely in the widely reported cases of Māʿiz b. 
Mālik and al-Ghāmidiyya, and it is also found in the practice of the early companions.129 The 
first reported instance of rajm took place in the time of the Prophet with respect to a Jewish 
couple who were convicted of adultery. However it is unclear whether the Prophet ordered the 
sentencing according to the Torah or Islamic law.130 
There are also ḥadīths which suggest that there was a verse on rajm (ayat al-rajm) in the 
Qurʾān131 which some scholars maintain was abrogated but the ruling of implementation 
                                                          
128 Brown, ‘Stoning and Hand Cutting’, 10. 
129 According to John Burton, stoning as a penalty for adultery was almost universally adopted ‘in the oldest stage 
of Islamic intellectual activity.’ See Burton, ‘The Penalty for Adultery in Islam,’ in GR Hawting and Abdul-Kader 
A Shareef (eds), Approaches to the Qurʾān (London: Routledge 1993) 269. For a comprehensive overview of all 
the narrations on rajm see Muḥammad Anas Sarmīnī, al-ʿUqūbāt allatī Istaqallat bī Tashrīʿihā al-Sunna al-
Nabawiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islamīyya 2017) 393-491.  
130 ibid 456-57; al-Mūṣilī, al-Ikhtiyār, 4:88. Four reported instances of rajm took place during the life of the 
Prophet: 1) Jewish couple; 2) Māʿiz b. Mālik; 3) a woman from the tribe of al-Ghāmid; 4) a woman who committed 
zina with her husband’s laborer (known as hadith al-ʿAsīf) (Sarmīnī, al-ʿUqūbāt, 408-446).  
131 Sarmīnī, al-ʿUqūbāt, 478-86. The verse stated, ‘The noble man and woman, if they commit zinā, surely stone 




remained (naskh al-tilāwa dūn al-ḥukm).132 Other ḥadīths show that the Prophet disliked that 
the verse of rajm be written down and according to Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), this was done ‘with 
a view to lessening the burden of reciting and writing in the Qurʾān what is a rather difficult, 
and severe rule, and a harsh punishment, even though that law still applies. It also points to the 
virtue of concealing ills of this nature’.133 
It is also reported that ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb addressed the people and said, ‘Do not have doubts 
about the rule of stoning for it is the truth. I was tempted to write it into the Qurʾān and 
consulted Ubayy b. Kaʿb who said: “Did you [ʿUmar] not come to me when I was still studying 
it with the Prophet? You then hit me on the chest and said: You study the verse of stoning 
whilst they cohabit with each other like donkeys do”’.134 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449) 
observed that this indicated to the fact that the recitation was removed because of 
controversy.135 If fornication was so rampant then many people would be at risk of such a 
punishment. 
ʿAbdullah b. Muḥammad al-Ṣadīq al-Ghumārī (d. 1993), however, refuted the claim of naskh 
al-tilāwa. He argued that all the ḥadīths that allude to rajm as being a Qurʾānic verse are not 
widely transmitted enough to reach the epistemic value of the Qurʾān (tawātur) and thus cannot 
be considered part of it. Rather it is a highly irrational claim that the Qurʾānic text was altered 
and contradicts the Qurʾān’s message about itself that it is a text that is intact and guarded by 
                                                          
132 Most pre-modern Muslim scholars had no problem with such a concept of abrogation where the ruling remained 
intact. The famous Hadith scholar Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) stated that he knew of no disagreement on 
the possibility of naskh al-tilāwa dūn al-ḥukm for stoning; Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, al-Sunan al-Kubrā (Muḥammad 
ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿ Aṭā ed, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1420/1999) 8:367.  For more on the concept of abrogation 
see, Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muḥammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1950) 53, 73-74, 191; 
Christopher Melchert, ‘Qurʾānic Abrogation Across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbayd, Muḥāsibī and Ibn 
Qutaybah’ in Bernard G Weiss (ed), Studies in Islamic Legal Theory (Leiden: Brill 2002), 81, 84-88; John Burton, 
The Sources of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1990) 122-64. 
133 al-Ṣuyūṭī, al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān (Muneer Fareed tr, n.d) 65 available at 
<www.ashtoncentralmosque.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/al-Itqan-fi-Ulum-al-Quran.pdf> accessed 2 
February 2016.  





God.136 El Fadl’s concept of the ‘conscientious pause’ is also of significance here. He argues 
that any tradition that has serious ethical and legal consequences requires the reader to ‘take a 
pause and ask: to what extent did the Prophet really play a role in the authorial enterprise that 
produced this tradition?’137 It is therefore difficult to see how these narrations can be used as 
decisive legal proofs.138 
Another dissenting view proposes that the Qurʾān’s silence on rajm is indicative of a uniform 
punishment of 100 lashes, for both adultery and fornication, for which there is a clear provision 
in the Qurʾān. This opinion is mainly attributed to the Kharijites.139 The renowned Egyptian 
scholar Abū Zahra (d. 1974) also rejected the punishment of stoning and quoted a ḥadīth 
recorded in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī140 wherein the companion, ʿAbdullah b. Abī Awfā, was 
questioned whether Sūra Nūr (which contains the provision for flogging) was revealed before 
or after the ḥadīth of rajm. He answered that he did not know.141 In other words, it is possible 
that the Qurʾānic verse on flogging abrogated the practice of rajm.  
                                                          
136 Abdullah b. Muḥammad al-Sadīq al-Ghumārī, Dhawq al-Ḥalāwa bi-Bayān Imtināʿ Naskh al-Tilāwa (2nd edn, 
Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira 2006) 12, 14.  
137 El Fadl, Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (London: Oneworld Publications 2014) 
213. El Fadl further substantiates his point by claiming that, ‘[t]his is not an invitation to the exercise of whimsy 
and feel-good determinations. The duties of honesty, self-restraint, diligence, comprehensiveness, and 
reasonableness demand that a Muslim make a serious enquiry into the origin, structure, and symbolism of the 
authorial exercise that produced the tradition before simply waving it away and proceeds on his merry way.’ (ibid). 
138 Scott C Lucas, ‘Perhaps You Only Kissed Her?’ (2011) 34(3) Journal of Religious Ethics 399, 410. 
139 ʿAwdah, al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī, 1:640; Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Fatāwā (Muḥammad ʿUthmān Bashīr 
ed, Damascus: Dār al-Qalam 2006) 672. 
140 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 804. 
141 In 1972, at an Islamic conference in Libya, Abū Zahra disclosed a jurisprudential opinion that he had kept 
secret for the past 20 years (out of fear that his character and reputation would be disparaged and vilified as 
happened in this conference). He stated that he believed stoning was a Jewish practice that the Prophet at first 
followed, until the practice was abrogated by the punishment of a hundred lashes in Sūra al-Nūr citing the above 
hadith as one of the proofs.  He considered the punishment too cruel and contrary to the Prophet’s nature arguing 
that stoning was Judaic law and fits the cruelty of Judaic culture (hādhihi sharīʿa yahūdiyya wa hiya alīqu bi-
qasāwati-l-yahūd). This was reported by two scholars in attendance, Muṣṭafā Zarqā’ and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, see 
Abū Zahra, Fatāwā, 673; ʿAlī A Manṣūr, Niẓām al-Tajrīm wa al-ʿIqāb fī-l-Islām (Madina: Mu’assasa al-Zahra 
1396/1976) 181-83; al-Qaraḍāwī, ‘Nadwa al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī fī Lībyā’ (Al-Qaradawi, n.d) <www.al-




Extensive debates have emerged over the years regarding the validity of rajm in Islamic law. 
What is clear is that although it cannot be established from the Qurʾān, it is attested through 
the practice of the Prophet and companions.142 Whether the Qurʾān abrogated it or not 
introduces an element of doubt into the whole debate and history shows that this punishment 
was rarely, if ever, applied.143 It can be viewed as more symbolic rather than a literal 
application.   
Nevertheless, even for those that insist on rajm, in order for such a brutal punishment to even 
apply, a number of stringent evidentiary criteria must be met for a person to be convicted and 
judges can use the doctrine of shubha to prevent the ḥadd being inflicted.  
5.5 Sodomy (Liwāṭ)  
Liwāṭ is defined as ‘the act of the people of Lot’ (ʿamal qawm Lūṭ)144 i.e. sodomy and has been 
condemned in the sharīʿa.145 This is principally derived from the Qurʾānic verses: 
And [We had sent] Lot when he said to his people, ‘Do you commit such 
immorality as no one has preceded you with from among the worlds? Indeed, you 
approach men with desire, instead of women. Rather, you are a transgressing 
people.’146 
                                                          
142 See Mohamed S El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law (Plainfield: American Trust Publications 1993) 15-17; 
Waqar Akbar Cheema and Gabriel K Al-Romaani, ‘Opposition to Rajm: Analysis and Refutation’ (2013) 1(1) 
Journal of Islamic Sciences 14-24; Azman bin Mohd Noor, ‘Stoning for Adultery in Christianity and Islam and 
its Implementation in Contemporary Muslim Societies’ (2010) 18(1) Intellectual Discourse 97-113; Reza Aslan, 
‘The Problem of Stoning in the Islamic Penal Code: An Argument for Reform’ (2003) 3 UCLA J. Islamic & Near 
E. L.; Pavel Pavlovitch, ‘The Stoning of a Pregnant Adulteress from Juhayna: The Early Evolution of a Muslim 
Tradition’ (2010) 17 Islamic Law and Society, 1-62; John Burton, ‘The Penalty for Adultery in Islam’ in GR 
Hawting and Abdul-Kader A Shareef (eds), Approaches to the Qurʾān (London: Routledge 1993) 269. 
143 Brown (‘Stoning and Hand Cutting’, 15-18) details the historical application of ḥudūd in Islamic civilization 
and notes that ‘[i]n the roughly five hundred years that the Ottoman Empire ruled Constantinople, records show 
that only one instance of stoning for adultery took place’. 
144 Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 7:396. 
145 For a useful study, see Sara Omar, ‘From Semantics to Normative Law: Perceptions of Liwāṭ (Sodomy) and 
Sihaq (Tribadism) in Islamic Jurisprudence (8-15th Century CE)’ (2012) 19 Islamic Law and Society, 222-56. 




Do you approach males among the worlds and leave what your Lord has created 
for you as mates? But you are a people transgressing.147 
Based on the scriptural texts, it is agreed amongst scholars that liwāṭ is prohibited in Islam 
however there is no consensus that it is liable for the death penalty.148 Jurists identified liwāṭ 
as an action rather than a desire or inclination, it is ‘inserting the penis into the anus of a man’.149 
It thus follows that tribadism (siḥāq) is not treated as severely as liwāṭ due to the absence of 
penetration and therefore exempt from the death penalty.150 
The punishment for liwāṭ varies among the four sunnī schools from taʿzīr to ḥadd.151 The 
Mālikī school holds that both the active and passive partner are executed by rajm irrespective 
of marital status.152 The Shāfiʿī position states that liwāṭ incurs a similar penalty to zinā, the 
active partner is executed whilst the passive is lashed 100 times and exiled for a year.153 
According to the Ḥanbalīs, liwāṭ is punished exactly like zinā so the married will be sentenced 
to death and the single will be lashed 100 times and exiled for a year.154 It is only the Ḥanafī 
                                                          
147 Qurʾān 42:165-66. 
148 On the prohibition of liwāṭ see Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-Muḥiṭ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmiyya 2007) 4:556; al-Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Talībīn, 10:90; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā’ (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr 
1402/1982) 6:172; ʿ Alī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā (Cairo: Idāra al-Ṭibāʿa al-Munīriyya 1352/1933) 
11:380; Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmi li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī 
ed, Beirut: Muʾassasa al-Risāla 1427/2006) 9:274ff; al-Ṣan’ānī, Subul al-Salām, 7:120-21; Ibn Qudāma, al-
Mughnī, 12:348ff. 
149 Ramlī, Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj, 7:423-24. 
150 Camilla Adang, ‘Ibn Ḥazm on Homosexuality: A Case-Study of Ẓāhirī Legal Methodology’ (2003) 24(1) Al-
Qantara, 10. See also Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 11:390-94. 
151 Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle provides a detailed analysis of each school’s reasoning on liwāṭ and its punishment 
in his monograph Homosexuality in Islam: Critical Reflection on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims 
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications 2010) 145-159. 
152 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Juzayy al-Gharnāṭī, al-Qawānīn al-Fiqhīyya (Mājid al-Ḥimawī ed, Beirut: Dār Ibn 
Ḥazm 1434/2013) 584; al-Dusūqī, Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī 4:314; al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, 6:296; al-Bayhaqī, al-
Sunan al-Kubrā, 8:404-405; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Miṣbāh al-Zujāja Sharḥ Sunan Ibn Mājah (Karachi: Qadīm 
Kutubkhāna n.d) 184; Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-Salām al-Ābī, al-Thamar al-Dānī fī Taqrīb al-Maʿānī Ḥāshiya Risāla Ibn 
Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (2nd edn, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī 1944) 438. 
153 al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, 4:187; Muḥammad Nawawī b. ʿUmar al-Jāwī, Qūt al-Ḥabīb al-Gharīb (Cairo: 
Maṭbaʿa Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī 1938) 246.  
154 al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 6:94; al-Mirdāwī, al-Inṣāf 10:176-77; Manṣūr b. Yūnus al-Buhūtī, al-Rawḍ al-
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school that does not consider liwāṭ a ḥadd offence and therefore does not impose the death 
penalty. It considers liwāṭ to be a taʿzīr offence; however, a habitual offender may be executed 
in the interest of public order by the judicial authority’s discretion (siyāsa).155 
The basis for the sharīʿa positions on liwāṭ and its punishment is derived from a number of 
factors. These include: 1) the Qurʾān’s explicit censure of going to men out of desire instead 
of women; 2) several ḥadīths denouncing liwāṭ and laying down severe punishments for it; 3) 
the use of legal analogy (qiyās) based on zinā; and 4) a range of legal edicts from the founding 
generations of the companions (saḥāba) and their successors (tābi’īn), based on their 
interpretation of the primary sources and legal reasoning.156 These individuals regarded liwāṭ 
either like zinā or distinct from it. Consequently, punishments prescribed for the offence ranged 
from capital punishment i.e. stoning to death, corporal punishment i.e. lashing, to burning or 
throwing the offender from tall buildings.157 
Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457) argued that the wide berth of disagreements between the 
companions and successors over the punishment of liwāṭ was in itself an indication that the 
offence cannot be categorised as one of ḥudūd. It also demonstrated that ḥadīths on liwāṭ which 
advocated for the death penalty were not reliable or they must not be interpreted as a general 
rule. If liwāṭ was a ḥudūd crime then there would not be such a large variation of opinions 
amongst the early scholars.158 
Liwāṭ finds its staunch condemnation not only in the Qurʾān but in explicit ḥadīths, some of 
which endorse the death penalty as its punishment. The most famous ḥadīth from the Prophet 
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advocating the death penalty for liwāṭ has been narrated on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās that the 
Messenger of God said: ‘Whoever you find doing the action of the people of Lot, kill the one 
who does it, and the one to whom it is done’.159 
Other variations of the ḥadīth have been narrated from Abū Hurayra and Jābir b. ʿAbdullah. 
Abū Hurayra reported that ‘the Prophet said concerning the one who commits the act of the 
people of Lot, “stone both the upper and the lower [partner], stone them both”’. 160 Jābir 
narrated that the Prophet said, ‘Whoever has committed the action of the people of Lot, kill 
him’.161 
These ḥadīths have been contentious amongst many classical scholars due to defects found in 
their isnād.  The great Shāfiʿī scholar, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, acknowledged that the ḥadīths 
used to establish liwāṭ as a ḥudūd crime were not reliable enough. He identified the ḥadīth of 
Ibn ʿAbbās as ‘differed in terms of its reliability’ (mukhtalaf fī thubūtihi) and graded the chain 
of Abū Hurayra’s ḥadīth as much weaker than that of Ibn ʿ Abbās, arguing that it was not correct 
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Naysābūrī, al-Mustadrak, 4:395, no. 8049.    
160 (1) The sanad is: ʿAṣim b. ʿUmar - Suhayl - his father - Abū Hurayra – the Prophet. Found in: Ibn Mājah, 
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(lam yasiḥḥu).162 Ibn al-Ṭallāʿ (d. 497/1104) also claimed, in his Aḥkām, that rajm for sodomy 
was not established from the Prophet.163 
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Zaylaʿī (d. 762/1361), the renowned ḥadīth scholar and jurist, provided a 
critique of all the different chains relating to the above ḥadīths and cited a number of prominent 
ḥadīth experts who challenged their reliability.164 Amongst them were al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) 
and al-Bazzār (d. 292/905) who considered the chain of Abū Hurayra unreliable due to the 
presence of a narrator named ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmar who was known for weak retention (ḥifz).165 
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), Yaḥya Ibn Maʿīn (d. 233/848), Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzi (d. 
277/890), and al-Jūzajānī (d. 259/873) all declared him weak (ḍaʿīf); al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) 
and al-Tirmidhī noted that he was rejected in ḥadīth (munkar al-ḥadīth).166 
In the chain of Jābir, both ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAqīl and ʿAbbād b. Kathīr were 
criticised thereby weakening the chain considerably.167 Similarly, the chain of Ibn ʿAbbās was 
criticised due to the presence of ʿAmr b. Abī ʿAmr and ʿIkrima. Scholars have differed 
regarding both narrators’ reliability. ʿAmr b. Abī ʿAmr was generally deemed to be a credible 
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narrator by ḥadīth critics and he was used by both al-Bukhārī and Muslim (d. 260/875) in their 
canonical texts. Abū Ḥātim, Aḥmed Ibn Ḥanbal and Abū Aḥmad b. ʿAdī said there was ‘no 
harm in him’ (lā baʾsa bihi). Abū Zurʿa al-Rāzī (d. 264/878) deemed him a reliable narrator 
(thiqa).168  
ʿAmr b. Abī ʿAmr was, however, criticised for his narrations from ʿIkrima in particular. al-
Bukhārī questioned whether ʿAmr had indeed heard from ʿIkrima and consequently he did not 
include any ḥadīth in which ʿAmr had directly narrated from ʿIkrima in his Ṣaḥīḥ. Yaḥya Ibn 
Maʿīn, Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/889), and al-Nasāʾī (d. 303/915) also categorised ʿAmr’s ḥadīths 
as ‘not strong’ (laysa bi-l-qawī).169 ʿIkrima’s reliability has also been challenged, arguably 
more so than ʿAmr, with both classical and contemporary scholars writing critiques and 
rebuttals in his defence.170  
The Shāfiʿī jurist, Muḥammad b. Ismā’īl al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 211/1768) affirmed that ‘the origin, 
wording and authenticity of the tradition stipulating punishments for homosexual acts were 
disputed by authorities of ḥadīth’.171 In each ḥadīth, we find an individual whose credibility 
was questioned in rijāl books and therefore cannot say with absolute certainty that they provide 
for the death penalty since it is based on questionable grounds. 
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The Ḥanafī scholar, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981) argues that the death penalty for adultery 
is restricted to heterosexual intercourse only. He supports his argument with the ḥadīth of the 
Prophet which specified the three occasions when a Muslim can be executed,172 and liwāṭ was 
not one of them. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ affirms that the ḥadīths containing provisions for the death penalty 
for liwāṭ have unreliable narrators in their chains and cannot be used as conclusive evidence to 
sentence a Muslim to death.173 
Although great scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar questioned the reliability of ḥadīths on liwāṭ, they 
still endorsed it as a ḥudūd offence based on it being analogous to zinā.174 The Ḥanafī school 
did not accept the use of analogy (qiyās) to include crimes under the remit of ḥudūd (lā qiyāsa 
fī-l-ḥudūd).175 Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī (d. 587/1191), in his seminal work on Ḥanafī 
fiqh, concluded that according to Abū Ḥanīfa, even though anal intercourse with a man is 
prohibited, it does not incur the ḥadd because ultimately it is not zinā.176  
A semantic and lexicographical argument also arises here as some scholars177 argued that zinā 
and liwāṭ are lexically congruent (al-liwāṭa bi zinā haythu li-ism).178 They are both associated 
with the Qurʾānic word for ‘indecency’ (fāḥisha) so they deserve to be punished equally.179 
However, the nouns zinā and liwāṭ signify two different acts because if they were the same, 
there would be no need to use two different verbs (zanā and lāṭa) to denote the same action. 
Al-Sarakshī put forth this argument in his Mabsūṭ and also cited the famous second-century 
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AH poet, Abū Nuwās (d. 200/815), who distinguished between the lūṭī (sodomite) and zānī 
(adulterer/fornicator) suggesting that he thought of two completely different persons and 
personalities.180  
Ḥanafī jurists argued that:  
Since this act [sodomy] is known to be different [in nature] from adultery, it should 
not be treated as a ḥadd crime equivalent to adultery…This act is a kind of sexual 
intercourse in a bodily opening that has no relation to legal marriage and does not 
necessitate giving a dowry or determining parentage [as adultery does]. Therefore 
it has no relation to the ḥadd punishment for adultery.181 
In other words, liwāṭ lacks the anatomical interaction which may lead to procreation and 
legitimate offspring nor does it involve penetration that can validate a legal marriage.182  
Although he was from the now extinct Ẓāhirī school,183 Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) makes a cogent 
argument against ‘some impudent and foolish people who may say that refraining from killing 
such people will only encourage them in this act [sodomy]’.184 He argues that, by extension, 
refraining from killing every fornicator would therefore be equivalent to declaring zinā licit 
and refraining from killing the consumer of pork, carrion, blood, and wine would be equivalent 
to declaring their consumption permissible. ‘God forbid that we express anger for him [the 
offender] more or less than what God expresses in His dīn (religion), and that we legislate 
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corrupt laws based on our own opinions, and we praise God abundantly for granting us 
adherence to the Qurʾān and sunna’.185 
Liwāṭ was quintessentially a private matter, morally reprehensible but not legally punishable 
by death. The Ḥanafī line of reasoning is more credible as ḥudūd are to be severely restricted 
with jurists using procedural technicalities to insist on their suspension yet using analogy is 
doing the opposite and arguably extending the application of ḥudūd and therefore the death 
penalty.  
5.6 Apostasy (ridda) 
The term for apostasy in Islamic law is irtidād or ridda. Ridda is linguistically defined as 
turning away from something (al-rujūʿ ʿan al-shayʾ) such as turning away from Islam.186 Its 
technical definition is disbelief of a Muslim by a clear statement, or an utterance that refers to 
it [the disbelief], or an action that includes or indicates to it [the disbelief].187 
In all four classical schools, the punishment for apostasy is death as illustrated in their fiqh 
literature. In order for the apostasy to be valid, the apostate must be Muslim,188 sane,189 
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mature,190 and free from duress.191 Kamali notes that, ‘despite the remarkable consistency that 
one finds on this point, the issue of punishment by death for apostasy is controversial, and 
various opinions have been recorded on the matter ever since the early days of Islam’.192 
There are two main areas where Muslim scholars have differed on the legal rulings of apostasy. 
First is whether an apostate is given the chance to repent and second is whether female apostates 
are executed. Generally, the apostate is given three days to reconsider and revert back to Islam, 
failure of which results in his execution. Unlike the other three doctrinal schools, the Ḥanafī 
school does not consider offering a chance to repent as mandatory but rather as desirable.193 
However, the same school also takes a more nuanced approach to the killing of women 
apostates by exempting them altogether from the death penalty, whereas the majority treat both 
men and women equally.194  
Moreover, the manner in which the term apostasy was used and interpreted in the early days of 
Islam suggests a separation between apostasy simpliciter and political apostasy akin to treason 
or warfare. In agreement with this, Brown has argued that ‘[t]he way that the early Muslim 
community seems to have understood apostasy differs strikingly from the decisive rulings of 
the later schools of law’.195  
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Sabīl, 2:407; al-Nawawī, al-Majmuʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab li-l-Shirāzī (Muḥammad Najīb al-Muṭīʿī ed, Jeddah: 
Maktaba al-Irshād n.d) 21:57.  
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al-Umm, 7:398; al-Shamil 6:147; Sharḥ al-Anṣārī 4:239; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 12:291-95; al-Ḥajjāwī, al-
Iqna’, 4:306; ʿUlaysh, Minaḥ al-Jalīl, 4:407; al-Nawawī, al-Majmuʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, 21:57-58. 
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(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr n.d) 5:423-425; Wahba al-Zuhaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islamī wa Adillatuhu (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr 
1997) 6:186-188; al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, 4:330-331; al-ʿAynī, al-Bināya fī Sharḥ al-Hidāya, 7:267-68. Ibn 
Taymiyya maintains that the well-known and the prevalent (mashhūr) view of the whole Ḥanafī madhhab is that 
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Nawawī, al-Majmuʿ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, 21:65-66. 
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5.6.1 Ridda in the Qurʾān 
The debate on whether apostasy is a capital offence is positioned on the legal and theological 
hermeneutic tafsīr (exegetical) interpretations of specific Qurʾānic verses. Although the 
Qurʾān, per se, cannot differ, a number of interpretive possibilities arise regarding those verses’ 
meaning.196 
The Qurʾān’s emphasis on freedom of religion197 is prima facie incompatible with a 
criminalisation of apostasy. Irtidād is used only twice in the Qurʾān, in 2:217 and 5:54.198 A 
return to unbelief after belief is explicitly mentioned in both verses yet neither stipulate death 
as the punishment for return to disbelief: 
They ask you about the sacred month - about fighting therein. Say, ‘Fighting therein 
is great [sin], but averting [people] from the way of Allah and disbelief in Him and 
[preventing access to] al-Masjid al-Haram and the expulsion of its people 
therefrom are greater [evil] in the sight of Allah. And fitnah is greater than killing.’ 
And they will continue to fight you until they turn you back from your religion if 
they are able. And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies 
while he is a disbeliever - for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world 
and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire, they will abide therein 
eternally.199  
O you who have believed, whoever of you should revert from his religion - Allah 
will bring forth [in place of them] a people He will love and who will love Him 
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[who are] humble toward the believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they 
strive in the cause of Allah and do not fear the blame of a critic. That is the favor 
of Allah; He bestows it upon whom He wills. And Allah is all-Encompassing and 
Knowing.200  
After assessing all the commentaries by the classical exegetes on these verses of irtidād, Declan 
O’ Sullivan argues that what becomes apparent is that none of them indicate or make any 
reference to the death penalty as a fitting punishment for apostasy, or that such a ruling is 
derived from these verses.201  
Furthermore, Nuʿmān ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Samarāʾi collated a number of classical exegetes’ 
tafsīr comments on 5:54 including al-Ṭabarī, al-Nīshāpūrī, al-Qurṭubī, al-Zamakhsharī, al-
Rāzī, and al-Tabarasī. All of whom interpreted the verse as merely a warning and a prophecy 
of the ridda wars following the death of the Prophet:  
The warning conveyed was that apostasy would not affect Divine purposes in the 
least. The prophecy foreshadowed the apostasy of several tribes on the death of the 
Prophet and gave the glad tidings that they would be replaced by God-loving and 
God-loved true Muslims. The main inference derivable from the ayah is that there 
is no punishment for apostasy to be enforced in this world, for such human 
aberrations cannot frustrate God's purposes.202 
The ridda wars (ḥurūb al-ridda) were a series of military campaigns led by the first caliph, 
Abū Bakr al-Siddīq (d. 13/634). Following the Prophet’s death, several tribes refused to pay 
their tax obligations (zakā) and reverted to their former religions. Different perceptions of the 
                                                          
200 Qurʾān 5:54. 
201 See Declan O Sullivan, Punishing Apostasy: The Case of Islam and Shari’a Law Re-considered (DPhil thesis, 
Durham University 2003) for a comprehensive assessment of the āyas dealing with ridda; SA Rahman, 
Punishment of Apostasy in Islam (2nd edn, New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan 2006) 54. 
202 Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, 46 citing Nuʿmān ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Samarāʾi, Aḥkām al-Murtad 
fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya (Beirut: Dār al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Ṭabāʿat wa al-Nashr wa al-Tauzīʾn.d.). 
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ridda wars suggest that they were a manifestation of political rebellion by Muslims and/or a 
consequence of several tribes’ renunciation of Islam. 
Dispelling the notion that the persons Abū Bakr fought against were all apostates, a number of 
historical reports suggest that some of the tribes did not actually reject Islam but felt they did 
not need to pay zakā as the Prophet was no longer alive and it was only paid to him. Fighting 
arose due to their rebellion and hostility against the state and they actively waged war against 
the Muslims.203 Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī and Abū Ḥanīfa therefore maintain that those who reject 
paying the zakā are not to be killed and are only to be fought when they take up arms which is 
what happened here.204 
Saeed and Saeed note that:  
Had Abū Bakr not pursued his policy, it is conceivable that the nascent Muslim 
community would have disappeared and any expansion of Islam within or outside 
Arabia would have been blocked, and the mission of the Prophet might not have 
endured. It was Abū Bakr’s political acumen as well as his strategic thinking that 
led him to fight for survival.205 
Hence the battles fought in the ridda wars were not religious per se but largely political. As 
such, the justification for the death penalty based on these events is not convincing evidence. 
In line with this reasoning, Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the retired Chief Justice of Pakistan, argued 
that the mere act of apostasy does not necessitate the death penalty because ‘in the early years 
                                                          
203 Saeed and Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, 65. For a detailed analysis of the causes of apostasy 
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157AH/774AD (DPhil thesis, Glasgow University 2002) 129-130; Khurshid Ahmad Fariq (ed), Tarikh al-Ridda: 
Gleaned from al-Iktifa of al-Balansi (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House 1970).  
204 Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, ʿUmdat al-Qārī: Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
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of Islam, the fact that persons who defected from the religion also joined the enemy groups, 
may have obscured the distinction between peaceful renegades and apostates who actively 
opposed the faithful’.206 
Another verse linked to apostasy addresses those who repeatedly believe and disbelieve: 
‘Indeed, those who have believed then disbelieved, then believed, then disbelieved, and then 
increased in disbelief - never will Allah forgive them, nor will He guide them to a way’.207  
A prominent argument is that the repeated apostasies and reversions to the faith, without 
mention of any temporal punishment for these defections, is strong evidence against the death 
penalty for apostasy. The act of apostasy must therefore be a sin and not a crime. If the 
individual was killed due to his very first defection, a history of conversions would not be 
possible.208 
Reaffirming this point, Kamali argues that:  
The implication [of the ayah] is unmistakable. The text would hardly entertain the 
prospect of repeated belief and disbelief if death were to be the prescribed 
punishment for the initial act. It is also interesting to note that the initial reference 
to disbelief is followed by further confirmation of disbelief and then “increase in 
disbelief”. One might be inclined to think that if the first instance of apostasy did 
not qualify for capital punishment, the repeated apostasy might have provoked it - 
had such a punishment even been intended in the Qurʾān.209 
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5.6.2 Ridda in Ḥadīth Literature 
Whilst the Qurʾān is largely silent on the death penalty for apostasy, the punishment takes root 
in the ḥadīth literature. The death penalty for apostasy is primarily derived from three ḥadīths 
found in al-Bukhārī.210 The first is narrated on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās that the Prophet 
said: 
‘Whoever changes their religion, kill them’ (man baddala dīnahu fa-qtuluhu).211 
This is a general (ʿāmm) command which needs specification (takhṣīṣ).212 If taken on face value 
it would mean that persons who change their religion to Islam or from one religion to another 
such as Christianity to Judaism, would be included in the scope of the ḥadīth (emphasis 
added).213 The ḥadīth has been further specified in the Qurʾān to preclude those who publicly 
renounce Islam under duress so long as the person remains faithful in his heart.214 The Ḥanafīs 
have further restricted the reach of the ḥadīth by exempting female apostates from the sentence 
of death.215 
The ḥadīth must also be read in light of other ḥadīths such as ‘the blood of a Muslim who 
confesses that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that I am His Messenger, 
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ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī ed, Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī n.d) 2:103.  
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2:86, no.285; ʿAbdallah b. Muḥammad Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shayba, 10:143, no. 29614; Abū Bakr 
ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. Hammām al-Ṣanʿānī, Muṣannaf ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 5: 213, no. 9413; Sunan Sughrā, 7:189, no. 
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ʿUqūbāt, 136-37). 
212 Muḥammad Anas Sarmīnī, al-ʿUqūbāt, 143-44. 
213 ibid 144; al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awṭār, 13:515-16. 
214 Qurʾān 16:106; al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awṭār, 13:514. 




cannot be shed except in three cases: a life for a life, a married person who commits zinā, and 
the one who reverts from Islam (apostate) and leaves the community’.216 
This ḥadīth has been narrated with minor variations217 which seem to qualify what is meant by 
a person who has abandoned his religion. In some versions, such as above, the apostate is 
qualified with the phrase al-mufāriq li-l-jamāʿa (the one who forsakes the community)218 
which suggests hostility and political betrayal. In another version, the one who ‘makes war on 
God and His Messenger’ (yuḥārib Allāh wa rasūlahu) is added.219 
The third ḥadīth is regarding Muʿādh b. Jabal who informed another companion, Abū Mūsā al-
Ashʿarī, that killing an apostate ‘was the judgment of Allah and His Messenger and he repeated 
it thrice. Then Abū Mūsā ordered that the man be killed, and he was killed’.220 
A full reading of the ḥadīth shows that the political aspect of apostasy was not mentioned 
however this is because no contextual information is provided to give an informed and nuanced 
reading of the text.221 Furthermore, it is found in al-Muwaṭṭaʾ that ʿUmar did not agree with 
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4016; al-Tirmidhī, Jāmiʿ Tirmidhī, no. 1402; al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, no. 4354; Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn 
Mājah, no. 2534; Sunan Sughra, 8:8, no. 2959; Sunan Kubra, 8:194, no. 18268; Ibn al-Jārūd, al-Muntaqā min al-
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4407; Abū ʿAwāna Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq al-Asfarāʾinī, Musnad Abī ʿAwāna, 4:97, no. 6164; al-Mawṣilī, Musnad Abī 
Yaʿlā, 8:206, no. 4767; Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad Aḥmad, no. 4065.  
217 Six companions are reported to have narrated the hadith regarding the three types of people who are allowed 
to be killed in Islam: (1) Ibn Masʿūd (2) ʿĀʾisha (3) ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (4) Jābir b. ʿAbd Allah (5) Ibn ʿAbbās (6) 
Abū Qilāba. See Sarmīnī, al-ʿUqūbāt, 146-158 for details. 
218 This is narrated from Ibn Masʿūd, see fn 204. The main narrations of this Hadith all have the wording al-tārik 
li-dīnihi al-mufāriq li-l-jamāʿa or al-mufāriq li-dīnihi al-tārik al-jamāʿa. Some narrations of this Hadith that are 
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Islam.’ 
219 This is narrated from Aisha. See al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, no. 4355; al-Nasāʾī, Sunan al-Nasāʾī, no. 
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Muʿjam al-ʾAwsaṭ, 4:118, no. 3760; al-Bayhaqī, al-Sunan al-Kubrā, 8:283, no. 17774;  al-Dāraquṭnī, Sunan al-
Dāraquṭnī, 4:57, no. 3087; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Taḥqīq fī ʾaḥādīth al-Khalāf, 2:309, no. 1755; al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ 
Mushkil al-Athār, 5:51 no. 1800, 1801. Abu Qilaba also narrates this hadith with similar wording (ḥāraba Allāha 
wa rasūlahu). See al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 4610, 6899; Ibn Abī Shayba, Musannaf Ibn Abī Shayba, 
9:393, no. 28433; al-Bayhaqī, al-Sunan al-Kubrā, 8:128, no. 16900; ʿAlī b. Ḥasan b. Hibat Allah al-Dimashqī 
(Ibn ʿAsākir), Tārīkh Dimashq (ʿAlī Shīrī ed, Dār al-Fikr n.d) 21:481. 
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Abū Mūsā’s decision and questioned why he did not imprison the apostate for three days, feed 
him every day, and preach Islam to him so that he may revert back. He then said, ‘O Allah, I 
did not attend the execution, and did not order it, and I did not know about it’.222 
Ibn Ḥazm also narrates another incident regarding the people of Juhayna whom Abū Mūsā 
executed for being apostates. ʿ Umar said, ‘Had you brought them [to me], I would have offered 
Islam to them. Had they repented, I would have accepted this; otherwise I would have put them 
in prison’.223 
Scholars have also made references to the practice of the Prophet to demonstrate that apostasy 
simpliciter was not a death penalty offence.224 Moreover, Ibn al- Ṭallāʿ observes that no reliable 
instance is reported where the Prophet executed anyone for apostasy.225  
5.6.3 Muslim Jurists’ Views on Apostasy 
Some scholars have compared the apostasy condemned in ḥadīth literature as being analogous 
to high treason, thus differentiating between political apostasy and apostasy simpliciter.226 The 
location of apostasy in books of fiqh indicates that early Muslim jurists were concerned 
regarding the public nature of apostasy and its ramifications for maintaining political order. 
Notable Ḥanafī jurists such as al-Sarakhsī (d. 1096), Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457), and Ibn al-
Sāʿātī (d. 694/1295) discussed apostasy in their chapter of foreign relations (kitāb al-siyar) and 
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not criminal punishments.227 Similarly, the Shāfiʿī fiqh treatise, the Muhadhdhab of Abū Isḥāq 
al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), dealt with apostasy under the chapter of rebellion (al-baghī).228 
Notwithstanding the above, a number of scholars have incorrectly held that al-Sarakhsī did not 
view apostasy as a death penalty offence.229 A cursory glance of bāb al-murtaddīn (chapter of 
the apostates) in al-Sarakshī’s Mabsūṭ dismisses this argument. The opening statements of the 
chapter assert that when a Muslim commits apostasy, Islam is presented to him. He either 
embraces Islam or is killed.230 
Nevertheless, his legal reasoning for the offence provides a unique insight into the way he 
perceived the crime of apostasy. It is noteworthy that he does not include bāb al-murtaddīn 
under kitāb al-ḥudūd (book of ḥudūd) and furthermore, the use of the plural noun al-murtaddīn, 
instead of the singular al-murtadd, indicates towards a political element attached to the rulings. 
Engaging in a polemic with al-Shāfiʿī who held that both male and female apostates are 
executed, al-Sarakshī favours the ruling of Abū Ḥanīfa that female apostates are exempt from 
the death penalty and are to be imprisoned until they repent.231 He relies on narrations wherein 
female apostates were killed only when they were enemy combatants or inciting war against 
the Muslims.232 
Al-Sarakshī further expounds upon this issue by clarifying that:  
The meaning in [not executing a female apostate] is that she is a disbeliever (kāfir), 
so she is not killed just like the one who is initially a female disbeliever. This is 
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because execution is not the punishment for apostasy [alone] but is necessitated 
due to persisting on disbelief…Indeed changing the religion [away from Islam] as 
well as the initial state of disbelief are from the greatest of offences. However, they 
are between the person and his Lord. Thus, punishment of them is delayed to the 
Abode of Recompense…By persisting on disbelief, he becomes a belligerent to 
Muslims, so he is killed to ward off warfare.233 
What becomes evident here is that although al-Sarakshī held apostasy as a capital offence, it 
was linked to the meaning of apostasy as a political act, not mere renunciation of faith. In 
agreement with this is the widely cited opinion of Ibn al-Humām who argued that: 
It is necessary to punish apostasy with death in order to avert the evil of war, not 
as punishment for the act of unbelief, its punishment [disbelief] is greater and with 
Allah, Most High. This [punishment of death] is specifically for him who comes 
with war and is a man; this is because the Prophet prohibited killing women.234   
This is a significant statement which is in harmony with the letter and spirit of the Qurʾān, 
demonstrating that mere apostasy does not incur a death sentence. 
The Mālikī jurist Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081) noted that apostasy is ‘a sin for which 
there is no ḥadd punishment’.235 Other prominent Islamic jurists such as Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī 
(d. 96/717) and Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) held that the apostate should be given the 
opportunity to repent forever (yustatābu abadan)236 or in another version, as long as there is 
hope for his repentance (yuʾajjal mā rujiyat tawbatuhu).237 It is likely that al-Nakhaʿī meant a 
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repeat apostate is to be given a chance to repent each time.238 However, Ibn Qudāma observed 
that this position will lead to the apostate never being killed which contradicts the sunna and 
ijmāʿ (consensus of scholars).239  
Maḥmūd Shaltūt, Shaykh al-Azhar (d.1963) further argued that the death penalty for apostasy 
is based on solitary ḥadīth and ḥudūd cannot be established with them.240 Furthermore, it 
should be noted that classical jurists who advocated the death penalty for apostasy were writing 
from within the context of a specific state. It is therefore entirely plausible that the death penalty 
is predicated on the political element of apostasy which is tied with hostility and war. Insisting 
on the death penalty for the apostate demonstrates a lack of critical awareness since the notion 
of apostasy is often employed by political and religious authorities to curtail freedom of 
religion.  
5.7 Highway Robbery (Ḥirāba) 
The final ḥudūd offence to incur the death penalty is ḥirāba which is defined as banditry or 
highway robbery. It is derived from the root word ‘ḥarb’ which means war. The one who 
commits ḥirāba is known as a muḥārib (pl. muḥāribūn).241 
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The Mālikīs242 and Ḥanbalīs243 use the term ‘al-ḥirāba’ whilst the Ḥanafīs244 and Shāfiʿīs245 
employ the term ‘qaṭʿ al-ṭarīq’. Some jurists, predominantly of the Ḥanafī school,246 also use 
the phrase ‘al-sariqa al-kubrā’ (the great theft). 
5.7.1 Verse of ḥirāba 
The basis of ḥirāba is found in the Qurʾān itself, under 5:33-34: 
Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and 
strive upon earth [to cause] corruption (fasād) is none but that they be killed or 
crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be 
exiled from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the 
Hereafter is a great punishment.  
Except for those who return [repenting] before you apprehend them. And know 
that Allah is Forgiving and Merciful. 
Verse 5:33 is commonly referred to as the ḥirāba verse or āyat al-ḥirāba. The occasion for 
revelation differs amongst the classical exegetes. Some reports refer to a group from the ahl 
al-kitāb (People of the Book) who broke a covenant with the Prophet and caused corruption on 
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243 Ibn Qudāma, ʿUmdat al-Fiqh (ʿAbd Allah Safar al-ʿAbdalī and Muḥammad Dughaylib al-ʿUtaybī eds, Taif: 
Maktaba al-Ṭarafayn n.d.) 149; al-Mirdāwī, al-Inṣāf, 10:291-299; Ibn Mufliḥ, al-Mubdiʿ fī Sharḥ al-Mughnī, 
9:144-154; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 6:149-154.  
244 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūt, 9:195-205; al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, 9:360-366; Ibn Najīm, al-Baḥr al-Rāʾiq, 
5:113. 
245 Zakariyyā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, Manhaj al-Ṭullāb (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1418/1997-8) 128; 
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the land.247 Other reports refer to a group of polytheists,248 or Banū Isrāʾīl (Israelites),249 or the 
Ḥarūriyya (the early Khawārij)250 as the intended subjects of the verse. 
Most of the exegetes assert that the ḥirāba verse was revealed regarding a group from the tribe 
of ʿUrayna and/or ʿUkal who came to the Prophet and embraced Islam. They complained that 
the climate of Medina did not suit them, so the Prophet sent them with some camels to support 
them and a young Nubian shepherd called Yasār.251 The men later apostatized and tortured 
Yasār by severing his limbs and inserting thorns into his eyes until he died. They then stole the 
camels and escaped. Upon capture, the Prophet severed their hands and feet, blinded them, and 
left them to die in the desert.252 Scholars have differed over whether the verse abrogated or 
reprimanded the Prophet for his actions.253 
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Regardless of the true cause of revelation, Muslim jurists agree that the ḥirāba verse lays down 
the punishment(s) for such a crime. The commonly agreed upon juristic definition of ḥirāba is 
the taking of wealth, or killing, or terrorizing of people, openly and forcefully.254 
5.7.2 Conditions (shurūṭ) 
The schools of law differ on certain elements of ḥirāba, for example the use of weapons, the 
act of robbery, and the site of commission of the crime.255 The use of weapons is an important 
element to the crime and is emphasised by the Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī jurists. This must 
be done overtly (mujāhara) and forcefully (mukābara).256 The Mālikīs focus on the act of 
terrorizing the victims as the central element to ḥirāba, whether the criminal uses a weapon or 
not.257 The spreading of fear and rendering victims helpless is the sine qua non of ḥirāba and 
based on this principle, the Mālikīs broaden the scope of ḥirāba so that the act of robbery is 
not a necessary element.258 The majority however consider robbery as an important element of 
ḥirāba in their definitions.259 
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Another main difference is that Abū Ḥanīfa, and some Ḥanbalī jurists, restrict the crime of 
ḥirāba to the desert and uninhabited areas.260 This is because the victims cannot be helped in 
these places whereas they can be rescued in towns, villages or other inhabited areas by the 
authorities or members of the public.261 
The majority however do not make such a distinction between populated and unpopulated 
areas. They argue that the verse of ḥirāba is general and does not make this distinction, 
moreover, committing a crime in a populated area is more deserving of the ḥadd than 
committing it in a deserted place.262 
5.7.3 Scope of Ḥirāba 
The term fasād in the ḥirāba verse is interpreted to include all the crimes that fall under the 
remit of ḥirāba. Classical exegetes agreed that fasād, in such a context, was defined as forms 
of extreme violence such as armed robbery, mass murder, rape and murder.263 
Al-Dawoody notes that due to the evolution of time and place, the types of fasād are expected 
to change such as the use of modern weaponry to cause indiscriminate destruction on lives and 
property.264 Certain scholars have therefore advocated for broadening the crime of ḥirāba to 
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include other crimes such as abduction for ransom,265 organised assassinations,266 terrorism,267 
and drug trafficking.268 This is based on the principle that they terrorize the victims and their 
families and/or inflict damage on lives of individuals and society as a whole. 
However, this means that the crime of ḥirāba could be broadened to include a wide range of 
activities and allow the death penalty to be applied indiscriminately, and frequently, which is 
at odds with the consensus of many Islamic scholars, as discussed above, on restricting the 
ḥudūd. Furthermore, concepts such as ‘terrorism’ lack an agreed international definition and 
risk the politicisation of ḥirāba to include peaceful political opposition.269 
5.7.4 Punishment of Ḥirāba 
The ḥirāba verse is the only verse in the Qurʾān which stipulates an earthly punishment for an 
offence that relates to corruption on earth.270 The four prescribed punishments for ḥirāba are: 
1) death (qatl) 2) crucifixion (ṣalb) 3) cross amputation of hands and feet (qaṭʿ aydīhim wa 
arjulihim min khilāf) 4) exile (nafī).271 
The grammatical structure of the verse of ḥirāba, namely the function of the connector ‘aw’ 
(or), has resulted in two main juristic opinions with regard to the imposition of the punishment. 
The Ḥanafīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Ḥanbalīs interpret the aw to indicate towards tartīb (order) i.e. the 
order of punishments commensurate with the severity of the crimes committed.272  
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They assert that if the individuals kill and rob, they will be executed and crucified; the Ḥanafīs 
maintain the judge has discretion to add crucifixion or amputation.273 It is agreed upon that if 
the offenders kill but do not rob, they will be executed but not crucified. If they only rob, their 
hands and feet will be amputated from opposite sides. If they merely terrorise the victims, they 
will face exile.274 
It must be noted here that Khaled Abou El Fadl identifies that crucifixion (ṣalb) in Arabic does 
not mean nailing someone’s hands or feet to a cross which would be considered heretical in 
Islamic theology. Rather the term used in the Qurʾān and Islamic law simply means tying and 
hanging someone on the bark of a tree (yurbaṭ fī jizʿi al-nakhla).275 When questioned about 
crucifixion, Imam Mālik replied that ‘I have never heard of anyone who was crucified except 
a man called al-Ḥārith who was crucified in the time of Abdul-Mālik b. Marwān after claiming 
to be a prophet’.276 El-Awa maintains that this suggests the punishment was prescribed solely 
to deter a potential criminal without having to administer the actual punishment.277 
According to the Mālikīs, the aw indicates to takhyīr (choice) so the judge has the discretion to 
apply any of the four punishments prescribed in the Qurʾān, excluding cases involving 
homicide.278 Therefore an individual guilty of ḥirāba could be executed even if no homicide 
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or robbery took place. Al-Qarafī asserts that ‘the judge has to do his best to determine what is 
most beneficial for the community and then to act on it’.279  
However, this risks the death penalty being arbitrarily applied. An example of this can be seen 
during the reign of the Umayyad Caliph, ʿUmar bin Abd al-ʿAzīz (r. 99/717 – 101/720). He 
admonished his governor who wrote that he had captured a group of rebels and then quoted the 
ḥirāba verse to ʿUmar but omitted the part regarding banishment. In other words, the governor 
was implying that the robbers should either be killed, crucified, or have their limbs amputated 
but not exiled or banished. ʿUmar wrote in response ‘do not alter things [according to your 
whim]. Have you dedicated yourself to killing and crucifying people?...If you get my letter, 
banish the robbers to Shaghab’.280 
As with all other ḥudūd, the jurists are unanimous that the insane and the minors are exempt 
from the ḥadd penalty of ḥirāba. According to the Ḥanafī jurist al-Marghinānī (d. 593/1197), 
if there is a minor, or an insane, or a maḥram (prohibited relation) of the person robbed, 
amongst the muḥāribūn, then the ḥadd is waived from both the individual and the rest of the 
group. This is because all the offenders share the responsibility of the crime so if the ḥadd is 
not liable on one, it will not be liable upon the rest.281 He clarifies this by stating that: 
Where it happens that the act of some of them is not an occasion of punishment, 
the act of the others is then only a part of the cause, and an effect cannot be 
established by a part of a cause; in the same manner as when two persons kill a 
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man by one of them striking him wilfully, and the other accidentally, in which case 
retaliation [qisas] does not take place, as the act of the person who struck wilfully 
is only a part of the cause.282 
Similarly, Abū Ḥanīfa argues that a woman’s participation in the crime will drop the ḥadd from 
her and the group as a whole. This is based on the jurists viewing a woman’s disposition as 
gentle in nature and she would not be expected to cause chaos and fear in society. Thus, a 
woman’s participation will raise shubha and void the ḥadd penalty.283  
The Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs, however, do not consider the participation of a minor and/or insane 
as affecting the ḥadd punishment for the other offenders. They argue that ḥirāba committed by 
a compos mentis individual is deserving of the stipulated punishment because ḥirāba is 
connected to the right of Allah which considers the crime, not the individuals.284 Likewise they 
assert that men and women are to be treated equally in ḥudūd and so they are both liable for 
the ḥadd punishment.285  
Although this argument seems more plausible as ‘excluding punishments of ḥadd for those 
who commit crime simply because of the participation of children and insane [and women] 
would jeopardise the criminal justice system in Shari’a law’,286 it is not necessary that the 
offenders are exempt from any charges being brought forward (emphasis added). A 
discretionary punishment can be imposed without resorting to the ḥadd.  
Although the death penalty for ḥirāba is explicitly found in the Qurʾān, it is not mandatory per 
se as it depends on the severity of the crime(s) perpetrated. Furthermore, like other ḥudūd, it 
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must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence and the crime 
must be brought before the judge at the time of commission.287 The provision of repentance is 
a way of avoiding punishment altogether. If the offenders repent before they are apprehended, 
repentance acts as a bar to the ḥadd punishment. Jurists can rely on the maxim of ‘dropping 
ḥudūd due to doubt’ to preserve the right to life and impose a discretionary sentence.  
5.8 Repentance (tauba) 
The provision for a believer’s repentance in Islam cannot be overstated. In all four instances 
where the Qurʾān prescribes a punishment for an offence, a provision for repentance and 
reformation immediately follows which is a notably consistent characteristic of the merciful 
penological philosophy of the Qurʾān.288  
Bassiouni argues:  
Repentance is surely grounds for remission of all penalties. Why repentance is not 
recognised and applied by contemporary Muslim legal systems, which apply the 
Shari’a, as part of contemporary theories of rehabilitation for crimes of offenders 
can only be attributed to their selective application of the letter of the law taken 
without regard for Shari’a’s enlightened spirit.289 
Jurists have held differing views on repentance and its impact on the ḥudūd. ʿAbd al-Qādir 
ʿAwdah (d. 1954) has categorised them into three main groups. Some jurists of the Shāfiʿī and 
Ḥanbalī school maintain that repentance suspends the ḥudūd if offered before completion of 
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the crime. Since this is allowed in the crime of ḥirāba which is considered the most serious 
then the admissibility of repentance is stronger in lesser crimes such as zinā. 
The second view, maintained by Mālik, Abū Hanīfa, and some Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī jurists, is 
that repentance has no effect on ḥudūd except for ḥirāba which is based on clear scriptural text. 
They argue that the wording of the Qurʾānic verses on ḥudūd are general and apply to the 
repentant and unrepentant alike. Moreover, the case of Māʿiz and al-Ghāmidiyya, who despite 
their repentance and confession (of zinā) were still punished, is further support of this 
argument. Therefore, repentance does not nullify punishment but constitutes expiation for the 
guilt. 
Proponents of the third view are Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 
751/1350), from the Ḥanbalī school. They held that punishment purifies the offender from sin 
as does repentance. Thus if the offender repents, the punishment is annulled unless he insists 
on being punished in order to purify himself.290 
Repentance is largely overlooked by Islamic states and according to Kamali, it has not been 
adequately reflected in juristic doctrine.291  The evolution of the theological interpretation 
which protects life rather than uses the criminal justice process to take it away needs to be 
advocated in current religious and legal discourse. Translating this into practice, Islamic 
communities will significantly benefit from criminal justice policies that promote the 
flourishing of life and not from punishment that takes it away. 
5.9 Application of Ḥudūd Today292 
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El Fadl argues for an approach that considers both the historical context of Qurʾānic discourses 
and the moral trajectory or objective of the text, it needs to ‘go beyond immediate material 
causes to look at the Qurʾān as a transcendental project of divine guidance’.293 Taking a look 
at the ḥudūd penalties mentioned in the Qurʾān: 
There is no indication that by choosing particular punishments, the Qur’an intended 
to be particularly severe or cruel. The punishments decreed were well within the 
range of criminal penalties imposed at the time, and indeed when compared to the 
various forms of corporal punishments prevalent in the medieval era, these 
penalties were not understood by its contemporaries as exceptional or unusual. 
…In an age of cosmopolitanism, it is impossible to apply the same penalties 
without communicating a message of cruelty and barbarism, which would 
completely undermine and corrupt the original intended message of the Qur’anic 
determinations.294 
The application of Islamic criminal law to reflect the evolution of social and political policies 
can be traced back to the actions of the Prophet and the early caliphs who considered the 
prevailing conditions with respect to enforcing ḥudūd.295 The ḥudūd were suspended during 
times of military engagement with enemy forces to mitigate the risk of disunity, desertion, and 
military weakness.296 The Caliph ʿUmar b. Khaṭṭāb also suspended the ḥadd of theft (sariqa) 
during the period of famine as it would be unjust to enforce such punishments in these 
circumstances.297 This emphasises the ability of Islam to consider and evaluate a social 
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injustice and prevent retributive criminal law in such circumstances. Hence the Ḥanafī jurist, 
al-Kāsānī (d. 587/1191), observed that ‘it is not permissible to establish ḥudūd without some 
benefit’.298 
The evolution of society with respect to imposing ḥudūd has been addressed by Muslim 
scholars such as Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) who noted that: 
We do not dispute that [the ḥudūd] are part of Islam, but we find it strange that they 
are considered to be the whole of it. We wish to see the punishments enforced so 
that the rights and the security and the virtues may be preserved, but not that the 
hand of a petty thief be cut off while those punishments are waived in the case of 
those who embezzle fantastic sums from the state treasury.299  
Similarly, Muṣṭafa al-Zarqa (d. 1999), relying on the legal maxim that ‘necessity makes the 
unlawful permissible’ (al-ḍarūra tabīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt), concluded that current social realities are 
inappropriate for the enforcement of ḥudūd.300 Consistent with this reasoning, Tariq Ramadan 
argues that Muslim-majority societies fail to guarantee a fair and equal treatment of individuals 
before the law and, therefore, ‘it is our moral obligation and religious responsibility to demand 
for the immediate suspension of the application of the ḥudūd which is inaccurately accepted as 
an application of “Islamic sharia”’.301  
Ramadan identifies that the ḥudūd are applied indiscriminately to women, the poor and the 
most vulnerable in society but never to the wealthy or those in power. Furthermore, prisoners 
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lack adequate recourse to defence counsel with death sentences handed out against women, 
men, and children without due process; ‘[i]n resigning ourselves to having a superficial 
relationship to the scriptural sources, we betray the message of justice of Islam’.302 
Ramadan’s call for a moratorium on the ḥudūd was met with criticism from both sides of the 
spectrum. Some Muslim scholars viewed it as contradictory to Islamic principles whilst others 
saw it as an attempt in ‘trying to please the West’.303 Ramadan defended his stance by declaring 
that: 
In the name of the higher objectives of the message that call for respect for the life 
and dignity of women and men, equality and justice, it was urgent to put an end to 
an instrumentalization of religion through literalist, formalist implementations that 
continued to affect poor people, women, political opponents who have never had 
the means to defend themselves and who are punished for example’s sake and 
without justice.304 
Using the doctrine of shubha, it can be argued that the Muslim community is in an ‘era of 
doubt’ due to extreme difficulty of meeting the necessary conditions for applying these 
penalties which is also the position put forth by Egypt’s Grand Mufti of Al-Azhar, Shawki 
Allam.305 
There can be no justification for a particular punishment without supplying the right to a fair 
trial following sharīʿa principles. To bypass the protective guidelines and evidentiary 
safeguards laid down in Islamic law, would be to initiate an arbitrary and cruel criminal justice 
system. In the context of a right to a fair trial and providing equitable circumstances and 
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fairness, if those safeguards were applied, the ability to justifiably administer the death penalty 
would be severely restricted and be practically impossible. 
In agreement with Jonathan AC Brown, perhaps the most crucial interpretive point in this area 
of Islamic law is that ‘Muslim scholars have affirmed that what is essential for Muslims is to 
believe that the Shariah is ideal law and that the Ḥudūd are valid in theory. The actual 
implementation of the Ḥudūd comes at the discretion of the ruler/state and is not necessary for 
people to be Muslim’.306  
Therefore, it is only necessary for Muslims to believe that the death penalty exists in theory in 
the sharīʿa, but it is not imperative for Muslims to believe that the death penalty must be 
administered in our modern-day society (emphasis added). It is an acceptable expression of 
faith for a Muslim to be against the imposition of the death penalty because the punishment 
cannot be practically applied fairly.307 It is an acceptable practice for Muslims around the world 
to believe that Islam can contribute to the global promotion of flourishing lives and the 
protection of the right to life by the non-application of the death penalty.  
5.10 Conclusion 
The classical period fenced around these crimes so effectively that they could never be 
punished. In effect, what these jurists were doing was adopting a liberal stance. Islamic 
jurisprudence on the ḥudūd allows so much interpretation, whether to restrict enforcement or 
to question the status of an offence as a ḥadd, that any definitive conclusion based on them is 
highly doubtful and that those who advocate harsh punishments are probably going against 
both the letter and the spirit of what they are teaching.  Muslim jurisdictions that apply the 
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ḥudūd can take inspiration eclectically from the different madhāhib in a way that curtails the 
















































6. Non-Ḥudūd Crimes 
6.1 Introduction 
The remaining two categories of crimes in Islamic penal law are qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr. The former 
deals with cases of injury through to homicide whilst the latter deals with offences of a 
discretionary nature. Although the death penalty is found in these categories, a retributive 
system is not the only framework present in Islamic penal justice. A closer look at Islamic 
jurisprudence highlights alternative recourses to the death penalty depending on the seriousness 
of the crime, damage caused, the personal status of the offender, and the victim’s position.  
This chapter analyses how, in the early centuries of Islamic legal scholarship, alternative 
practices were present in qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr crimes such as compensation, reconciliation, pardon, 
warning, fines, and reintegration. It traces the origins of the death penalty in both categories of 
crimes and discusses the implications of its application today. 
6.2 Sanctity of Life 
In order to understand qiṣāṣ laws, an appreciation of the right to life in Islam is required. The 
tale of Cain and Abel, the sons of Prophet Adam, deals with the sanctity of human life and the 
very first violation of this right. According to the Qurʾānic narrative, Cain intended to kill his 
brother Abel to which Abel responded: ‘If you should raise your hand against me to kill me - I 
shall not raise my hand against you to kill you. Indeed, I fear Allah, Lord of the worlds’.1 Abel 
refused to pre-emptively terminate Cain’s life in order to preserve his own and chose the 
morally superior option of preserving the right to life.2 He did not wish to contribute towards 
the destruction of life through murder for ‘the very act of spilling blood, even if for justifiable 
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reasons, destroys the life created by God and, in fact, disassembles and subverts the very logic 
of creation’.3  
Murder, a significant violation of the right to life, is viewed as a great sin in the sharīʿa.4 The 
magnitude of such a crime is described in both the Qurʾān and sunna: 
And do not kill the soul which Allah has forbidden, except by right. And whoever 
is killed unjustly - We have given his heir authority, but let him not exceed limits 
in [the matter of] taking life. Indeed, he has been supported [by the law].5 
And those who do not invoke with Allah another deity or kill the soul which Allah 
has forbidden [to be killed], except by right, and do not commit unlawful sexual 
intercourse. And whoever should do that will meet a penalty.6 
And do not kill the soul which Allah has forbidden [to be killed] except by [legal] 
right. This has He instructed you that you may use reason.7 
Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul 
unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind 
entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely. And 
our messengers had certainly come to them with clear proofs. Then indeed many 
of them, [even] after that, throughout the land, were transgressors.8 
There are also numerous ḥadīths which emphasise the sanctity of life and its value in Islam.9 
In one ḥadīth it is narrated that the Prophet said there are three types of people who are most 
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hated by God: ‘Whoever kills another in the sacred area of ḥaram (sanctuary), whoever kills 
anyone other than the one who killed him, or whoever kills anyone in revenge as in times of 
jāhiliyya (pre-Islamic times)’.10  
Early Muslim jurists acknowledged that human beings are granted universal rights by default, 
simply by virtue of being a human being, the most important being the right to life. Al-Sarakhsī 
wrote:  
As Allah the Exalted created man to carry His trusts, He honoured him with 
intellect and sacred inviolability in order to be responsible for the duties and rights 
of Allah placed upon him. Then He granted man sanctity, freedom, and ownership 
rights to continue upholding His trusts. Hence, this freedom, sanctity, and 
ownership rights are granted to a person from the time of birth. The one capable of 
discernment and the one who is not are both equal in this regard. Likewise, sacred 
inviolability is established at birth whether he is of sound mind or not.11 
Nonetheless, the right to life in Islam is not absolute. This is demonstrated in the Qurʾānic 
verses and ḥadīths which prohibit killing ‘except by right’. The introduction of qiṣāṣ laws in 
Islam qualified what is meant by this ‘right’ and the circumstances which warrant such a 
penalty. 
6.3 Qiṣāṣ: A Historical Background 
Qiṣāṣ is derived from the verb ‘qaṣṣa’ which means ‘to cut’ or ‘to follow a track in pursuit’ 
and is defined as retaliation by killing for killing or injuries for injuries (al-qatl bi-l-qatl aw al-
jurḥ bi-l-jurḥ). It has also been given the meaning of ‘qawad’ which means ‘to drive’ or ‘to 
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lead’.12 Safia Safwat argues that to define qiṣāṣ as retaliation is incorrect as it has a wider 
meaning in English, ‘equivalent to almost returning evil for evil and would more fitly apply to 
blood-feuds’.13 Rather qiṣāṣ deals with making the punishment equal or appropriate to the 
crime and should therefore be translated as ‘just retribution’.14 Similarly, Mohammad Habash 
remarks that the word retribution is not synonymous with execution rather, ‘execution is the 
abolition of life, but retribution means to seeking [sic] justice and clarification, equality and 
compensation’.15 Using this as a starting point to understand qiṣāṣ laws will help develop a 
more enlightened reading on the right to life in Islam. 
The origins of qiṣāṣ law date back to pre-Islamic Arabia where tribal feuding and vengeance 
(tha’r)16 was rife and unrestricted in its scope. Trivial reasons such as an insulting word or 
killing an animal would result in blood feuds between tribes and sometimes last for several 
years. An example of this was the notorious Basūs war (ḥarb al-Basūs), a forty-year war (494-
534 CE) between the tribes of Banū Bakr and Banū Taghlīb over the killing of a female camel.17  
The Arab tribesmen believed that the soul of the victim who was not avenged became a hāma, 
a small night-bird, which would stand on his grave exclaiming: ‘quench my thirst, quench my 
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thirst with the blood of my murderer!’ (isqūnī, isqūnī min dam qātilī). When the victim was 
avenged, it would fly away.18 
Under these tribal customs, the death of a killer did not appease the victim’s tribe because they 
considered him to be socially inferior. The victim’s family would seek revenge not only against 
the perpetrator but also from his family and/or tribe members thus perpetuating a malicious 
cycle of revenge and hostility. Afraid of bringing dishonour to the tribe, they would abstain 
from women, wine, meat, and refuse to wash or change their clothes until they sought 
revenge.19 Qiṣāṣ laws were introduced to reform such practices. 
The Qurʾān introduced these reforms in the following verses: 
O you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered 
- the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. But 
whoever overlooks from his brother anything, then there should be a suitable 
follow-up and payment to him with good conduct. This is an alleviation from your 
Lord and a mercy. But whoever transgresses after that will have a painful 
punishment.20  
And there is for you in legal retribution [saving of] life, O you [people] of 
understanding, that you may become righteous.21   
                                                          
18 Abū ʿUthmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān (ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn ed, 2nd edn, Cairo: 
Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī 1385/1965) 2:298; Muḥammad b. Mūsā al-Damīrī, Ḥayāt al-Ḥayawān al-Kubrā (2nd 
edn, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1424/2003) 2:509-11. 
19 See Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyāsa al-Sharʿiyya fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rāʿī wa al-Raʿiyya (ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʿImrān ed, 
Jeddah: Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid 1429/2008) 198; Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Abī al-Karam Muḥammad (Ibn al-Athīr), 
al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1407/1987) 1:391ff.; al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 7:22; Abū al-
Faḍl Shihāb al-Dīn al-Sayyid Maḥmūd al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Maʿānī fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-ʿAẓīm wa al-Sabʿa al-
Mathānī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī n.d) 2:51-52; Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām 
al-Qur’ān (ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī ed, Beirut: Muʾassasa al-Risāla 1427/2006) 3:64-65, 89; al-
Ṭabarī 2:60; 15:57; Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallah (Ibn al-ʿArabī), Ahkām al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmiyya n.d) 1:89; Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq al-
Qamaḥāwī ed, Beirut: Dār Iḥyā Turāth al-ʿArabī 1412/1992) 1:164ff; al-Rahaybānī, Maṭālib Ulī al-Nuhā, 6:43. 
20 Qurʾān 2:178. 
21 Qurʾān 2:179. 
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And never is it for a believer to kill a believer except by mistake. And whoever 
kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave and a 
compensation payment presented to the deceased's family [is required] unless they 
give [up their right as] charity. But if the deceased was from a people at war with 
you and he was a believer - then [only] the freeing of a believing slave; and if he 
was from a people with whom you have a treaty - then a compensation payment 
presented to his family and the freeing of a believing slave. And whoever does not 
find [one or cannot afford to buy one] - then [instead], a fast for two months 
consecutively, [seeking] acceptance of repentance from Allah . And Allah is ever 
Knowing and Wise.22  
And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a 
nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But 
whoever gives [up his right as] charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever 
does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the 
wrongdoers.23  
Early classical exegetes such as al-Ṭabarī24 (d. 310/923), al-Thaʿlabī25 (d. 427/1035), 
Nisaburī26 (d. 728/1328), Gharnatī27 (d. 745/1344) and Ibn ʿAtiyya28 (d. 541/1147) interpreted 
verse 2:179 (‘and there is [saving of] life for you in qiṣāṣ’) as a response to the tribal culture 
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of revenge in pre-Islamic Arabia.29 Al-Ṭabarī explained that verse 2:179 refers to the 
preservation of life for others because only the killer should be held to account. Hence innocent 
family and/or tribe members would be saved from death.30  
It is reported in a ḥadīth that the Prophet said: 
The most hated persons to Allah are three: (1) A person who deviates from the right 
conduct, i.e., an evil doer, in the Haram (sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina); (2) a 
person who seeks that the traditions of the Pre-lslamic Period should remain in 
Islam (3) and a person who seeks to shed somebody's blood without any right.31  
Ibn Ḥajar has explained that what is meant by the second type of person is the one who has a 
right against a person (i.e. to seek retribution) but takes it from another.32 
El Fadl adopts an evolutionary interpretive approach toward qiṣāṣ laws by arguing that it was:  
part of an evolutionary process towards a greater fulfilment of divinity and justice. 
Furthermore, there is an aspirational element to the law – under certain conditions 
talion might be a necessary step in the development of moral law. It was a step 
towards weaning human beings away from strongly ingrained practices of 
classicism and inequality, but the moral hope is to take further steps towards 
forgiveness, or towards supernal moral behaviour as exhibited by Abel towards 
Cain.33 
6.4 Qiṣāṣ for Homicide  
                                                          
29 Michael Mumisa, Sharia Law and the Death Penalty (London: Penal Reform International 2015) 12. 
30 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān, 3:120-23. 
31 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 6882; Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, 1:165. 
32 Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 12:219-20; al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, 15:69.  




Qiṣāṣ deals with instances concerning bodily harm and homicide. Of these crimes, it is 
homicide that is tied to the death penalty.34 The crime of homicide has been classified into 
various subdivisions which differ from one school to another. The largest number of 
classifications are attributed to the Ḥanafī school which recognises five types. They are: 1) 
intentional homicide (qatl al-ʿamd); 2) quasi-intentional homicide (shibh al-ʿamd); 3) 
accidental homicide (khaṭaʾ); 4) equivalent to accidental (jari majra-l- khaṭaʾ); 5) indirect (bi-
sabab).35 The Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools acknowledge only three types of homicide: 
intentional, quasi-intentional, and accidental36 whilst the Mālikī school disposes of the 
intermediate category and only recognises homicide as either intentional or accidental.37  
There are varying degrees of criminal intent which will give rise to different legal effects. It is 
only the first type of homicide, intentional, which results in qiṣāṣ whilst the others result in 
payment of blood-money (diya). Intentional homicide consists of three elements: (1) the 
offence must be committed against a living person; (2) the homicide is a result of the offender’s 
act; and (3) the offender intends to take the life of the victim.38 
Killing an animal or attacking a person who is already dead (even if the killer is unaware) will 
not be treated as intentional homicide. The action of the killer must be one that generally causes 
death. However, ‘since the weapons and means of homicide substantially vary in their 
effectiveness of killing as well as on their impact on the human body, the jurists have laid down 
                                                          
34 See Qurʾān 2:178. 
35 See Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Ḥāshiyah Radd al-Muḥtār, 5:339; Ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 10:220; al-Mūṣilī, al-
Ikhtiyār, 5:22-23; Ibn Najīm, al-Baḥr al-Rāʾiq, 9:5. 
36 Ramlī, Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī 1967) 7:239; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, 4:6; 
al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 7:14; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī 11:444-45; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 5:504-505; al-
Rahaybānī, Maṭālib Ulī al-Nuhā, 6:5. 
37 Ibn Rushd al-Qurṭubī, Bidāya al-Mujtahid, 928; al-Zurqānī, Sharḥ al-Zurqānī, 8:6; Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-
Ṣāwī, al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr alā Aqrab al-Masālik ilā Madhhab al-Imām Mālik (Muṣṭafā Kamāl Waṣfī ed, Cairo: 
Dār al-Maʿārif n.d) 4:327. 
38 ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAwdah, al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī: Muqāranā bi-l-Qānūn al-Waḍʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-




different injunctions and conditions in consideration of the nature and effects of such means 
and weapons’.39 
Jurists acknowledge that ascertaining the accused’s state of mind (mens rea) is a highly 
subjective and difficult endeavour hence they adopt an external criterion to determine whether 
the homicide is intended. This is dependent on the weapons or means employed to carry out 
the crime. Abū Ḥanīfa argues that just as the penalty for intentional murder is severe to the 
highest degree (death), the criminal intent in such a case must also be to the highest degree 
(absolute). In other words, the intention must be unconditional and free from any doubt.40 
Based on this rationale, if the killer uses a sharp weapon which cuts or pierces the body it would 
be classified as intentional homicide thus judging intention by the overt act. According to Abū 
Ḥanīfa, the word ‘ʿamd’ signifies ‘qaṣd’ which means intention. Intention is an action of the 
heart and cannot be ascertained except by external evidence which, in this context, is using a 
tool that results in killing (huwa mubāshara al-ʾāla al-mawjūba li-l-qatl ādatan).41  
Therefore, if the murder is committed with a deadly weapon which is made for the purpose of 
killing, the homicidal intent is clear as the instrument used is clearly indicative of the 
murderer’s intention. For example, a sword, knife, spear, gun, or anything that penetrates the 
body such as fire or glass.42 Killing by all other weapons or means which may generally kill 
but do not wound or penetrate (such as a blunt instrument like a stone or a stick, drowning, 
physical assault etc) would be classified as quasi-intentional hence, according to Abū Ḥanīfa, 
many forms of wilful manslaughter could not be subject to the death penalty.43 
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Imam Shāfiʿī and Aḥmad, however, stipulate that the instrument for murder should be one that 
usually causes death, whilst Imam Mālik also looks at the circumstances surrounding the 
murder if death is caused by an instrument or act that is generally not fatal.44 According to 
these three schools, killing by way of a sharp or blunt instrument, asphyxiation,45 drowning,46 
burning,47 confinement and starvation,48 and sorcery49 are all forms of intentional homicide 
and would therefore be liable to qiṣāṣ. 
6.5 The Right of Qiṣāṣ 
Retaliation for intentional homicide (death penalty) is regarded as the right of the victim’s heirs 
(walī al-dam, pl. awliyāʾ al-dam). Qiṣāṣ can only be carried out if all the heirs demand it 
otherwise it is waived even if one of them chooses to remit the penalty.50 According to Imām 
Abū Ḥanīfa, if the guardian or heir of the victim is unknown, qiṣāṣ is inhibited because it is 
only obligatory when the victim’s heir demands it to be enforced. Since qiṣāṣ cannot be 
exercised on behalf of an unknown person, the question of its enforcement does not arise at 
all.51 
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Minhāj 1426/2005) 468; ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Sharwānī, Aḥmad b. Qāsim al-ʿAbbādi and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar al-
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Sharḥ al-Kabīr, 9:320; al-Ḥajjāwī, al-Iqna’, 4:163; ʿAwdah, al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī, 2:26-28.  
45 al-Mūṣilī, al-Ikhtiyār, 5:29; al-Dusūqī, Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī, 4:242; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, 4:59; Ibn 
Qudāma, al-Mughnī 11:449-50; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 5:508; al-Mirdāwī, al-Inṣāf, 9:439; al-Rahaybānī, 
Maṭālib Ulī al-Nuhā, 6:9. 
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All schools, except the Mālikī, hold that the victim’s heirs for qiṣāṣ are all those who inherit a 
share in the victim’s property whether they are male or female, adult or minor. Even those heirs 
who may be deprived of inheriting due to the victim’s debts taking precedence would be 
entitled to qiṣāṣ.52 Adopting a wider definition of which family members have the right of qiṣāṣ 
would make it more improbable for all relatives to reach unanimity in comparison to the Mālikī 
school. 
The Mālikī school considers retaliation as a right exclusive to the victim’s closest adult male 
agnatic relatives. This follows the same rules governing inheritance of the agnatic relations 
(aṣaba bi-l-nafs) in the Islamic law of succession. There are four main classes: (a) descendants; 
(b) ascendants; (c) brothers and sons of brothers; (d) paternal uncles. Thus, hierarchy of classes, 
closeness of relations, and strength of blood-ties will exclude some relatives. Relatives of a 
higher class exclude those of a lower (e.g. a father excludes a brother) and within each class, 
the closer relatives exclude the more remote ones (e.g. a father excludes the grandfather). 
Similarly, a germane brother will take precedence over a consanguine brother.53  
Females will only be considered if three conditions are met: (1) she is an heir of the victim, e.g. 
sister or daughter; (2) no male heir is present otherwise he must have a more remote relation to 
the victim, e.g. a daughter will have the right of qiṣāṣ in the presence of a paternal uncle; (3) 
the female heir is such that had she been a male, she would have been from the male agnatic 
heirs, e.g. a daughter or germane sister.54  
6.5.1 A Joint or Exclusive Right? 
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If there is a single heir of the victim, then he/she has the exclusive right to qiṣāṣ. Where there 
are two or more heirs present, two juristic opinions arise. Imām Abu Ḥanīfa and Imām Mālik 
maintain that the right of qiṣāṣ is exclusive to each heir in its totality; it is not a divisible right 
and therefore cannot be shared between claimants.55 Imām Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, Abū Yūsuf, and 
Shaybānī hold that the right to qiṣāṣ is shared amongst the heirs. Since the victim is subjected 
to the crime, the right of qiṣāṣ is his but death incapacitates him from exercising this right. 
Consequently, his heirs will take over the responsibility and so the right to qiṣāṣ will be shared 
between them all.56 
The difference between these diverging views becomes apparent when there is a minor and/or 
insane amongst the heirs. According to the first view, execution will not be delayed until the 
minor reaches puberty, or the insane recovers from his insanity, and the adult heir(s) will be 
entitled to qiṣāṣ on the basis of exclusive and independent power.57 On the other hand, the 
second view means that the adult heir(s) will have to wait for the minor to reach puberty, or 
insane to recover, as it is a joint right and therefore cannot be exercised without the consent of 
the other party.58  
All jurists endorse the principle that an absentee heir will be waited for. Qiṣāṣ cannot be 
executed until their return due to the possibility of remission. It is possible that the absent 
heir(s) may have pardoned the killer without informing those who are present thus annulling 
the right to qiṣāṣ. The Ḥanafī jurists, however, do not consider the possibility of remission by 
                                                          
55 al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, 10:270; Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Ḥāshiyah Radd al-Muḥtār 5:364; al-Dardīr, al-Sharḥ al-
Kabīr, 4:227; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 11:576. 
56 al-Shīrāzī, al-Muhadhdhab, 5:53; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 11:576. 
57 al-Ṣāwī, al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr, 4:360. There is also another opinion amongst the Ḥanbalīs which, although not 
their substantive position, allows the sensible and adult heirs to execute qiṣāṣ without waiting for the puberty or 
the recovery of the insane person. See Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 11:576. 
58 al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, 10:271; al-Zaylaʿī, Tabyīn al-Haqāʾiq, 6:109; al-Zurqānī, Sharḥ al-Zurqānī, 8:36; 
al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, 4:53-54; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 11:576; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, 5:533; 





a child or insane person as they lack the qualification to do so.59 The preferred opinion 
according to the Mālikīs is that the absent person who is not far away will be awaited and the 
one who is at a great distance will not be waited for. Another opinion is that no differentiation 
is made based on distance.60 
6.6 Limits of Qiṣāṣ 
There are a number of factors that will impede the imposition of qiṣāṣ and preserve the right to 
life. These are explained below.  
6.6.1 Minors and those Suffering from Insanity 
If a minor or insane commits intentional homicide, they are exempt from qiṣāṣ.61 However, 
their ʿāqila (family) will have to pay diya to the victim’s heirs. ʿĀqila is an institution created 
in Islamic law to assist in compensating victims and preventing conflicts. Scholars agree that 
it consists of the offender’s family members but there is a difference of opinion on which 
members these may be.62 The word ʿāqila is derived from ʿaql which can mean ‘to bind’ or ‘to 
protect and defend’. After payment of diya, the victim’s heir is restrained (corresponding to the 
first meaning) and if the second meaning is taken, it refers to the family protecting its individual 
guilty of homicide, against qiṣāṣ, through payment of diya.63  
6.6.2 Pregnancy 
A pregnant woman cannot be executed until she gives birth and completes weaning of her 
child. This is because qiṣāṣ does not prejudice anyone other than the offender. Executing a 
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pregnant woman is considered an excess in killing due to the presence of another life (the 
unborn child) and the burden of one person cannot be shouldered by another.64 The Qurʾānic 
verse 17:33 clearly states: ‘do not commit excess in killing’ (fa-lā yusrif fī-l-qatl).  
Furthermore there is a ḥadīth which states that if a pregnant woman kills a person, she shall 
not be subjected to qiṣāṣ until she gives birth and tends to her child.65 Execution is to be delayed 
until weaning is complete otherwise the child may suffer harm. The incident of the Ghāmidiyya 
woman demonstrates this principle at work. The Prophet delayed the woman’s execution until 
she had given birth and when she came to him again, he turned her away until she completed 
weaning of her child.66 
6.6.3 Relationship Between the Killer and Victim 
The relationship between the killer and his victim can also act as a bar to qiṣāṣ. For example, 
a father cannot be executed for killing his child. This is according to all schools except the 
Mālikī. It is based on the ḥadīths ‘the father will not be subjected to qiṣāṣ for the killing of the 
son’ (lā yuqādu-l-wālidu bi-l-waladi) and ‘you and your belongings are property of your father’ 
(anta wa mālika li-abīka). The former ḥadīth contains an explicit prohibition whilst the latter, 
although ambiguous, involves doubt hence invalidating the punishment based on the principle 
of ‘drop ḥudūd in cases of doubt’. Doubt arises here as this ‘ownership’, though it is not legal 
ownership per se, indicates that the father killing the son is not the same as him killing another 
person.67 The three Imāms agree that the words ‘father’ and ‘son’ encompass all those 
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individuals from their ascendants and descendants. Hence the word ‘father’ also applies to the 
paternal grandfather, the maternal grandfather and so on. Similarly, ‘son’ also applies to the 
grandson, great grandson and so on.68 
This exception of qiṣāṣ also applies to the mother as the injunction in the ḥadīth uses the word 
wālid which encompasses both the mother and father; therefore, the mother is equally included 
with the father in the judgment. Moreover, as she is accorded a higher honour than the father, 
she is more deserving than him in being exempt from qiṣāṣ. Like the grandfather, the principle 
is also extended to the paternal and maternal grandmothers.69 Imām Mālik, on the other hand, 
argues that the father will be liable for qiṣāṣ if he wilfully kills his son. He will only be exempt 
in the case of inadvertent homicide, such as by way of chastisement.70 
If the child of the perpetrator is also amongst the victim’s heirs, qiṣāṣ will not take place due 
to conflict of interest. For example, a husband killing his wife cannot be sentenced to death if 
they have children as the children are amongst the heirs of the mother.71  
6.6.4 Significance of the Victim’s Religion 
Imām Mālik and Shāfiʿī hold that a Muslim is not liable to qiṣāṣ for the murder of a non-
Muslim because a condition for qiṣāṣ is equality and ‘since disbelief is a deficiency, equality 
ceases to be valid in the presence of disbelief and thus qiṣāṣ is inhibited’.72 They cite the ḥadīth 
which mentions that the lives of Muslims are equal and a believer is not killed in retaliation for 
the murder of a disbeliever.73 
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Conversely, Imām Abu Ḥanīfa does not differentiate between punishments on the basis of 
religion. All the injections of qiṣāṣ laid down in the Qurʾān are of a general nature (ʿāmm) and 
do not discriminate between the victims. Hence there is no clear proof for such a claim of 
specification.74 
6.7 Annulment of Qiṣāṣ 
Qiṣāṣ can be annulled due to 3 reasons: (1) lapse of the object of qiṣāṣ (fawāt maḥal al-qiṣāṣ); 
(2) remission (by diya or ʿafw); (3) reconciliation (ṣulḥ). 
6.7.1 Lapse of the Object of Qiṣāṣ (fawāt maḥal al-qiṣāṣ) 
The purpose of qiṣāṣ is seeking retaliation i.e. the life of the offender. If the offender dies then 
the purpose is non-existent, and the punishment is invalidated. Although the heirs lose their 
right to qiṣāṣ, Imām Shāfiʿī and Aḥmad maintain that they are still entitled to blood money 
from the killer’s property because diya is obligatory if qiṣāṣ does not apply. If it is impossible 
to enforce one punishment on grounds of death of the offender, the other punishment will 
become necessary. Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik hold that the heirs cannot seek blood-money 
from the killer’s estate because diya depends on the consent of the killer to pay it.75 
6.7.2 Remission (diya or ʿafw) 
An alternative to the retaliatory principle is remission of qiṣāṣ. This can be done in lieu of 
compensation or without compensation. Compensation entails the payment of blood money 
(diya) and without compensation is a complete pardon (ʿafw). Jurists agree that remission is 
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better than exercising qiṣāṣ based on the Qurʾānic verses 2:178 and 5:45 and the practice of the 
Prophet.76  
Although remission of qiṣāṣ is a laudable action, the main juristic difference here concerns 
whether foregoing qiṣāṣ in lieu of diya is considered as remission or reconciliation. According 
to Imām Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik, the heirs only have two options, the right to demand qiṣāṣ or 
a complete pardon (ʿafw). Foregoing qiṣāṣ in lieu of diya is therefore classed as reconciliation 
(ṣulḥ) because consent of the offender is essential for payment of diya and agreement of both 
parties is viewed as a compromise.77  
Imām Shāfiʿī and Aḥmad, on the other hand, hold that the heirs only have the option to choose 
between exercising qiṣāṣ or accepting diya. This means diya automatically becomes mandatory 
as a result of foregoing qiṣāṣ and so consent of the offender is not required. They treat diya as 
remission and invalidation of qiṣāṣ in absolute terms.78 
6.7.2.1 Right of Remission 
Qiṣāṣ can only be remitted by the person who enjoys such a right as a right can only be 
invalidated by the one to whom it belongs. It thus follows that if a minor has the right of qiṣāṣ, 
his father or grandfather cannot forfeit it because the right belongs to the minor and their 
guardianship is restricted only to the child’s interest. This is the opinion of Imām Abū Ḥanīfa 
and Mālik whilst Imām Shāfiʿī and Aḥmad hold that the father, grandfather, or sovereign can 
forfeit qiṣāṣ in lieu of compensation.79  
According to Imām Mālik, the right of remission follows the (Mālikī) principle that only male 
agnatic relatives have the right of qiṣāṣ. If all the heirs entitled to seek qiṣāṣ are males of equal 
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rank, then each of them possesses the right of remission. If one of them has a greater right of 
inheritance, then only he will be entitled to remit qiṣāṣ. The same principle will apply if the 
heirs happen to be female. For example, in the presence of a daughter and sister, the former 
will possess the right in question. If there are only females of equal ranks, remission will be 
effective once the authorities endorse it. If male and female heirs are of equal ranks, or if the 
male heirs enjoy a greater share of inheritance, the females will be exempt from the right of 
remission.80  
6.7.3 Reconciliation (ṣulḥ) 
There is no difference of opinion amongst jurists regarding reconciliation as annulment of 
qiṣāṣ. Reconciliation may take effect in lieu of diya or more or less than diya. It is similar to 
an out of court settlement.81  
ʿUmar b. Shuʿayb narrates that the Prophet said: ‘Whoever commits homicide, he is to be 
handed over to the heirs of the victim, and if they wish they will kill the offender and if they 
wish they may take diya, thirty hiqqa, thirty jadhʿa, forty khalfa (different types of camels). It 
will be right for them on whichever alternative they come to a compromise upon’.82 
Reconciliation is mentioned in the Qurʾān thirteen times. People are encouraged to resolve their 
disputes, from spousal problems through to bloody wars, by adopting a conciliatory approach. 
Using this general guidance and examples of the past, ‘Islamic jurisprudence has thoroughly 
elaborated on the question of conciliation between offenders and victims to settle criminal cases 
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for the purpose of restoring peace and love’.83 Al-Nasafī explains that the objective here is to 
end conflict and friction, viewing it as ‘closing the eye i.e. easement and forgiveness’.84 
Al-Sarakhsī elaborates that if the victim has no family, the government acting as the legal heir 
should accept conciliation by providing money from the treasury (bayt al-māl). In such 
circumstances the offender would escape capital punishment and al-Sarakhsī states that 
‘conciliation by getting money is more useful for the community than execution’.85 It is 
interesting to note that at every stage, jurists are emphasising the alternative to capital 
punishment and seemingly reluctant to impose it.   
There is also consensus amongst scholars that the conciliatory role can be delegated to another 
person on behalf of the victim. Mutaz Qafisheh believes that ‘such possibility opens the door 
for indirect contacts between offenders and victims and their families, especially in the cases 
in which direct interaction between rival parties poses an emotional difficult. This way can be 
viewed as a form of systematic mediation upon parties’ request’.86 
According to al-Kasānī, Islam introduced compensation and conciliation by striking a balance 
between Judaism and Christianity. In the Torah, the only punishment for murder is talion: an 
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.87 In the New Testament, the only choice for the victim 
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is forgiveness.88 Islam balanced the two approaches by urging victims to accept a third option 
which stands in the middle between systematic retaliation and pardon.89 
6.8 Alternative Actions 
6.8.1 Diya 
Diya, often known as ‘blood money’, is a form of financial compensation paid to the victim or 
victim’s heirs for injury or death caused by a serious offence against the person. It provides the 
offender relief from the administration of quantitative retribution.90  
Originating as a pre-Islamic tribal custom, diya was used as a peaceful alternative to tribal 
feuds that were characteristic of Arabian society at the time. The obligation to pay diya was on 
the paternal relatives of the murderer and payment was due to the victim’s heirs, failure of 
which entitled the heirs to vengeance. Diya was integrated into Islam to prevent inter-tribal 
warfare and unify various tribes.91  
The option of diya as an alternative to qiṣāṣ is stipulated in the Qurʾān, under verse 4:92, and 
it has been compared to ‘a settlement in a wrongful death tort action, precluding the aggrieved 
party from fully enforcing their civil right in court’.92 Daniel Pascoe argues that although it has 
similar features to clemency and pardon as understood in secular common law legal systems, 
the practice of diya constitutes elements of both civil and criminal law and should therefore be 
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viewed as a sui generis institution of Islamic law.93 It appears to operate at the intersection of 
civil law which resolves disputes between individuals (through the payment of money) and 
criminal law which resolves offences against the state (through the collective imposition of 
punishment). This involves substituting the criminal sentence of death with another corrective 
measure aimed at upholding social order i.e. a fine.94 M. Cherif Bassiouni maintains that diya 
‘embodies a concept of collective responsibility’95 as it involves multiple parties i.e. the 
offender, the victim or the victim’s family, and the state. 
6.8.1.1 Amount of diya 
The amount of diya set under classical doctrine is the value of a hundred camels for a free 
Muslim male. This is based on the ḥadīth, ‘there are hundred camels for [the killing of] a 
soul’.96 
All jurists agree that the basic form of diya is camels, but the difference arises in payment other 
than camels. Imām Abu Ḥanīfa and Mālik maintain that diya can be paid in camels, gold, and 
silver. This is because during his lifetime, the Prophet prescribed ‘a thousand dinars for people 
of gold and 12,000 dirhams for people of silver’.97 According to Imām Aḥmad, Abū Yūsuf, 
and Muḥammad, diya can be paid in six kinds: camel, gold, silver, cow, goat, and suits of 
clothes. This is based on the practice of ʿUmar when he became the caliph. He held that camels 
had become expensive and fixed the value of diya for those who possessed gold at 1000 dinars, 
those who possessed silver at 12000 dirhams, those who possessed cattle at 200 cows, those 
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who possessed sheep at 2000 sheep, and those who possessed suits of clothing at 20 suits.98 
The raison d’etre behind ʿUmar’s legislation was based on the availability and accessibility of 
commodities.99 Imām Shāfiʿī’s old opinion matched that of Imām Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik but 
he later recanted and argued that diya is to be paid in the form of camels only.100  
The practice of assessing diya today varies across jurisdictions. According to Pascoe:  
Given the vast geographical spread of these societies, and their respective political 
and economic conditions and cultural norms, the modern law of diya is complex. 
The modern law of diya also results from the interplay between tribal traditions, 
classical Islamic jurisprudence, and the colonial influences evident in [such] 
jurisdictions.101 
Some still take the camel as the standard criterion and use its equivalent market price in 
monetary terms to determine the amount of diya such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan.102 As of 
2011, the diya price for a Muslim male in Saudi Arabia was SR400,000 (approx. £75,778) for 
premeditated murder, triple the previous amount due to a sharp rise in the price of camels.103 
In other jurisdictions, the sharīʿa judge can set the diya amount which may vary depending on 
the degree of judicial authority over the price, the extent of damages, the financial position of 
the victim, and the status and resources of the offender.104 Another practice of determining the 
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diya price involves negotiation between the offender and the victim’s heirs, ‘even at the last 
moment before execution’.105 
6.8.1.2 When is Diya Paid? 
With the exception of the Ḥanafī school, all three schools are of the position that diya is to be 
paid immediately and a postponement is only permissible with the consent of the victim’s heirs. 
They argue that since diya is a substitute for qiṣāṣ and qiṣāṣ should be carried out immediately, 
its substitute should also be payable immediately. Imām Abū Ḥanīfa, however, allows delay in 
payment of diya. According to him, diya can be paid in three annual instalments for ‘it is 
enough that diya is proven and is chargeable on the property of the killer’.106 
Pascoe argues that like clemency and pardons in secular common law systems, ‘diya is 
oftentimes arbitrarily granted and legally unimpeachable’.107 The practice of diya can be 
discriminatory and favour the wealthy resulting in the elites ‘paying off’ their crimes whilst the 
poor suffer. However, in certain jurisdictions, after a diya settlement is reached, a discretionary 
sentence (taʿzīr) by way of imprisonment is imposed. Countries such as Saudi, Pakistan, and 
Nigeria have introduced this at varying degrees into their legal systems.108  
Although the right to remit qiṣāṣ in lieu of diya remains with the heirs, the state may still 
encourage such actions. Diya differs from clemency and pardon as the decision to substitute a 
death sentence with a lesser penalty is the prerogative of the victim’s heir(s) rather than the 
executive authority of the state. This ‘private exercise of leniency’ by the victim’s family is a 
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salient feature of diya, particularly in its historical context since diya was implemented before 
the development of a state mechanism to prosecute crimes and maintain public order.109 
However, in modern Islamic legal systems, diya is ‘explicitly authorised and regulated by a 
legislative framework’.110  
6.8.2 The Role of Forgiveness  
In accordance with the Qurʾānic verse 5:45, the third option in homicide cases is to pardon the 
offender. As seen above, diya refers to remission with full compensation, conciliation involves 
remission with partial compensation, and pardon refers to forgiveness without something in 
return, hence it can be called ‘complete forgiveness’. In qiṣāṣ laws, the human instinct for 
punishment competes with the religiously inspired qualities of mercy, compassion, and 
forgiveness.111 Forgiveness is another sharīʿa-prescribed alternative to the sentence of death 
and can serve as a powerful antidote to retributivism. According to Abdelaziz Sachedina: 
The alternative to retributive justice assumes that no peace can result from 
retaliatory measures until forgiveness enters to provide the healing process needed 
to restore human relationships. Forgiveness is a human capacity that makes genuine 
social change possible, it can also affect a just and peaceful political order by 
bringing individuals, families, and groups closer together.112 
The Arabic word ghafara (to forgive), along with all its derivatives, appears 124 times in the 
Qurʾān.113 These references are either attributed to the forgiving character of Allah or to 
humans, encouraging them to forgive.114 The Qurʾān does not enforce a legal requirement to 
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forgive, although ‘there may be a moral imperative to forgive as an imitation of Allah’s mercy 
and justice’.115 
All but one of its 114 chapters begin with a pronouncement of Allah’s endless mercy and 
compassion (bismillah al-raḥmān al-raḥīm).116 An entire sūra is named after the merciful 
quality of Allah (al-Raḥmān) and the subject matter itself, from its beginning to end, highlights 
the manifestations of God’s merciful and forgiving nature.117 
In sura al-Shuʿarāʾ, the believers are described as ‘those who avoid the major sins and 
immoralities, and when they are angry, they forgive’.118 Three verses later it mentions, ‘the 
retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it, but whoever pardons and makes reconciliation 
- his reward is [due] from Allah. Indeed, He does not like wrongdoers’.119 The Qurʾān also 
narrates the story of the first man to be created, Adam, who sought forgiveness from his Lord 
for eating from the forbidden tree. He supplicated, ‘Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves, and 
if You do not forgive us and have mercy upon us, we will surely be among the losers’.120  
Similarly, ḥadīth collections are replete with references to forgiveness, a notable trait of the 
Prophet. Abū Hurayra reports that the Prophet would seek forgiveness from God more than 
seventy times a day.121 He advised people to ‘be merciful to others and you will receive mercy. 
Forgive others and Allah will forgive you’.122 Several notable incidents in Islamic history also 
shed light on the concept of forgiveness in Islam. Biographical accounts of the Prophet’s life 
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that it may not be an independent surah but being part of the previous surah, sura al-Anfāl. See Muḥammad ʿAlī 
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describe how he travelled to the city of Ṭā’if to propagate the religion but was persecuted by 
its residents and injured. He was given the choice to either destroy or forgive the people and 
despite suffering great abuse, he opted for the latter in the hope that future generations would 
follow Islam.123 In Hudaybiyya, a group of eighty people intended to attack the Muslims and 
were apprehended, but the Prophet set them all free. It was on this occasion that verse 48:24 
was revealed.124  
Another prominent example is the conquest of Makkah after which the Prophet pardoned many 
enemies of Islam. He announced: ‘I say to you what Yūsuf (Joseph) said to his brother: There 
is no blame upon you. Go, for you are free!’.125 His mercy even extended to the woman, Hind 
bint ‘Utba, who orchestrated the murder of his uncle Ḥamza. She mutilated his body and is 
infamously known to have chewed his liver. However, when she accepted Islam, the Prophet 
forgave her and also forgave Wahshī, the slave who killed Ḥamza.126 
The virtue of forgiveness can also be demonstrated in medieval Islamic ethics, namely between 
the ninth to twelfth centuries CE. Major works of adab literature (Arabic literature) and akhlāq 
(Islamic ethical discourse) dealt with forgiveness as a laudable virtue.127 Examples include Ibn 
Miskawayh’s (d. 421H/1030) moral treatise Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq128 (Refinement of Character), 
al-Isfahānī’s (d. 502/1109) al-Dharī’a129 (The Path to Virtue), and al-Ghazālī’s magnum opus 
Iḥyā ‘Ulūm al-Dīn130 (Revival of Religious Sciences). 
                                                          
123 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 3231. 
124 al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām, 19:324. 
125 Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society 
1991) 302-303; Al-Tabari, The History of Al-Tabari: The Victory of Islam (Micheal Fishbein tr, New York: 
University of New York Press 1997) 8:182. 
126 Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources, 173, 182, 189. 
127 Russell Powell, ‘Forgiveness in Islamic Ethics and Jurisprudence’ (2011) 4 Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Law 17, 24. 
128 See al-Miskawayh, The Refinement of Character (Tahdīb al-Akhlāq) (Constantine K Zurayk tr, Chicago: Kazi 
Publications 2003). Powell notes that although it does not elaborate much on the context of forgiveness, it does 
list it as a subsidiary virtue of temperance, see ibid. 
129 See al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī, al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyya 1980). 
130 See al-Ghazālī, Iḥya ʿUlūm al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm 2005). 
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Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Akhlāq wa-l-Siyar (Morals and Behaviour), one of his notable works in ethics, 
indicates towards forgiveness reflecting a higher virtue: 
Do not deliver your enemy to an oppressor, and do not oppress him yourself. Treat 
him as you would treat your friend, except for trusting him…The greatest of good 
deeds is to refrain from punishing your enemy and from handing him over to an 
oppressor…Magnanimity consists not of mingling with our enemies but of 
showing mercy to them…A man undergoes many trials during his life, but the 
worst are those inflicted by his fellow men.131  
In terms of Islamic criminal law, the right to forgive has been provided in qiṣāṣ offences 
through the Qurʾān itself, the sunna, and the writings of classical jurists. Manṣūr b. Yūnus al-
Buhūtī (d. 1052/1641) in his influential Islamic legal text, Kashshāf al-Qināʿ, wrote ‘there is 
legal consensus that it is permissible to pardon [the guilty party] in qiṣāṣ cases and that this 
option is better’.132 He cites a report from Anas b. Mālik that whenever a case involving qiṣāṣ 
was brought to the Prophet, he would order the party to forgive.133 
Al-Shawkānī (d. 1249/1834) included a chapter on the merits of forgiveness in qiṣāṣ where he 
mentioned ‘it is narrated on the authority of Abū al-Dardāʾ that he said: “I heard the Prophet 
of God saying: whoever suffers some physical injury and pardons the offender, God will 
elevate him or her a degree higher and erase some of his or her sins”’.134 Ibn Ḥazm emphasises 
that the death penalty is ‘permissible’ in qiṣāṣ, not mandatory. Pardon is the preferable option 
and the preferable should take priority over the permissible.135 
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135 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā 11:125. See also al-Mirdāwī, al-Inṣāf, 10:3. 
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ʿAwdah argues that as qiṣāṣ offences are of a personal nature, they have a greater impact on 
the life of the victim than on collective security and tranquillity. Therefore, the sharīʿa sees no 
danger to public peace by pardoning on the part of the victim or his lawful heir. He explains 
this by comparing homicide to theft. Homicide is committed due to personal motives and if 
one person is wronged, it does not mean that everyone will also fear being wronged whereas 
everybody fears a thief because he knows that the thief does not need the goods of any 
particular person but simply steals goods wherever he can find them.136 Hence punishment of 
the latter is required to protect public order whereas the former is not necessary: 
In allowing the victim, or the victim’s heirs, the right to forgive, the sharīʿa has 
taken a logical position, for punishment is primarily designed to eradicate crime, 
but in most cases punishment does not prevent the occurrence of crime, whereas 
remission can often serve as a deterrent. Pardon occurs only when the parties are 
reconciled, the minds are clear of animosity and the criminal motivation 
diminishes. Thus pardon virtually plays the role of punishment and succeeds in 
achieving the result which punishment fails to achieve.137 
Daniel Philpott argues that forgiveness instantiates justice only if justice extends beyond rights 
or deserved punishment. Such a concept of justice can be found in the Qurʾān where justice 
means ‘righteousness or right relationship understood comprehensively as the entire set of 
obligations of everyone in the community in relationship to one another and to God’.138 Philpott 
lists five ways that forgiveness restores relationships and participates in the justice of 
                                                          
136 ʿAwdah, al-Tashrīʿ al-Jināʾī al-Islāmī, 1:666. 
137 ibid 1:666-67. 
138 Daniel Philpott, ‘The Justice of Forgiveness’ (2013) 41(3) Journal of Religious Ethics 400, 403. See also Majid 
Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (John Hopkins University Press 1984) 3-12; Omar A Rashied, 




reconciliation.139 This does not deny the difficulty of forgiveness, or how the restorations will 
occur to greater or lesser degrees, or the rarity of forgiveness, but it demonstrates how 
forgiveness enacts the justice that restores.140 
Forgiveness is an inherent principle in Islam and nearly all offences against human beings can 
be subject to forgiveness in one shape or another. Using a system based on pardon and 
conciliation could help contribute to defining the question of amnesty in Islamic criminal 
systems worldwide.  
Although mercy and forgiveness are principal elements in Islamic theology, El Fadl rightly 
notes that: 
It is nothing short of tragic that these are not the values that most people associate 
with Islam in the contemporary age. Furthermore, one would be hard pressed to 
claim that modern Muslims have led the world in setting an example in promoting 
systems of justice that are premised on the core values of mercy and compassion. 
This could represent a serious failure in discharging the covenant that binds 
Muslims to God. Furthermore, observing the amount of despotism that exists in the 
Muslim world today, a Muslim cannot help but be concerned that indeed the unjust 
have come to rule the unjust.141 
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El Fadl proposes that the concept of mercy and forgiveness in Islamic discourse is linked to a 
state of genuine perception of others in society. Hence, in the Qurʾān, mercy is linked to human 
beings practising tolerance and patience. One of the constituent elements to build a just society 
and achieve justice is ‘[g]enuine perception that enables persons to understand, appreciate and 
become enriched by the diversity of humanity…[Hence] the divine mandate for a Muslim 
polity is to pursue justice by adhering to the need for mercy’.142 It is argued that the primacy 
of diya and forgiveness in qiṣāṣ must be utilised by Islamic states to counter the application of 
the death penalty.  
6.9 Taʿzīr Crimes  
Taʿzīr is a verbal noun in Arabic corresponding to the verb azara which means to restrain and 
prevent. It also has the meaning of aid and support (azzara) hence it is accordingly categorised 
as one of the asmāʾ al-aḍdād (words that have meanings which are contrary to one another).143 
Both meanings are connected in the sense that to prevent someone from committing an offence 
is to help him.144 It is narrated in al-Bukhārī that the Prophet said, ‘help your brother, whether 
he is an oppressor or he is an oppressed one’. The companions asked, ‘O Messenger of Allah! 
It is all right to help him if he is oppressed, but how should we help him if he is an oppressor?’ 
to which he replied, ‘by preventing him from oppressing others’.145 
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Taʿzīr is therefore aimed at disciplining, reforming, and deterring the offender.146 Jurists have 
defined taʿzīr as a ‘discretionary punishment to be delivered for transgression against God, or 
against an individual for which there is neither fixed punishment nor penance’ (ʿuqūba ghayr 
muqaddara sharʿan, tajibu haqqan lillāh aw li-ʾādmī, fī kulli maʿsiyya laysa fīhā ḥadd wa lā 
kaffāra ghāliban).147 This means that all crimes for which ḥadd, qiṣāṣ, or kaffāra148 are applied 
are automatically excluded. Taʿzīr may be applied as an alternative and/or additional 
punishment in some of these cases but not as the sole punishment.  
6.9.1 Origins 
The word taʿzīr has not been used in the Qurʾān or sunna in the same manner that it is employed 
in Islamic legal writing. However, the Qurʾān has laid down the principles from which taʿzīr 
punishment is deduced.149 The origin of taʿzīr punishment (al-ʾaṣl fī-l-taʿzīr)150 can be found 
in verse 4:34 of the Qurʾān which deals with the treatment of disobedient wives:  
…But those [wives] from whom you fear rebellion - [first] advise them; [then if 
they persist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike them. But if they obey you 
[once more], seek no means against them. Indeed, Allah is ever Exalted and Grand.  
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Although the corrective steps detailed in the verse are to be used consecutively, it allows the 
husband to act under discretion. Some jurists interpret this verse based on analogy (qiyās). The 
husband is considered the head of the household and given the authority to safeguard the 
interests of the family and its members; similarly, the ruler of society and his judges must have 
the ability to safeguard the interests of society when confronted with acts or omissions that fall 
outside the purview of ḥudūd or qiṣāṣ.151  
There are several crimes mentioned in the Qurʾān with no specific punishment stipulated hence 
it is left to the judge to impose the appropriate sentence. An example is verse 4:16: ‘And the 
two [males] who commit it among you, punish them both…’ which according to exegetes refers 
to homosexual relations between men. The command to ‘punish them both’ is delegated to the 
ruler/judge without specifying the type of punishment, its quantity, or the method of 
sentencing.152  
El-Awa presents another verse, 42:40, which he claims is more directly connected to taʿzīr. 
The first part articulates a general principle: ‘the recompense of an evil is a like evil…’. This 
establishes the legal rule that punishment is to be commensurate with the offence committed. 
The ‘equality’ indicates the maximum threshold of the penalty not the minimum due to the 
latter part of the verse which states: ‘but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his 
reward is due from God…’. Hence this verse can be considered as a valid origin of taʿzīr as it 
assumes that the person liable to taʿzīr has acted to the detriment of another individual and/or 
society. Based on the above Qurʾānic verses, El-Awa argues the legal principles of taʿzīr are 
expressed in the Qurʾān either implicitly or explicitly.153  
                                                          
151 El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, 98. 
152 See Chapter 5 for the differing opinions on whether this is taʿzīr or ḥadd. 




Other examples can be found in the sunna where the Prophet deprived a man of his share of 
the war booty due to a misdeed committed against the leader of the army.154 The Prophet also 
enforced the social boycott of three individuals who failed to respond to his call to arms without 
any legitimate reason. The boycott lasted until a verse was revealed absolving them and 
accepting their repentance.155  
Another example from ḥadīth is the theft of fruit. When the value of the stolen fruit is less than 
that which incurs the ḥadd penalty (amputation), the offender is to pay ‘twice its value and be 
punished’.156 The double amount is a fine which can be interpreted as a taʿzīr punishment but 
the kind and type of punishment referred to in the latter part is left to the discretion of the 
judge.157 
Similarly, a fine can be imposed as a taʿzīr punishment for failure to pay zakā as stated in the 
following ḥadīth:  
He who pays zakat with the intention of getting reward will be rewarded. If anyone 
evades zakat, we shall take half the property from him as a due from the dues of 
our Lord, the Exalted. There is no share in it (zakat) of the descendants of 
Muhammad.158 
El-Awa asserts that based on examples from the Qurʾān and sunna it can be said that taʿzīr 
punishments originated from the foundational texts of Islamic law but the development of this 
system of punishment was expressed at a comparatively later date by the different juristic 
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schools.159 It must be noted that Islamic penal law does not specify a definitive penalty for 
every taʿzīr offence and not all taʿzīr crimes are explicitly mandated within the shari’a, for 
example, those Islamic countries which apply the death penalty for drug offences – such as in 
Iran.160  The significance of this in present-day Islamic legislation will be taken up in section 
6.12 where its status as a sharīʿa punishment has been questioned.  
Since taʿzīr punishments are discretionary it is up to the judge to decide which punishment fits 
the crime in question, taking into account the offender’s background and psychological 
condition.161 There are a number of punishments available to the judge ranging from 
admonition to severe penalties. ʿAwdah details the different type of taʿzīr punishments in 
length and asserts that moderation and leniency in such cases are more likely to reform the 
offender.162 Since there is such an emphasis on the corrective and reformative nature of taʿzīr, 
imposing the death penalty in this category of crimes is at odds with these objectives. 
The judge’s authority is restricted by the breadth of punishments that may be imposed. No 
judge can order a punishment that contravenes Islamic law for example, ordering the offender 
to be whipped naked.163 Taʿzīr punishments vary and are broad in scope hence addressing them 
all in sufficient detail is beyond the confines of this research. It is important to note that any 
punishment which fulfils the role of taʿzīr, that is to reform the offender(s) and deter future 
crime is permissible as long as it does not infringe upon the general principles of Islamic law. 
The main taʿzīr punishments as found in the traditional legal texts and practice are illustrated 
below. 
6.10 Types of Taʿzīr Punishments 
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6.10.1 Admonition (al-waʿiẓ) 
Admonition entails reminding the offender of his transgression and this method has been 
enjoined in verse 4:34 of the Qurʾān as the first step in dealing with disobedient wives. It is 
restricted to those offenders whom the court believes will be reformed by such treatment and 
usually applies to minor offences.164 
6.10.2 Censure (al-tawbīkh) 
This can be through ‘any word or act which the judge feels to be sufficient to serve the purpose 
of taʿzīr’.165 The Prophet also used censure as a way to reform the offender. Abū Dharr narrated 
that he argued with a man and insulted his mother to which the Prophet rebuked him saying ‘O 
Abū Dharr, you have called his mother names, there is still pagan ignorance in you’.166 
It has also been reported that the Prophet warned that delaying payment by the one who 
possesses means makes it lawful to dishonour and punish him (layyu-l-wājidi yuhillu ʿirḍahu 
wa ʿuqūbatahu). Ibn al-Mubārak said that ‘dishonour’ means that he may be reprimanded and 
‘punish’ means that he may be imprisoned for it.167 
6.10.3 Warning (al-tahdīd) 
A warning is another preventative measure aimed at reforming and deterring the offender out 
of fear of punishment. For example, the court may threaten the offender with imprisonment or 
any other severe penalty if he repeats the offence.168 This is comparable with the concept of 
suspended sentences in modern legal systems.169 
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A warning can take a variety of forms such as sending a representative of the judiciary to notify 
the offender that the judge has learnt of his/her crime, by giving official notice to cease and 
desist from perpetrating certain crimes, or by summoning the offender to court. Scholars have 
also mentioned that warning may be achieved by talking in a ‘tough’ manner or frowning at 
the offender as the judge sees fit.170  
6.10.4 Boycott (al-hajr) 
The basis of boycott as a taʿzīr punishment can be found in the same verse that deals with 
admonition, 4:34, which permits husbands to admonish disobedient wives and ‘forsake them 
in bed’.171 The Prophet also practised a social boycott of Kaʿb b. Mālik, Murāra b. al-Rabīʿ, 
and Hilāl b. Umayya for not participating in the battle of Tabūk. The community severed all 
social relations with them for fifty days until verse 9:118 was revealed forgiving them.172 The 
Caliph ʿUmar is reported to have imposed a boycott upon a man who used to deliberately 
question difficult words in the Qurʾān in order to confuse people.173 
6.10.5 Public exposure (al-tashhīr) 
This punishment requires the offender’s crime to be publicly disclosed and generally concerns 
cases relating to fraud or fake testimony. During the early stages of Islam, the common method 
adopted was to announce the crime committed at public places. Using al-tashhīr, the Prophet 
punished a tax collector who kept a portion of the money for himself claiming it had been given 
as a gift. The Prophet stood on his pulpit and addressed the public saying: 
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What is wrong with the employee whom we send (to collect zakāt from the public) 
that he returns to say, “This is for you and that is for me.” Why didn’t he stay at his 
father’s and mother’s house to see whether he will be given gifts or not? By Him 
in Whose Hand my life is, whoever takes anything illegally will bring it on the Day 
of Resurrection by carrying it over his neck…174 
Another method was for the authorities to parade the offender around the city informing the 
public that he had committed a crime deserving of a taʿzīr punishment.175 Al-Sarakshī records 
Shurayh, a prominent judge who served under the Caliphs ʿUmar and ʿAlī, affirming that an 
individual guilty of perjury must be publicly identified by taking him to the markets and streets. 
The public must then be informed of his crime and warned against trusting him.176 
As access to information has advanced significantly in today’s age, this would generally be 
done through announcements in the newspaper, television and/or radio broadcasts, or 
publishing court judgements.177  
6.10.6 Fines (al-gharāma) 
Jurists have differed regarding the validity of imposing a financial penalty as a taʿzīr 
punishment. Abū Ḥanīfa, Aḥmad, and the new opinion of Shāfiʿī all declare it an invalid form 
of taʿzīr punishment arguing that financial penalties were only applicable during the beginning 
of Islam and abrogated later on. They also contend that this is an ineffective method of reducing 
crime as corrupt rulers will use it as a tool to extort money from the people.178 
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ʿAwdah acknowledges that the second objection is untenable because, in today’s modern law, 
public finances are generally thought to be in safe hands with the legislative authority 
prescribing the minimum and maximum limits of fine to be imposed and the function of 
awarding punishments has been delegated to the courts.179 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim from the Ḥanbalī school strongly reject the claim of abrogation 
using evidence based on the practice of the Prophet and his companions.180 Ibn Qayyim further 
adds that:  
After the death of the Prophet, the actions of the Khulafāʾ Rāshidūn (rightly guided 
caliphs) and the great companions of the Prophet negate the claim of abrogation 
[of financial penalties]. Those who claim abrogation do not have any evidence from 
the Qurʾān or sunna, nor does ijmāʿ (consensus) support their claim. They can only 
say that our school does not permit it therefore their position is between the 
parameters of acceptability and rejection i.e. in limbo. When this genre of 
evidences has been removed (i.e. Qurʾān and sunna), the only thing left [to rely 
upon] is ijmāʿ which is also wrong because there is no consensus on its abrogation 
and it is impossible that consensus abrogates the sunna. If there is a consensus 
established there would be scriptural evidence which acts as the abrogator.181 
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Abū Yūsuf, Mālik, and some Shāfiʿī jurists hold that fines are a valid punishment. Abū Yūsuf 
permits financial penalty in order to reform the offender. However, the money will not go to 
the public treasury, but the judge will seize it until the offender repents. This is because it is 
not permissible to take the wealth of another without a valid legal reason. Failure to repent 
allows the judge to spend the money on public welfare requirements.182  
Although there are differing views on the validity of financial punishment, it is evident that 
this punishment does form part of the Islamic penal system as there is nothing in the Qurʾān 
and sunna which clearly indicates otherwise. 
6.10.7 Banishment (al-taghrīb)183 
This is resorted to when the offender’s acts are communicable and influence others who may 
commit criminal activity to their own detriment.184 The period of expulsion varies across the 
schools from less than a year (according to some Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs) to any period extending 
a year.185 El-Awa argues that this is not practical in recent times since states do not permit 
convicted criminals to cross their borders. Rather, ‘the only form banishment can take is 
imprisonment’.186 
6.10.8 Imprisonment (al-ḥabs) 
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There are two kinds of imprisonment in Islamic law: limited imprisonment (al-ḥabs muḥaddad) 
and unlimited imprisonment (al-ḥabs ghayr muḥaddad). Under limited imprisonment, the 
minimum term is one day whilst jurists differ over the maximum period.187 
The Shāfiʿī school restricts the maximum term of imprisonment to less than a year based on 
analogy between imprisonment and banishment. They argue that the period fixed for 
banishment in zinā cases is one year and zinā is a ḥudūd offence. Therefore, punishment for a 
non-ḥudūd offence should be less so that it does not turn into a ḥadd.  Other schools reject this 
use of analogy between imprisonment and banishment. They do not fix a maximum prison 
term, instead allowing the judge to determine the period depending on the offence perpetrated 
and the individual concerned.188 
An unlimited term of imprisonment is imposed upon those guilty of heinous crimes and 
habitual offenders who do not desist from their crimes despite undergoing prescribed 
punishment. All schools agree that imprisonment continues until the offender’s death unless he 
repents.189   
6.10.9 Lashing (al-jald) 
The punishment of lashing is a common penalty laid down by Islamic penal law. It already 
constitutes a ḥadd punishment for the crime of zinā by unmarried persons (100 lashes) and the 
crime of qadhf (80 lashes). Jurists have differed over the maximum number of lashes 
permissible in taʿzīr cases.190 This is a lengthy discussion in itself and falls beyond the scope 
of this research.  
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6.11 Death Penalty by Taʿzīr (al-qatl bi-l-taʿzīr) 
Since the emphasis on taʿzīr is on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender, appropriate 
taʿzīr is that which does not violate the right to life otherwise it defeats the purpose for which 
it was created. Nevertheless, all schools have permitted derogation from this rule for what they 
consider as ‘exceptional’ cases but they do not all agree on what circumstances warrant such a 
harsh punishment. 
Imām Mālik and some Ḥanbalī jurists allow the death penalty for treason in opposition to Abū 
Ḥanīfa, Shāfiʿī, and Abū Yaʿlā from the Ḥanbalī madhhab. Propagating heretical doctrines and 
innovations is another death penalty offence according to most Mālikī jurists as well as a group 
of Ḥanbalīs. According to the Ḥanafīs, death penalty as taʿzīr is only warrantable in terms of 
siyāsa i.e. based on public policy.191 Some Ḥanbalīs, particularly Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
Qayyim, as well as some Mālikīs also subscribe to this view. Ibn Taymiyya opines that if the 
only way a person’s corruption can be rectified is by killing them then it is lawful to do so.192 
The Ḥanafīs permit the death penalty for the habitual offender such as the habitual homosexual 
(man takarrar minhu al-liwāṭ) or in homicide cases where the instrument used does not meet 
the criteria for qiṣāṣ (al-qatl bi-l-muthqil). It must be noted that offences for which the Ḥanafīs 
impose the death penalty as siyāsa are considered to be ḥudūd or qiṣāṣ crimes according to the 
other schools. For example, liwāṭ and al-qatl bi-l-muthqil may warrant execution on the basis 
of taʿzīr whereas the other three schools consider the first a ḥudūd offence and the second as a 
qiṣāṣ offence, both which incur the death penalty as punishment.193  
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It is important to note that there are certain ḥadīths that permit the death penalty as a taʿzīr 
punishment, such as in cases of spying for the enemy where the Prophet ordered the offender 
to be executed. However, the death penalty as taʿzīr is an exception to the rule and there are 
only a limited number of cases, as explained above, that warrant such a severe punishment. 
ʿAwdah argues that there are only five taʿzīr offences that can be punished by death and that 
such cases will not be left to the discretion of the judge but determined by the ruler or person 
in authority.194 
Ultimately, taʿzīr is discretionary and the death penalty, although restricted to a few crimes, is 
argued not to be mandatory in such a context. There should be no bar to achieving abolition in 
this category. 
6.11.1 The Judge’s Power of Discretion 
A judge’s discretion in taʿzīr is far more restricted than commonly perceived. Taʿzīr offences 
fall under two main categories: (1) those crimes that are of the same nature as ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ 
crimes but fail to reach the qualifying criteria; (2) those that may simply qualify as 
‘transgressions’.195  
The judge is required to reach a fair taʿzīr sentence by means of conscientious reasoning 
(ijtihād). Hence, he must not deliver penalties based on his personal predilections or turn from 
one punishment to the other in an arbitrary manner as this would be unjust and contrary to 
consensus.196 In response to the claim that a judge has arbitrary power in taʿzīr offences, 
ʿAwdah cogently argues that:  
The texts of the sharia have explained the offences and penalties, the judge’s 
authority is confined to applying the text to the case under consideration. If it 
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applies to the case, he will apply the penalty. The freedom given to the judge is in 
choosing the penalty he considers fit from those stated for the crime. The sharia 
leaves it to the judge, in choosing the penalty, to consider the character of the 
accused, his past record and the effect of the penalty on him and consider also the 
offence and its effect on society. It gives the judge the freedom to apply the 
maximum down to the minimum penalty. He can implement the penalty or suspend 
it.197 
The Qurʾān and sunna determine what is prohibited in Islam therefore the judge must determine 
the appropriate punishment applicable but has no relation to the actual determination of the 
offence since it has already been stipulated by the source texts. There are a number of examples 
but the main taʿzīr offences cited in the Qurʾān include usury (ribā),198 false testimony 
(shahādat al-zūr),199 breach of trust (khiyānat al-amāna),200 insults (sabb),201 and bribery 
(rishwa).202 
Although possible offences have been clearly mentioned in the Qurʾān and sunna, there are 
numerous others that are not explicitly found therein such as drug offences. Here the ruler has 
the power to establish these offences and determine their penalties. This does not contradict 
God’s legislative prerogative as exercised through the Qurʾān and sunna because ‘neither the 
Qurʾān nor the sunna has given, nor is expected to give, detailed laws to control every aspect 
of human life; it is only the general principles that may be found therein’.203 The details are left 
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to the ruler who must ensure that legislation passed does not contradict the principles laid down 
by the primary texts. This governmental authority to pass such laws is translated as siyāsa 
sharʿiyya. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarafī (d. 1285), the great Mālikī scholar, described siyāsa as ‘that 
power entrusted to the government to improve society. Exercises of this power were valid 
insofar as they were undertaken with the purpose of enhancing the community’s welfare and 
did so improve it in fact’.204 Furthermore, the ruler must act in a way that preserves the five 
basic interests in Islamic law: religion, life, lineage, intellect, and property. In other words, it 
must promote maṣlaḥa (public welfare).205  
Of the taʿzīr offences cited above, sabb is of particular relevance since it has been used to 
justify the death penalty which, it is argued, has a questionable basis in Islamic law and neither 
does it promote maṣlaḥa in today’s globalised society. 
6.11.2 Blasphemy (sabb) 
The death penalty for blasphemy rests upon questionable jurisprudential grounds due to the 
differences and ambiguity in the source-texts of Islamic law.206 Blasphemy is generally 
subsumed under two main words in Arabic: sabb (abuse, insult) and shatm (revilement, 
vilification).207 The most common terms used by jurists for blasphemy in Islam are sabb Allah, 
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sabb al-Rasūl (or sabb al-nabī), and sabb al-sahabī. The one who blasphemes is known as a 
sabbāb.208  
Lutz Weiderhold elaborates upon the terminology stating that ‘there are a number of other 
terms that are used less frequently in order to describe acts of blasphemy, such as laʿn (cursing, 
malediction), ṭaʿn (accusing, attacking), īdhāʾ (harming, hurting) or the verb nāla with the 
preposition min (do harm to somebody, defame)’.209 
The verb sabba is only used in the Qurʾān to warn Muslims against blaspheming the deities of 
those who would retaliate by blaspheming against God: 
And do not insult (la tasubbu) those they invoke other than Allah, lest they insult 
Allah in enmity without knowledge. Thus We have made pleasing to every 
community their deeds. Then to their Lord is their return, and He will inform them 
about what they used to do.210 
Verse 33:57, using the word īdha, also states: ‘Indeed, those who abuse Allah and His 
Messenger (yuʾdhūna allāha wa rasūlahu) - Allah has cursed them in this world and the 
Hereafter and prepared for them a humiliating punishment.’ 
It is notable that neither of these verses endorse a worldly punishment and Siraj Khan argues 
that ‘after the Prophet’s demise, the punishment for blasphemy is a cursed existence in this 
world and the hereafter and the promise of a humiliating punishment, all of which are explicitly 
for Allah to carry out and not for any worldly or clerical authority’.211 
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There are a number of ḥadīths which depict the Prophet’s non-violent response to those who 
insulted, defamed, and even physically abused him because of his religion. Instead he chose to 
retaliate with patience and mercy. The Prophet’s wife, ʿĀʾisha, narrates that he would never 
take revenge (over anybody) for his own sake.212  
However, the picture becomes more complicated once fiqh works are taken into consideration 
owing to the breadth of interscholastic disagreement. The two harshest interpretations belong 
to the twelfth-century Mālikī Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ213 and Ibn Taymiyya214 of the Ḥanbalī school who 
endorsed the death penalty for the blasphemer. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the blasphemer of 
the Prophet, Muslim or non-Muslim, has committed a capital ḥadd crime and repentance or 
conversion to Islam does not annul the punishment.215 Despite this, ‘support may be found in 
each of the four Sunni madhāhib for either repentance or the impossibility of repentance’216 for 
the Muslim blasphemer. 
Furthermore, there is no scriptural evidence that mandates this as a ḥadd offence. Instead, it 
has been justified as a subcategory of apostasy (ridda) due to the expression of unbelief by the 
Muslim.217 The rationale behind this is based on the argument that to curse God (or the Prophet) 
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is to blaspheme Him which implicitly signals a departure from the community of Muslims and 
the laws governing them:    
The presumption [is] that a person could not possibly be a Muslim, fitting squarely 
within its systems of laws and confessing to the oneness and supremacy of God, if 
he or she at the same time curse[s] God. The same applie[s] to cursing the Prophet. 
If blasphemy could be so defined with respect to God, then, this reasoning would 
extend to protect any figure that Muslim ‘orthodoxy’ held to have been sent or 
otherwise revered by God.218 
This interpretation ties the offence to the punishment of death. This is because ‘since the 
punishment for apostasy is death (according to some Muslim jurists) the blasphemer, by virtue 
of mere apostasy, deserves the death penalty’.219 However, it must be noted at this juncture that 
there is a more nuanced understanding of apostasy in Islamic law involving military hostility 
against the Muslim polity as opposed to mere disbelief, as detailed in the previous chapter. 
According to Weiderhold, ‘in the relevant chapters of the formative texts of the madhhabs, 
insulting the Prophet or the Ṣaḥābah (companions of the prophet) is not mentioned among the 
punishable acts that constitute riddah or kufr’.220 He cites the absence of any passage that 
equates sabb to ridda in texts such as Mālik’s (d. 179/795) Muwaṭṭā’, nor in Saḥnūn’s (d. 
240/854) Mudawwana, nor in al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 204/820) al-Umm, nor in al-Shaybānī’s (189/805) 
Kitāb al-Aṣl.221  
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The Shāfiʿī jurist al-Muzanī (d. 264/878), in his book al-Mukhtaṣar (a marginal summary on 
Shāfiʿī’s al-ʿUmm), did not mention those who blaspheme against God or the Prophet amongst 
the apostates and therefore it would seem that he did not advocate for the death penalty in such 
a context.222 In contrast, another Shāfiʿī jurist, Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318/930) permitted the death 
penalty against those who blaspheme against the Prophet, citing the consensus of jurists as his 
only source.223 Al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) went one step further and opined that blasphemy 
against any of the prophets is akin to apostasy.224 It therefore seems that punishment for the 
offence was developed later by the jurisprudential schools. Khan observes that:  
Although al-Nawawī fails to mention blasphemers in his chapter on ridda, he does 
make some reference to the act of blasphemy within his definition of ridda. This 
does not seem to be a mistaken omission on the author’s part, but may be a subtle 
attempt to suggest that some forms of blasphemy can constitute apostasy.225 
As for the non-Muslim blasphemer, the picture does not get any clearer. The Shāfiʿī jurist, al- 
Khaṭṭabī (d. 388/998), noted that the authorities ‘differed in the matter when the insulter was a 
non-Muslim’.226 The most lenient in this regard were the Ḥanafīs whose eponym, Abū Ḥanīfa, 
held that non-Muslims who insult the Prophet ‘are not to be killed, because their [overall] 
unbelief is worse’ (lā yuqtalu yaʿnī lladhī hum ʿalayhi min al-shirki aʿẓamu).227 Furthermore, 
non-Muslim blasphemers, by virtue of their blasphemy, do not violate their pact with the 
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Islamic state that they reside in.228 In support of this argument, al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197) 
remarked: 
We argue that blaspheming the Prophet is an expression of unbelief from him [the 
dhimmi] and the unbelief that he has [due to his disbelief in Islam] does not prevent 
his covenant, so this supervening act of disbelief does not remove it. His covenant 
is not dissolved unless he joins the enemy territory, or the enemy overpowers a 
territory and wages war against us.229 
Other Ḥanafī jurists such as al-Taḥāwī (d. 321/933),230 al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1037),231 and Ibn al-
Humām (d. 861/1457)232 also agreed. Therefore, the Ḥanafī school is largely of the opinion 
that if the blasphemer belongs to a protected group (e.g. ahl al-ʿahd (treaty in place); ahl al-
dhimma (non-Muslims under protection of Muslim law); ahl-al kitāb (people of the book)) then 
the person is exempted from the death penalty and the judge is given the discretion to rule on 
an appropriate punishment by way of taʿzīr.  
Al-Bukhārī records the following ḥadīth which further expands upon the issue of blasphemy 
and its status as a non-capital offence: 
A Jew passed by Allah’s Messenger and said, “As-Sāmu ʿAlaika”. Allah’s 
Messenger said in reply, “Wa ʿAlaika”. Allah’s Messenger then said to his 
companions, “Do you know what he (the Jew) has said? He said, As-Sāmu 
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ʿAlaika.” They said, “O Allah’s Messenger! Shall we kill him?” The Prophet said, 
“No. When the people of the Book greet you, say: Wa ʿAlaikum”.233 
In this incident, the Jew, using a play on words, wished death upon the Prophet whilst also 
mocking the Muslim greeting. The Muslim greeting is ‘as-salāmu ʿalaykum’ (peace be upon 
you) whilst ‘as-sām’ means death. The Jewish passerby used the singular form of ‘upon you’ 
(ʿalayka) rather than the commonly used plural form (ʿalaykum), ‘implying not only 
inappropriate familiarity but also specificity’.234  However, the Prophet did not retaliate. 
Commenting on this ḥadīth, Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), a Ḥanafī scholar, observed 
that ‘al-Bukhārī has adopted the opinion of the Kufans, for according to them, whoever insults 
or berates the Prophet and he is a non-Muslim citizen (dhimmī) then he is rebuked (azara) and 
not killed’.235 He also reported that Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), an early jurist and ḥadīth 
scholar, held the same opinion.236 Other Ḥanafī scholars who adopted the same position include 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981),237 al-Qudūrī,238 al-Kāsānī (d. 587/1191),239 al-Manbajī (686/1287),240 
and al-Ḥaddād (d. 1132/1720).241 
An incident often quoted by supporters of the death penalty for blasphemy is when the Prophet 
ordered the execution of certain individuals after the conquest of Makkah, with the case of 
Kaʿb b. Ashraf, a Jewish leader, regularly cited in this regard.242 Kaʿb b. Ashraf was known to 
write satire about the Prophet and would incite the community to take up arms against him.243 
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Ibn Kathir reported that Kaʿb  went to Medina, ‘where he proclaimed his enmity and incited 
people to go to war. He had not left Mecca before he had united them to fight the Messenger 
of God’.244  
Commenting on the story of Kaʿb and other narrations, al-ʿAynī explains that ‘in these 
traditions it is shown that they were not killed merely for their insults. They were only killed 
due to their assistance of the enemy and gathering together for war and supporting it’.245 Ibn 
Ḥajar elaborates that the author (al-Bukhārī) has alluded to Kaʿb being an enemy combatant by 
including the ḥadīth under different chapters such as ‘killing enemy combatants’ (al-fatk bi ahl 
al-ḥarb).246 These narrations are therefore interpreted on the basis of public interest; in other 
words, the individuals in question were executed for sedition and insurrection. This is in line 
with the dominant Ḥanafī opinion that blasphemy is punishable, not as a matter of ḥadd, but as 
a matter of taʿzīr i.e. for reasons owing to public policy (siyāsa) and welfare (maṣlaḥa).247  
The first awareness of sabb as a mandatory capital crime (ḥadd) in the Ḥanafī jurisprudence 
emerged in the works of a fourteenth-century jurist from the Crimea, Ibn al-Bazzāz.248 In his 
commentary on Ḥanafī fiqh, Ibn al-Bazzāz relied upon Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl as 
the authoritative work on blaspheming the Prophet, arguing that ‘[the insulter of the Prophet] 
be killed as a ḥadd without any possibility for repentance’.249 Ibn al-Bazzāz’s opinion enjoyed 
much success in the following years and:  
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created an intellectual framework that would justify the Ottoman persecution of 
Shiʿis and other Muslim schismatics a century later. Soon after al-Bazzāz’s death, 
the Ottoman jurist Mullā Khüsrev (d. 1480) cited his work approvingly for the 
position that the Ḥanafī school calls for both Muslim and non-Muslim insulters of 
the Prophet to be killed and that repentance for the crime is impossible.250 
Two later Ḥanafī scholars, Ḥusām Chelebī (d. 1520) and the aforementioned Ibn ʿĀbidīn (d. 
1836) refuted Ibn al-Bazzāz’s introduction of the draconian blasphemy law into the madhhab 
and attempted to discredit him. Chelebi, an Ottoman judge and professor of Islamic law, 
advanced that ‘the Ḥanafī school had historically been loath to impose the death penalty for 
insulting the Prophet and he identified the source of the contagion as Ibn al-Bazzāz’.251 Ibn 
ʿĀbidīn elaborated upon Chelebi’s argument asserting that the death penalty was not 
mandatory in such a context. He wrote, ‘[o]n the issue [of insulting the Prophet] [Ibn al-Bazzāz] 
approached his sources in the sloppiest possible manner (qad tasāhala ghāyata al-
tasāhhuli)’.252  
Al-Qudūrī’s concept of ‘interpretive doubt’ (shubhat al-khilāf) is of relevance here.253 He 
maintained that the very fact of different juristic opinions as to whether an offence fell under 
the technical definition of a ḥadd crime created doubt about the appropriateness of the penalty 
and ‘automatically required avoidance of the ḥadd punishment, for fear that it would not be 
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authorized by God’.254 Therefore the interpretive plurality apparent in categorising blasphemy 
as a ḥadd or taʿzīr should act as a barrier to the imposition of the death penalty. 
To summarise, Ismail Royer argues that there is no ijmāʿ (consensus) amongst scholars about 
applying this specific punishment to non-Muslims.255 He notes that from the Shāfiʿī school, al-
Nawawī held that some punishment short of death was acceptable but not mandatory whilst 
Ibn Ḥajar argued that insulting the Prophet could be overlooked in the interest of maintaining 
ties with non-Muslims.256 Furthermore, at least one Ḥanbalī scholar, Qāḍī al-Ḥulwānī (d. 
546/1151), held that a non-Muslim blasphemer should not be killed.257 The Yemeni jurist al-
Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834) agreed with Ibn Ḥajar that such insults could be overlooked in the 
interest of harmonious relations.258 
Furthermore, the intent and context of blasphemy laws would be lost in a modern application 
due to being superimposed onto quite different structures of law and governance. According to 
Intisar Rabb, geopolitics have radically shifted from the premodern period to the modern era 
of globalisation:259  
Indeed, the shift in economic power and the type of global interconnectedness and 
geopolitics that left Muslims politically subordinate were key factors that made the 
recent worldwide Danish cartoon controversy possible. These factors also 
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facilitated the international profile and outrage at cases like those of Aasiya Bibi260 
and Lina Joy261.262 
Hence, for most jurists, blasphemy laws articulated in classical Islamic jurisprudence were 
applicable ‘to a Muslim society of earlier times and particular places of shared moral norms 
according to a narrow set of justifications’.263 It is apparent that blasphemy developed from a 
specific socio-political context. It is argued that blasphemy is not a capital crime. It is neither 
a ḥadd or qiṣāṣ crime, rather it is purely taʿzīr and therefore there is a political choice of 
whether or not to categorise such an offence as one that deserves the death penalty.  
6.12 Application of Qiṣāṣ and Taʿzīr Today  
Many Muslim jurisdictions around the world incorporate qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr laws in their legal 
systems albeit to varying degrees as discussed below. 
6.12.1 Nigeria 
In qiṣāṣ cases, instances where the heirs of the victim pardon the offender can still result in 
punishment on the strength of taʿzīr thereby ensuring that offenders do not go scot-free. A case 
in point is the Nigerian Zamfara State Shariah Penal Code of 2005 which contains offences of 
homicide and bodily injuries.264 Section 198 defines intentional homicide as: 
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Except in the circumstances mentioned in section 203, whoever being a mukallaf 
causes the death of a human being by an act: (a) with the intention of causing death 
or such bodily injury as is probable or likely to cause death; or (b) in a state of fight, 
combat, strife or aggression, which is not intrinsically likely or probable to cause 
death; or (c) if the doer of the act knew or had reason to know that death would be 
the probable and not only a likely consequence of the act or of bodily injury which 
the act was intended to cause, commits the offence of intentional homicide (qatl 
al-amd). 
and Section 199 punishes the crime: 
(a) with death; or (b) where the relatives of the victim remit the punishment in (a) 
above, with the payment of diyah; or (c) where the relatives of the victim remit 
the punishment in (a) and (b) above, with caning of one hundred lashes and with 
imprisonment for a term of one year:  
Provided that in cases of intentional homicide by way of ghilah or hirabah, the 
punishment shall be with death only. 
The basic principle of qiṣāṣ is respected in that the heirs can demand retaliation, blood money, 
or issue a pardon. What is more interesting is that the Mālikī school is dominant in Muslim 
Northern Nigeria;265 however, Section 49 of the Zamfara Code provides an open-ended 
definition to who constitutes a legal heir in qiṣāṣ cases. A legal heir ‘include[s] male agnatic 
heirs, daughter, full sisters, paternal aunts and consanguine sisters’. This is a clear departure 
from the Māliki principle which creates a hierarchy in that the right to qiṣāṣ belongs to the 
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closest adult male agnatic relatives in order of priority. Female relatives only have the right to 
seek redress in the absence of such relatives or where the relationship between the female and 
the deceased is closer compared to the male relative.266 Furthermore, the Code does not contain 
any provision which, according to Mālikī fiqh discourse, requires the endorsement of the Head 
of State when a female relative chooses to exercise her right.267 
Musa Usman Abubakar observes that:  
Drafters of the law may have been inspired by the application of the shariah in other 
jurisdictions operating different schools of thought. This is because the Maliki 
School recognises gender-based hierarchisation of a deceased’s heirs, but no 
difference exists in the other Sunni schools…Giving heirs of the deceased the 
authority, regardless of gender, ensures justice to all as none of them can be said to 
incur more loss than his/her co-heir as a result of the demise of their relative…It 
also shows some progressive thought might have been put in the drafting process 
by viewing the Code as a legal document that will be in accord with modern form 
of social intercourse.268  
In the Niger State Shariah Procedure Code 2014, the governor can exercise his prerogative of 
mercy or order execution if six months have elapsed post-conviction without the sentence of 
qiṣāṣ being carried out.269 Following this, if the governor fails to take action within three 
months, the sentence is remitted and the offender can apply to court for remission of the 
sentence.270 In terms of qiṣāṣ, retribution will not apply but the court can impose diya as it 
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deems necessary.271 In this instance, the state’s rights override the individual’s rights whereas 
the opposite should occur under classical fiqh doctrine on qiṣāṣ laws. 
6.12.2 Sudan 
Sudan is another country whose laws, at times, diverge from its main doctrinal school and this 
can be seen in qiṣāṣ laws where the killer and the victim belong to different faiths. In a case 
that reached the Sudanese Supreme Court, concerning the intentional killing of a Christian by 
a Muslim, the Court held that the religion of the victim was of no significance in qiṣāṣ cases. 
The Court referred to Article 130(2) of the Criminal Act 1991 whose wording is unequivocal 
and does not distinguish between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, treating them on a par. The 
Supreme Court also acknowledged the different juridical opinions amongst the four sunnī 
schools on this matter. In the case at hand, the Court adopted the minority opinion belonging 
to the Ḥanafī school in that the religion of the killer and/or victim plays no role in homicide 
cases. 
This demonstrates that Islamic law is not a uniform entity but encompasses a plethora of 
interpretations and courts have, at times, embraced an eclectic approach in favour of ensuring 
justice and equality. Unfortunately, the opposite has also held true, such as Pakistan’s 
blasphemy laws which wrongly categorise sabb as a ḥadd offence. 
6.12.3 Pakistan 
Under Section 295-C of the 1986 Pakistan Penal Code:  
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any 
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name 




of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, 
or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Pakistan is a country whose laws follow the Ḥanafī madhhab yet Ismail Royer identifies that 
during parliamentary debate in 1986, advocates of the blasphemy provision ‘based their 
argument on the supposed unanimity (ijma‘) among Islamic religious scholars that death for 
insulting the Prophet is a hadd (divinely fixed) punishment for everyone, regardless of 
religion’.272  
In 1990, a petition was brought before the Federal Shariat Court (FSC)273 arguing that the 
alternative punishment of life imprisonment was repugnant to the Qurʾān and sunna and should 
therefore be held void.274 Rather, blasphemy ‘comes within the purview of hadd and the 
punishment of death provided in the Holy Quran and Sunnah cannot be altered’.275 The FSC 
endorsed the petition declaring, ‘the penalty for the contempt of the Holy Prophet is death and 
nothing else. We have also noted that no one after the Holy Prophet exercised or was authorised 
the right of reprieve or pardon’.276 Although the imprisonment clause still remains, FSC 
judgements are legally binding and therefore the court declared that such a clause ‘shall cease 
to have effect’277 leaving death as the only punishment. It is important to note that the FSC 
largely relied upon non-Ḥanafī Islamic legal treatises to promote blasphemy as a mandatory 
capital offence.278 
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Discussing the implications of a conviction under Section 295-C, Osama Siddique and Zahra 
Hayat argue that:  
A grave consequence of the death penalty is the implicit sanction it grants extremist 
elements which invariably demand such penalty in blasphemy cases, to themselves 
inflict the penalty through vigilante justice if the court does not deliver according 
to their wishes. That acts of this nature have occurred make the barbarism of the 
extremists evident. While it is arguable that even in the absence of the death 
penalty, the bigoted attitude of the extremists would remain unaltered, it is 
undeniable that legal sanction for death to the accused is an added impetus to their 
taking the law into their own hands.279  
This can be seen in the case of Salman Taseer. In January 2011, Governor Taseer of Punjab 
was assassinated by his bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri for working on a blasphemy case. Taseer 
intended to appeal for clemency on behalf of Asia Bibi who was on death row for the alleged 
crime of blasphemy. He was met with widespread criticism from the nation’s religious 
establishments and was declared a blasphemer and apostate for his actions.280 Qadri argued that 
the murder was justified because the governor was an apostate.281 In February 2016, the state 
executed Qadri for Taseer’s murder and ‘[h]is supporters subsequently turned his grave into a 
shrine, where they have since held rallies and honored him in other ways’.282    
                                                          
279 Osama Siddique and Zahra Hayat, ‘Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan-Controversial 
Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications’ (2008) 17(2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 303, 
383. 
280 ‘Blasphemy Law Claims Another Life’ Dawn (Karachi, 5 January 2011) 
<www.dawn.com/news/596277/blasphemy-law-claims-another-life> accessed 3 April 2018; ‘Sunni Ittehad 
Council Warns of Anarchy if Aasia Pardoned’ Dawn (Karachi, 26 November 2010) 
<www.dawn.com/news/585859/sunni-ittehad-council-warns-of-anarchy-if-asia-pardoned> accessed 3 April 
2018.  
281 ‘Salman Taseer Murder: Mumtaz Qadri Sentenced to Death’ BBC (London, 1 October 2011) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15135502> accessed 3 April 2018. 
282 Royer, Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law and Non-Muslims’, 7. See also Asad Hashim, ‘In Pakistan, A Shrine to 




6.12.4 The Breadth of Taʿzīr  
In terms of taʿzīr, punishments vary from country to country. Bassiouni states that the ‘penalty 
choices for these crimes reflect cultural perspectives and social policy choices’.283 For example, 
in Bangladesh possession of more than 25 grams of heroin is a death penalty offence284 whilst 
in Iran, possession of drugs is a death penalty offence for recidivist offenders.285 In Sudan, 
crimes such as undermining the constitutional system,286 waging war against the state,287 
espionage,288 terrorism-related offences,289 and drug trafficking290 all incur the death penalty. 
The diversity of punishments in different Islamic countries reveals that there is not a theological 
consensus on the extent of punishments for taʿzīr offences. What is apparent, however, is that 
countries are expanding taʿzīr crimes punishable by death contrary to the restricted application 
that is found in classical jurisprudence.   
6.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the backdrop to qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr crimes in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Qiṣāṣ laws emerged as a way to tackle tribal feuding and vengeance in pre-Islamic Arabia. 
Although it provides for the death penalty in cases of intentional homicide, it also offers two 
alternative actions which are considered to be the morally superior options: compensation or 
                                                          
<www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/02/pakistan-shrine-murderblasphemy-170206103344830.html> 
accessed 3 April 2018. 
283 Bassiouni, ‘Death as a Penalty in the Shari’a’, 184. Ibn Farḥūn (Tabṣira al-Hukkām, 2:219) notes that ‘taʿzīr 
differs between regions and localities; because what is considered as a discretionary punishment in one region 
may be an honourable action in another. For example, not donning the robe in the Levant is considered noble. 
Another example, uncovering the head is not considered an unworthy action according to the Spaniards, whilst it 
is considered an offense to remove headwear in Iraq and Egypt.’  
284 Bangladesh Intoxicant Control Act of 1990, arts 9 and 19. 
285 Iran Anti-Narcotics Law of 1997, arts 5 and 9. 
286 Sudan Criminal Act of 1991, art 50. 
287 Sudan Criminal Act of 1991, art 51. 
288 Sudan Criminal Act of 1991, art 53. 
289 See eg, Terrorism Combating Act of 2000, arts 5 and 8. 
290 Sudan Narcotics Drug and Psychotropic Substance Act of 1994, arts 15, 16 and 17. 
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forgiveness. There needs to be a greater emphasis on the latter two options as way of embracing 
and preserving the right to life.  
The fact that there is no consensus on the type of taʿzīr offence necessitating a death sentence, 
coupled with the discretionary nature of the offence and the objectives behind it, bolsters the 









































7. Concluding Observations 
7.1 Introduction 
A number of Islamic nations retain the death penalty; however, its application is seen to vary. 
Some employ the use of capital punishment at alarmingly high levels (such as Iran)1 whilst 
others apply it in the rarest of cases (such as Maldives).2 Although religious justifications are 
often invoked by such states, the diversity of practice implies that there is a lack of consensus 
amongst Muslims as to the nature and scope of the death penalty and this is reflected in Islamic 
law.   
This study has considered the effectiveness of the Universal Periodic Review as a platform for 
scrutinising the death penalty, and case studies have been offered on the extent to which the 
punishment has been scrutinised appropriately in the UPR through an analysis of Saudi 
Arabia’s and Sudan’s reviews. Moreover, it has sought to identify the extent to which the death 
penalty is a religious necessity in Islam by providing an intricate exposition and interpretation 
of Islamic law. This thesis has demonstrated, through an application of international human 
rights law and a theological interpretation of the sharīʿa, that Islamic states make erroneous 
claims of sovereignty and domestic criminal justice to justify the use of the punishment. 
7.2 Summary of Research 
Part One of this study presented the role of Islamic states in the UPR and their attitude towards 
the continued application of the death penalty. Chapter 2 provided the UPR framework for 
which the Islamic context would be reviewed and a history of Islamic state engagement with 
the death penalty. What emerged in Chapter 2 was a common theme of state sovereignty and 
internal criminal justice acting as a bulwark against a constructive discussion on the status of 
                                                          
1 Amnesty International, Global Report: Death Sentences and Executions 2017 (2018) 6. 
2 ibid 7. 
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capital punishment, in the context of human rights. This attitude has endured from the debates 
on the drafting of the ICCPR-OP-2 in the 1980s through to the present UPR cycles. For 
example, during the drafting of the ICCPR-OP-2, Oman observed that abolition is ‘inconsistent 
with the legal system of Islamic countries’3 and Iran declared that it is the ‘sovereign right of 
every state to choose the most appropriate penal system, taking into account its society’s 
cultural, religious and historical characteristics’.4 
This mindset is reflected in the UPR. Islamic retentionist states consistently receive death 
penalty recommendations, either to restrict its application in line with international standards, 
establish a moratorium, or to abolish the death penalty. However, these recommendations fail 
to enjoy support from such states. Furthermore, these states rarely issue any death penalty 
recommendations themselves, but this has known to occur in the UPR. Most notable is Egypt’s 
recommendation to Afghanistan, Viet Nam, the Central African Republic, and Chad to, 
‘continue using its sovereign right to apply the death penalty as a tool of criminal justice in 
accordance with the proper safeguards specified under international human rights law’.5  Going 
one step further, it recommended an abolitionist state, the Netherlands, to ‘initiate a debate on 
the death penalty, with a view to reaching responsive conclusions consistent with international 
human rights law’.6 Not only does this demonstrate attempts at problematising the death 
penalty but also has significant implications for safeguarding the right to life, especially if a 
state decides to implement such recommendations. 
                                                          
3 UN Doc A/C.3/37/SR.67, para 45. 
4 UN Doc A/C.3/49/SR.43, para 62. 
5 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Afghanistan’ (20 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/HRC/12/9, recommendation 95.46; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Viet Nam (2 April 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/6, recommendation 143.114. The recommendation to the 
Central African Republic and Chad is worded slightly differently: ‘Continue exercising its sovereign right of 
implementing its penal code in conformity with universally agreed human rights standards, including the 
application of the death penalty.’  
6 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: The Netherlands’ (13 May 2008) 




Statements concerning cultural relativism are often used in the UPR to act as a shield for non-
compliance, for example, Maldives maintained that, ‘any efforts to introduce values and 
practices that [are] contrary to the values of Islam…[will] not be entertained’.7 Islamic states 
are therefore using obscurantist attitudes towards religion as a way to avoid scrutiny of their 
international law obligations such as safeguarding the right to life under Article 3 UDHR and 
Article 6 ICCPR. An enlightened interpretation of Islam reveals cogent symmetries of the right 
to life in Islam and the right to life in international law.  
Chapter 3’s case study on Saudi Arabia analysed how the state failed to address the question 
of the right to life in its first UPR, in 2009, but this issue was picked up by recommending 
states, the OHCHR, and relevant stakeholders. This was not surprising given its pro death 
penalty position. It has consistently signed the note verbale of disassociation, for the General 
Assembly Resolution on the moratorium on the use of the death penalty, arguing that capital 
punishment is primarily a matter of criminal justice and also an important deterrent.8 
Whilst Saudi Arabia provided a generally self-affirming national report in its UPR, submissions 
from the OHCHR aimed to provide a more balanced picture and scrutinised the Kingdom’s 
position on capital punishment. The OHCHR report noted that the state was executing juveniles 
in contravention of the CRC and imposing the death penalty for crimes not considered the most 
serious. This was echoed by civil society and NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch. Hence, where the sovereign has chosen to remain silent and subjugate the right 
to life, other actors in the UPR have contributed to its advancement.  
Other Member States also made recommendations on Saudi Arabia’s use of the death penalty; 
however, a large number of these states issued vague recommendations such as, ‘establish a 
                                                          
7 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Maldives’ (13 July 2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/8, para 11. 




moratorium on death penalty as a first step towards its total abolition’9 and failed to cite the 
source of their recommendations (e.g. Article 3 UDHR or Article 37(a) CRC) which suggested 
a lack of time and investment in the UPR process. States need to go beyond mere lip-service 
to the UPR and provide concrete S.M.A.R.T recommendations to the state under review in 
order to facilitate legislative change for the preservation of life. If a recommendation is too 
vague it can result in insufficient actions by the state under review or actions which are contrary 
to the goal in mind. 
In response to recommendations received on the death penalty, Saudi Arabia stated that it, ‘has 
a clear position on capital punishment, which is considered a deterrent in Islamic Sharia. It’s 
not simple to impose it’.10 Its excessive and regular use of the punishment, as demonstrated by 
stakeholders, revealed the inaccuracy of such a statement. Amnesty International identified that 
Saudi Arabia imposed the death penalty for non-violent offences and noted its extensive use in 
defiance of international standards. The NGO’s global report on death sentences and executions 
revealed that at least 102 individuals were executed in 2008, the year before its first UPR.11 
This polarisation of submissions is a common pattern that transpired from the UPR mechanism.  
In its second review, Saudi Arabia dedicated a section in its national report to its criminal legal 
system and addressed the question of capital punishment. The state under review argued that 
the death penalty in Islam has ‘no leeway for interpretation’12 and failed to acknowledge other 
legitimate views; an uncompromising attitude which this research has directly challenged. 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of its criminal procedures into its report can be seen as an 
achievement of the UPR whereby, due to the negative attention received in the first cycle, the 
                                                          
9 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Saudi Arabia’ (4 March 2009) UN 
Doc A/HRC/11/23, para 65. 
10 ibid para 82. 
11 Amnesty International, Global Report: Death Sentences and Executions 2008 (2009) 15. 
12 UNHRC, ‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council 
Resolution 16/1: Saudi Arabia’ (5 August 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/17/SAU/1, para 36. 
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state under review felt it necessary to provide a justification for its death penalty laws even if 
the explanation was somewhat lacking.  
Chapter 4 focused on the second case study of Sudan. Although its capital punishment laws are 
based on an interpretation of Islamic law which is one of the sources of legislation under Article 
5(1) of the Interim National Constitution, Sudan failed to cite this as a justification. In fact, it 
did not address the right to life in either of its national reports, cycle one or two, which is 
consistent with the propositions of state sovereignty and domestic criminal justice. Its 
justification for the use of the death penalty only surfaced when confronted with state 
recommendations to abolish the punishment. Recommendations received on the death penalty, 
similar to Saudi Arabia’s review, were also generic and lacked specificity. 
Sudan argued that its application is consistent with the ICCPR and reserved for the most serious 
crimes. Providing the death penalty for crimes such as apostasy, adultery, drug trafficking, and 
rebellion against the state do not meet the restricted definition provided by the Human Rights 
Committee which confines the punishment to intentional killing. Sudan’s misinterpretation of 
the relevant international law is further compounded by the existence of Article 6(6) of the 
ICCPR which states that, ‘[n]othing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the 
abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant’. Hence, invoking 
criminal justice policies to prevent abolition is inadequate.  
Part One revealed that Islamic states are disconnected from: (1) the evolving human rights 
jurisprudence on the right to life, for example, failing to acknowledge the position of the 
Human Rights Committee and the Secretary-General reports on the death penalty; and, (2) 
alternative approaches in Islamic law that diminish the status of the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, the UPR can still be considered an effective mechanism for the delivery of human 
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rights protection as it allows such attitudes to be brought to the fore and respectfully challenged 
during the interactive dialogue and stakeholder submissions.   
Since Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia tend to rely on a form of religious argument to 
preserve the right to apply the death penalty, the impetus for change must come from within; 
in other words, from the Islamic legal tradition. One way to improve Islamic state engagement 
with the death penalty, and strengthen submissions in the UPR, is to raise awareness of the 
theological underpinnings of the death penalty in Islam and the enlightened reading of the fiqh 
to promote the right to life.  
This is what Part Two of this study has aimed to demonstrate.  Hence, when Islamic states 
identify sovereignty and criminal justice and/or deterrence to maintain the death penalty, based 
on religious norms, the pushback from other recommending states and stakeholders must now 
be more complex based on this research. 
Chapter 5 analysed the status of those ḥudūd crimes in Islamic law which warrant the death 
penalty through a comparative lens of the four sunnī doctrinal schools (madhāhib). What 
emerged was a reluctance by classical jurists to actually impose the punishment and the extent 
to which they were willing to create procedural and technical hurdles to overcome scriptural 
text in order to preserve the sanctity of life. This is reflected in the crime of zinā which places 
exorbitantly high evidentiary requirements thereby making a conviction, for all practical 
procedural purposes, not achievable. The doctrine of shubha provides numerous defences 
against a conviction of zinā such as the defence of mistaken identity. Furthermore, its penalty 
of rajm (death by stoning) has been contested on questionable jurisprudential grounds and 
therefore any definitive conclusion on the punishment is improbable. 
Similarly, the offence of liwāṭ (sodomy) is open to different interpretations; Abū Ḥanīfa does 
not consider it a death penalty offence arguing that the basis for such a punishment rests on 
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weak scriptural evidence. If ḥudūd are to be narrowly construed and suspended when faced 
with even the slightest of doubt, then adopting a pro death penalty stance for liwāṭ surely goes 
against this. 
A critique of the ḥadd offence of ridda (apostasy) revealed a more nuanced understanding of 
the crime in that apostasy simpliciter is not viewed as a capital offence but only when 
accompanied with military hostility and warfare against the Muslim polity. This understanding 
seems to have been lost with individuals being sentenced to death today for merely changing 
their faith such as the 2014 case of Meriam Ibrahim in Sudan. Although apostasy simpliciter is 
considered a sin in Islam it does not warrant a secular punishment.   
Whilst the crime of ḥirāba stipulates an earthly punishment in the Qurʾān, one of which is the 
death penalty, it is not mandatory but depends on the severity of the crime and a number of 
mitigating factors hinder its application. For example, the participation of minors or the insane, 
the location of the crime, and most importantly repentance of the offender. 
Repentance in Islam is of great significance with the Qurʾān and ḥadīth corpus replete with 
references to it. Where the Qurʾān mentions worldly punishment of offences, it is followed by 
a provision on repentance and reformation thereby emphasising the merciful nature of the 
religion. Current religious and legal discourse needs to adequately reflect the importance of 
repentance to protect life rather than using the criminal justice system to take it away. 
El Fadl has cogently observed that:  
The real paradox of the hudud is that while in contemporary Islam they are often 
imagined to be the harbinger and flagship of Islamic law, in the classical tradition 
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the hudud penalties were rarely applied precisely because of the space occupied by 
the divine in defining and redressing the crime.13  
Under each of the ḥudūd crimes, we find differing criteria amongst the madhāhib as to what 
will warrant a sentence of death or whether such crimes fall under the remit of ḥudūd. For 
example, according to the Ḥanafīs, confession of zinā must be made four times, a woman 
apostate is not killed, and liwāṭ is not a ḥadd offence; all of which are contrary to the other 
schools. One then wonders how the death penalty can be applied with such confidence 
especially when claiming to act in the name of God?  
Furthermore, deterrence is an oft-repeated justification for capital punishment in Islam. 
However, it is not based on a theological principle, rather it is an empirical question and one 
that has no definitive conclusion to support such claims. Islamic states should, therefore, refrain 
from using the deterrence argument to inform their position on the death penalty. 
It is submitted that Islamic retentionist states should adopt an eclectic approach that draws upon 
the legal opinions of the different madhāhib which favour the preservation of life. For example, 
the opinion that sodomy and apostasy simpliciter are not capital crimes, pregnancy out of 
wedlock does not constitute zinā, or that repentance nullifies all ḥudūd. There is evidence of 
Islamic states diverging from their main doctrinal school to apply legal principles of other 
madhāhib, such as Pakistan and Nigeria, and this study, in a similar vein, advocates for an 
eclectic approach that promotes and preserves the right to life rather than curtail it. 
This approach is also advocated in Chapter 6 which dealt with qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr crimes. Qiṣāṣ 
laws developed from tribal Arabia where blood feuds and vengeance were widespread, with 
whole tribes being slain in revenge for the murder of a single individual. Although qiṣāṣ gave 
                                                          




the victim or the victim’s heir(s) the option of retribution (death of the killer), it also provided 
two alternatives to the retaliatory principle: diya (blood money) and ʿafw (pardon). A greater 
emphasis on the latter two principles is required to help define the question of clemency in 
Islamic states. 
Taʿzīr crimes are of a discretionary nature and vary from country to country. Punishment of 
these offences are aimed at disciplining and reforming the offender. Hence execution defeats 
the objectives of taʿzīr and furthermore, there is no scholarly consensus as to which taʿzīr crime 
requires the death penalty. A very restricted reading of taʿzīr bi-l-qatl (death penalty by taʿzīr) 
is found in the fiqh literature, but this is also open to intra-madhhab polemics. There should be 
no bar to abolition in this category of crimes. 
The interpretative plurality of the Islamic legal traditions is also reason why broad 
generalizations about Islam should be avoided. Ibrahim Warde, for example, notes that:  
Any religion that has survived for fourteen centuries, and that has some 1.2 billion 
followers spread in every part of the globe must have some measure of flexibility 
and diversity. Any such religion should be resistant to broad-brush generalizations. 
Statements to the effect that ‘Islam says... ’ or ‘Muslims believe ... ’ must include 
significant qualifiers and caveats.14  
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This research is limited to two Islamic countries of the sunnī denomination. A future research 
project may benefit from considering other Islamic states including those which constitute a 
shīʿa majority such as Iran and Iraq. There also remains considerable scope to extend the 
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current research to extend to a wider analysis of Article 7 of the ICCPR to encompass all the 
issues that the UPR does not currently consider. 
7.4 Conclusion 
This study has demonstrated that at the UPR level the continued justification of the death 
penalty by Islamic states appears increasingly untenable, as a reasonable interpretation of 
Islamic law, and this is aggravated by the possibility of judicial errors and unfair trials in capital 
cases. The notion of Islamic law as an immutable and static ideal inclines to produce, ‘legal 
doctrines that are far more rigid, explicitly harsh, and resistant to change than Islam’s historical 
tradition would have it – especially in criminal law’.15 It is pertinent to note that this study has 
not challenged the authority of the sharīʿa nor is it about challenging the unique natures of 
Islam; there are certain features of Islam which should remain distinct and Muslims should be 
able to take pride in. Rather, this study is about providing an alternative interpretation on the 
question of the death penalty which is found under the fiqh genre. Fiqh is a man-made 
endeavour which is configured to varying degrees on, ‘epistemological hurdles and the 
elaboration of alternative viewpoints’.16  
It is these alternative viewpoints on the status of the death penalty in Islam that must be given 
a platform in the international community, i.e. at the UPR, in order to effect real change. For 
example, apostasy, blasphemy, and homosexuality, whilst prohibited in the sharīʿa, are not 
capital crimes deserving of death. Peer reviewing states and stakeholders can use the arguments 
made in this study to specifically challenge the assertion that capital punishment is mandated 
                                                          
15 Intisar A Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law 
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by Islam and utilise the UPR as a forum for such discussion, for example during the interactive 
dialogue and in the stakeholder submissions. 
Islam does not teach that the state must execute those guilty of serious crimes and neither does 
it insist on applying the death penalty (emphasis added). Whilst Muslims cannot deny the 
legitimacy of the death penalty in Islam, in principle, an enlightened reading of the faith 
demonstrates that it can contribute to the global promotion of flourishing lives and the 
protection of the right to life by the non-application of the punishment.  The death penalty 
precludes the benefit of amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence. An execution is 
irreversible and an erroneous guilty verdict, whilst possible to be corrected on the record, 
cannot bring the person executed back to life.17 The finality of the death penalty is recognised 
in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad’s injunction, which was adapted into a legal maxim, that 
any doubt must suspend the application of the ḥudūd. Furthermore, he advocated that, ‘it is 
better for the authority to err in mercy than to err in punishment’.18   
Islam is a universal religion addressed to all of humanity and not a specific socio-cultural group 
hence Islamic states must evaluate their actions in light of how they are viewed by their people 
and the rest of the world. This is of great significance as:  
A universal religion and a merciful faith must be accessible and accountable to 
others so that it can remain pertinent to humanity at large. A universal religion that 
is neither accessible nor accountable to humanity at large becomes like a private 
and closed club with bylaws and practices that make sense only to its members. 
Even worse, a merciful faith whose mercifulness is not comprehensible to others 
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Gambia: Baobab Printers) 39. 




or whose logic of mercy is not understood by others becomes self-serving and 
ultimately arrogant.19 
This study has revealed that the above generic observations of a self-serving and closed faith 
are demonstrated in the question of the death penalty. Using repentance, forgiveness, and doubt 
as barriers to the enforcement of capital punishment will restrain the power of the state to act 
as God’s executor. Acknowledging that Islam is founded upon certain universal values such as 
dignity, mercy, and justice will reduce state reliance on using religion to evade scrutiny on their 
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